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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Public policy systems around the world are changing at an ever-
increasing pace. Taxes and benefits are being introduced, adjusted,
and discarded in order to stimulate the economy, correct for market
imperfections, or promote redistributive goals of the government.
Many of these policies are directly targeted at couples and larger
families, constituting what is often called family tax policy. This part
of the tax system focuses on the issues which are specific to multi-
person households. The family tax policy debates are traditionally
under careful public scrutiny, because their topics touch people’s daily
lives. The issues discussed are diverse, including but not restricted
to: Should we tax the incomes of both spouses separately, or should
we add them up and apply a single tax rate? Should we promote
institutionalized child care, or should mothers be the ones looking
after their children? Should we promote fertility of the population
while sustaining active female workforce, or is it preferable to have
mothers staying outside of the labor markets?
Albeit being highly selective, this list illustrates that one of the
main discussion points of current debates is female labor supply.
Many countries are actively trying to promote female labor supply,
introducing new policies and reforming the old ones in order to
increase female labor participation and narrow down the gender wage
gap. But when looking at such interventions, we should ask: How
effective are these policies in reaching the desired goals? Could we do
better if we spent more money on the reforms? Or should we rather
consider alternative policy proposals? These are the questions which
can be answered through the prism of structural modeling, which is
the unifying theme of the chapters of this thesis.
The analysis of household decision making is a complex domain of
economic modeling which deviates in many ways from the standard
textbook approaches of labor economics and public economics. The
economic model which is traditionally used in these fields is the one
of a single decision-maker, who divides her time between leisure and
labor. Leisure is desirable since it increases individual utility, but it
is not a productive use of time (at least in the context of this model).
Labor requires effort, which lowers individual utility, but this loss
is compensated by income. Income increases utility since it can be
exchanged for goods, and it generally renders some form of labor
desirable. For that reason, the decision maker divides her time between
labor and leisure time in a way that would maximize her well-being.
Needless to say, this workhorse model has proven extremely useful
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for the development of labor economic theory, yielding many insights
about individual economic behavior. However, due to its inherent
simplicity, it fails to account for important aspects of the household
decision making which are crucial for our analysis.
In partnered households, we have two persons whose choices are
mutually dependent, and whose utilities are fundamentally inter-
twined. Keeping the primitives of the problem similar to that of the
workhorse model, this means that the partnered households are facing
two interdependent labor/leisure trade offs. Both spouses have to
decide how much they want to work, which complicates the analy-
sis due to all the possible labor & leisure combinations that can be
chosen. The joint nature of the problem is however beneficial for the
household, because spouses can now substitute each others’ labor sup-
ply (assuming they pool their earned incomes). That way, the couple
can exploit comparative earnings advantage of the more productive
spouse, increasing the joint well-being of the household.
The analysis becomes more involved if we allow for alternative time-
use choices such as non-market work (which is regarded as leisure in
the workhorse model). The rationale for separating non-market work
from leisure follows from the premise that the spouse who substitutes
away from working in the market is not going to spend her time
entirely on leisure activities. Rather than that, she will specialize in
non-market work which, unlike leisure, is a productive use of time
generating household good (a blanket term for all the goods and services
provided for the family outside of the formal labor markets). This
distinction is of considerable importance to the analysis of female
labor supply. Once a spouse decides to start working in the market,
she has to forgo not only her leisure time, but also her time spent on
non-market work. With less time in the household, her own provision
of household good is going to fall. But since the household good tends
to be highly desirable, the family will try to obtain it from alternative
sources - either by delegating other household members or by buying
it on the market. And as long as there are exercisable alternatives for
household good provision, the woman will enjoy sufficient flexibility
in her work choices. However, in the households which do not enjoy
enough leisure time and who cannot afford to pay for market provi-
sion, the work choices of women are going to be rather limited. This
can effectively prevent women from engaging in market work (which
we would not be able to capture without making the distinction be-
tween leisure and non-market work). Accordingly, the inclusion of
non-market work in the model can have considerable impacts on the
resulting analysis, being particularly important for evaluating policies
targeted at low-skilled female labor supply. This dependence is docu-
mented in Chapter 2, which allows for a model where spouses choose
both market work and non-market work allocations.
4 introduction
The non-market work becomes ever so important with the arrival
of children, as spouses have to dedicate substantial part of their time
to child care. The amount of time required by children is usually
decreasing as the children grow older, but especially in the pre-school
period it is likely to impose considerable constraints on parental time.
The need for pre-school child care provision often keeps women from
engaging in market work, unless they decide to substitute their own
care by the service of others. This, in turn, depends on several factors,
including availability of informal care providers (such as grandparents
or other relatives), availability of formal care providers (child care
centers and kindergartens), maternal preferences for own child care
provision, and other household characteristics such as the financial
situation of the family. All these factors contribute to the mother’s
decision whether to engage in the market work or not, and it can
be expected that the observed households will exhibit substantial
heterogeneity across all of the mentioned domains. Therefore, in order
to capture women’s attitudes towards market work, we have to pay
careful attention to modeling their child care preferences, access to
different modes of care, and its dependence on various household
characteristics. Accordingly, in Chapters 3 and 4 we employ models
of household decision making which allow for joint choice of labor
supply and child care.
Having acknowledged that the decisions of spouses are critically
dependent on having children, the next step in the analysis of house-
hold labor supply is to focus on the actual arrival of children, that is,
modeling fertility. This extension is pursued in Chapter 5. Accounting
for fertility becomes particularly important when evaluating policies
which are likely to impact not only the female labor supply, but also
childbearing (e.g., maternity leave or childcare subsidies). Following
the observation that some couples have children at a very young age,
whereas others postpone childbearing to much later stages of life, we
can attempt to capture their chosen life paths by modeling fertility
as a choice. The choice to bear children can be related to preferences,
earnings potential, current (or expected) financial situation, and other
household characteristics. That way, we can identify the fertility effects
for various subsamples of the population and evaluate the proposed
policies in a much more comprehensive framework.
All these extensions are trying to account for endogeneity present
in the original workhorse model. We show that the “leisure” category
is too broad to be treated as a homogeneous good which drives the de-
cisions of the whole population in a uniform way. Firstly, the introduc-
tion of non-market work and the implied necessity of household good
provision differentiates between the work options of well-endowed
households and those living on a budget, pointing out that we cannot
expect the same degree of work flexibility within both groups. Sec-
ondly, accounting for heterogeneity in the preferences for child care
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will refine the role of non-market work for labor supply decisions of
parents with young children. The last extension illustrates that there
are further decisions taken by the households which are likely to be
influenced by fiscal policy. Allowing families to have more (or fewer)
children in response to changing incentives brings the model closer
to reality. The corresponding reform predictions are therefore able to
capture not only the effects for families whose composition remains
stable, but also for the families who decide to have a child (or more
children) as a result of the proposed policy change.
This dissertation contains four core chapters which follow through
with the extensions discussed above. The ordering of the chapters
reflects the chronological order in which the corresponding papers
were appearing. I also like to think that it reflects the five-year-long
organic development of our ideas and research agendas, starting from
relatively simple models and moving to more involved, comprehensive
analyses of household decision making. This shift is reflected both in
terms of the complexity of our models and the econometric methods
used to estimate them.
From the policy perspective, the thesis can be divided into two
thematic parts. The first part consists of two chapters which are fo-
cused on the effects of joint versus individual income taxation of
couples in France and Australia, respectively. The policy analyses in
both papers are targeted at quantifying the labor supply responses
and revenue effects induced by a shift from joint income taxation to
individual income taxation. The last two chapters analyze the fiscal
stimuli for working parents, focusing on child care subsidy and tax
credit reforms in the Netherlands. The policy goal of both chapters
is to determine which of the policies - the child care subsidy or the
tax credit - was more effective in stimulating the female labor supply.
This is assessed firstly in a static, and subsequently also in a dynamic
modeling framework.
Part I: Moving from joint to individual income taxation
Income taxation constitutes one of the most robust pillars of public
policy systems around the world. Workers pay income tax by remit-
ting part of their earnings to the tax authority, and the size of this
remittance depends on the applicable income tax rate. The income tax
rates are generally increasing with income, which means that the poor
are taxed less than the rich, both in absolute and in relative terms.
This favorable treatment of low-income households constitutes what
is known as progressive income taxation.
One of the key questions in family tax policy is how should income
tax legislation treat couples. Generally, we distinguish two specific tax
regimes: the spouses can be either regarded as one entity with a single
tax rate applicable to their combined incomes, or they can be taxed
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separately with individual tax rates based on their respective incomes.
These two systems are known as joint income taxation, and individual
income taxation. Nowadays, the majority of OECD countries has
adopted individual income tax systems, but a handful of countries
(e.g., Australia, France or Germany) are keeping the joint systems in
place.
The joint income taxation has been repeatedly criticized by Apps
and Rees (1988, 1999, 2011) for its adverse effects on female labor
supply. With the joint income tax in place, women in partnered house-
holds become less likely to join the labor force, since as the second
earners they are facing high income tax rates irrespective of their
work efforts. The disincentives for labor participation become partic-
ularly apparent if we compare market work (yielding highly-taxed
earned income) with non-market work in the household (yielding
household good which is not burdened by any tax). Many women
will therefore substitute their market work by the non-market work,
taking advantage of the favorable tax treatment of household good
production.
In the two chapters which fall into this part of the thesis, we explore
the dependence of household decision making on the income taxation
regime in place. More specifically, we show what would happen if
France and Australia, two of the countries that are currently using
joint income tax system, switched to individual income taxation.
Chapter 2 analyzes the joint work and housework decisions of
married and cohabiting couples in France. It takes advantage of the
French Time Use Survey, a household-level dataset which contains
detailed information on the ways how French couples allocate their
time between work, housework and leisure. In order to capture work
and housework preferences of the surveyed households, we develop a
structural model of household decision making, following the seminal
work of Van Soest (1995). The model used is a static discrete choice
model which accounts for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in
households’ preferences. The unobserved heterogeneity is introduced
by allowing individual preference parameters to be drawn from a
specified distribution, rendering the utility function semi-parametric.
We estimate own wage elasticities of labor supply for both spouses,
finding that women are much more elastic in their labor supply than
their male partners. This result holds also if we look at cross-wage
elasticities, letting the spouses react to changes in wages of their
significant other. The core of the paper is dedicated to the analysis
of shift from joint to individual income taxation. We show that the
joint taxation indeed discourages female labor supply, with women’s
working hours being 3.7% higher under the individual taxation regime.
The switch to individual income taxation is also associated with a fall
of women’s housework hours by 2.0% on average. Men’s responses
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are found to be less pronounced, which is in line with their lower
labor supply elasticities. On average, men are predicted to reduce
their market work hours by 0.8% and increase their housework hours
by 1.3%. The increase in men’s housework hours is however not big
enough to cover the entire drop of women’s hours. This means that
there is less household good produced by the spouses themselves,
suggesting that the production is likely to be outsourced to the market
providers.
Chapter 3 builds on the groundwork set out in Chapter 2, shifting
the focus to a more specific population of interest - mothers with pre-
school-aged children in Australia. As outlined above, mothers with
young children are likely to be more restricted in their work choices.
The role of non-market work will be emphasized in their decision
making, since children require a substantial amount of attention and
care, leaving aside all the other forms of necessary housework. This
is confirmed by cross-country evidence presented in Apps and Rees
(2009), showing that female labor participation falls drastically in
the years after first childbirth. The resulting gender gap in labor
participation narrows as children grow older, but it never completely
disappears.
The decline of women’s work hours is however far from uniform.
Mothers with young children are likely to exhibit very different atti-
tudes towards market work depending on the availability of informal
& formal child care providers, and other factors mentioned in the prior
discussion. For the sake of sound policy analysis, this means that we
have to pay particular attention to child care when modeling maternal
labor supply. In this chapter, we benefit from a very rich household
survey of Australian population (HILDA), which contains meticulous
information on different modes of child care that may be used by
the surveyed families. The information on formal and informal child
care utilization is directly incorporated into our model. The model
is again a structural discrete choice model, but this time it considers
a different set of choice variables: mother’s labor supply, mother’s
non-market work engagement, and formal child care use. Here, the
major difference compared to Chapter 2 is that the father’s behavior
is treated as given. The only way how the father can influence out-
comes of the model is through his income (which is supplied to the
household). This assumption reflects stricter gender roles in Australian
households, where men are more often the sole breadwinners whose
choices are unlikely to respond to the decisions of their partners (see
Doiron and Kalb 2005). It also allows us to limit the computational
complexity of the baseline model, which allows us to pursue more
flexible treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Following Train (2009),
we adopt a latent class model, which uses different distributional
assumptions on the individual preference parameters and which is
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generally considered to be more flexible than the random coefficient
method used in Chapter 2.
We estimate own wage elasticities of labor supply for mothers with
pre-school children, showing that they are slightly lower than the ones
obtained from the sample of French women. Australian mothers are
found to reduce their market work if they are subject to an increase
of child care prices, substituting the expensive service by their own
child care provision. We also show that unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences is playing crucial role in household decision making and
failure to account for it results in biased preference parameters and
misleading policy implications. Similarly to the previous chapter, we
investigate the effects of installing purely individual income taxation
in Australian fiscal system, changing all the taxes and levies which are
dependent on joint income of the household. Our findings confirm the
conclusions of Chapter 2 - women are more likely to engage in market
work in the system which is based on individual, rather than joint
income taxation. Predicted increase in mothers’ market work hours is
3.41% on average, which is accompanied by 2.74% increase of average
formal child care hours.
Part II: Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli for working parents
It should be noted that the choice of population of interest in the
previous chapter is by no means accidental. The focus on mothers with
young children follows from the recent academic and policy debates
which emphasize active engagement of mothers in the labor force. The
labor participation of mothers with young children has been identified
to be highly influential for women’s later-life work choices (see Bernal
2008, Bernal and Keane 2011), implying that women are likely to follow
through with the work habits formed in the child-rearing phase. This
finding is important, since it makes way for targeted policies which
have the potential to be highly effective in stimulating female labor
supply whilst bearing relatively low budgetary costs.
In other words, we should incentivize the labor supply of mothers
with young children, because they constitute a relatively small group
within the population and they are likely to stick to their working
arrangements for many years to come. Naturally, this incentivization
can take on many forms. Governments can support working mothers
financially, provide them with occupational training, or facilitate their
access to the labor markets. In the following chapters we focus on
the policies using financial incentives which are also known as fiscal
stimuli.
The fiscal stimuli act by means of providing mothers with con-
ditional financial transfers to make their market work engagement
more attractive. Often, these transfers take on the form of child care
subsidies, following the rationale that some mothers would opted for
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market work had they have sufficient means for buying-in formal
child care. Alternatively, governments can employ in-work tax credits
which provide additional income to all parents who start working in
the market.
Needless to say, there are pros and cons to both child care subsidies
and tax credits. Child care subsidies are likely to stimulate both female
labor supply and the child care service sector, making formal child care
services easier to access. On the other hand, the subsidies are criticized
for crowding out the informal child care sector: with the subsidies
in place, a family with two employed spouses may opt for formal
child care, substituting the informal service provided by grandparents
or other relatives. However, since both spouses are already working,
they are unlikely to increase their market work hours further. This
substitution of modes of child care therefore creates an allocative
inefficiency which is hard to circumvent without intrusive oversight
and excessive targeting of child care subsidies.
In-work tax credits are generally considered effective in stimulating
female labor supply, but their outcomes may also go awry. For exam-
ple, the American version of the credit, the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), has been found to have strong negative effects on labor supply
of mothers in partnered households (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin,
2003). This outcome has been attributed to the eligibility criteria for
EITC, which require only one of the spouses to be actively working. As
a result, women in the position of secondary earners face lower incen-
tives to work, since the tax credit is awarded to the family irrespective
of their own labor engagement.
All things considered, it is still hard to determine which of the
policies would prove more efficient in stimulating the maternal labor
supply. This tasks calls for a structural model which would help to
uncover the relative effectiveness of child care subsidies and in-work
tax credits (and their various types). We investigate this issue in two
alternative modeling frameworks, starting with a static model and then
moving into a dynamic setting. Each analysis constitutes a separate
chapter of this part of the thesis.
Chapter 4 presents a static model of household decision making
which borrows parts of the modeling setup from the Chapters 2
& 3. We analyze the population of married and cohabiting adults
in the Netherlands who have children younger than 12 years of age.
The dataset comes from national administrative statistics (Statistics
Netherlands), and it provides us with detailed and high-quality data
on work & child care choices for a sizable fraction of the Dutch
population.
The fact that our analysis is set in the Dutch context has several mod-
eling implications. On one hand, we can take advantage of large-scale
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policy changes which happened in the country in the observed period:
Throughout the years 2004–2009, the Netherlands implemented sev-
eral reforms of child care subsidies and in-work tax credits for families
with young children, rendering maternal market work much more
attractive. These changes of credits and subsidies represented a sizable
(and arguably exogenous) variation in the incentives underlying the
household decision making. And since we know how the programs
actually changed, we can incorporate them explicitly into the model.
By doing so, we allow the structural parameters to be partially iden-
tified by the exogenous variation in the incentives, and thus we are
likely to improve on the inference of our model.
The Dutch context however brings also some complications. In the
Netherlands, the archetype of a sole male breadwinner is much less
prominent than in the Australian households, and therefore it seems
more appropriate to allow the work choices of both spouses to be
jointly determined. Accordingly, the modeled decisions include: labor
supply decision of men, labor supply decision of women, and the
decision to use formal child care. In contrast to the previous chapters,
the non-market work is not treated as a separate choice. It enters
the model combined with pure leisure time in a composite “leisure”
indicator. This treatment does not allow us to analyze the effects of
the reforms on intra-household allocation of housework, but it is
necessary since the administrative statistics lack the information on
spouses’ non-market work choices. The preference heterogeneity is
treated in the same way as in Chapter 3, using the latent class model
to explore the importance of unobserved factors in the utility function.
We estimate own wage elasticities of labor supply for both spouses,
confirming the French result that women are more elastic in their work
choices than men are. The elasticities for women are on par with those
extracted from the Australian data. The elasticities for men are lower
than those attributed to French men, however both these results should
be taken with a grain of salt, since the French elasticities correspond to
more heterogeneous population sample. The policy analysis focuses
on assessing the relative efficiency of several parameterizations of
child care subsidy and in-work tax credit reforms, including the ones
that were actually implemented in the Netherlands. We find that
in-work tax credits that are targeted at second earners are the most
cost-effective instruments for raising the female labor supply. The
difference between the two implemented policies is however found
to be rather small. An interesting outcome of the analysis is that the
effectiveness of both policies could be further improved if they were
set to increase with second earner’s income.
Chapter 5 is in many ways similar to Chapter 4. We ask the same
policy questions, we explore the same data source, and both the
analyzed households and the periods of observation are to a large
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extent overlapping. There are, however, several important factors
which distinguish Chapter 5 from the previous analyses.
First of all, the static model which characterized all the works
presented so far has been replaced by a dynamic model. The dynamic
structural model treats the decision maker as a forward-looking agent.
This means that her choices are reflecting the best option for both her
current and her future selves. This distinction becomes particularly
important when there is a direct link between her current choices and
the choices in the years to come. In the context of labor supply choice,
this link is embodied by human capital accumulation. By working in
the market, a woman will accumulate experience which will increase
her wage and improve her standing on the labor markets in the years
to come. Thus, her decision to work now is likely to influence her work
decisions down the road, since the gained experience will change the
state in which she finds herself when making the next year’s work
decision.
Accounting for human capital accumulation is very important for
assessing the long-run impacts of the competing fiscal stimuli. In
the short-run, the static model may prove to be informative enough,
but after 5 or 10 years, the cumulative effects of work experience are
likely to play in resulting outcomes. The human capital link may also
represent one of the factors explaining why we see strong persistence
of maternal labor supply choices. If it is the recent experience that
matters the most for women’s decision making, then the loss of experi-
ence in the periods of early child rearing can induce highly persistent
gaps between male and female labor supply for many years after the
childbirth.
The second factor which distinguishes Chapter 5 from the others
is the treatment of fertility. Since the previous models were static,
the number of children in the family was implicitly kept fixed at
the observed levels. In this model, the fertility is considered to be a
choice, entering the household’s choice set together with women’s
labor supply and formal childcare choices. This allows us to account
for the fact that introducing financial incentives for working parents
may enhance fertility, because prospective childbearing becomes less
costly. This channel is an important ingredient for the study of long-
run implications of the reforms targeted at working parents. If a
policy, such as child care subsidy, is likely to stimulate fertility, then
the costs of the policy are likely to increase in the years after the
implementation as there will be more families and more children
eligible for the subsidized care.
Our empirical model builds on the current developments in the
field of dynamic female labor supply, particularly on the works of
Francesconi (2002) and Bernal (2008). The labor choices in the house-
hold’s choice set are once again restricted to women, treating men’s
labor supply as given. In the Dutch context, this is more stringent
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assumption than in Chapter 3, however such restrictions are necessary
to limit the computational complexity of the model. Furthermore, we
have showed in Chapter 4 that men’s work choices are not too respon-
sive to changes in the incentives faced by the households. The pref-
erence heterogeneity is restricted to the inclusion of several observed
characteristics into the utility function, and making the unobserved
components corresponding to each choice variable correlated among
themselves.
The core of the paper is policy analysis which assesses relative
effectiveness of the 2004–2009 reforms in the Netherlands. Their ef-
fects are analyzed both in the short run, i.e., immediately after the
implementation, and in the long run, which denotes 10 years from the
implementation. In the short run, the results are very similar to those
found in Chapter 4. The two implemented reforms are shown to be
similarly cost-effective, with the difference between the two policies
being very small. However, in the long run, the child care subsidies
become much more costly due to the effects child care subsidization
has on fertility. The maintenance costs of the childcare subsidies are
projected to rise by more than 40% over the 10-year period, whereas
the costs of in-work tax credits are predicted to fall due to the effects
of human capital accumulation. This result is supportive of the claim
that in the short run static analyses are likely to produce reasonable ap-
proximation of the reform effects. On the other hand, it also shows that
these analyses fall short on capturing the dynamic changes which are
initiated by the reforms but unlikely to manifest earlier than several
years after the implementation.
A note to the interested practitioner
This dissertation is a collection of empirical analyses which all in-
vestigate similar phenomena, and as such it can be of interest to the
practitioners who want to explore the domains of household decision
making and public policy analysis. The following chapters, albeit the-
matically related, however differ in many of the imposed modeling
assumptions which raises the question, what is the most appropriate
set of assumptions to adopt when analyzing the household decision
making?
Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to this question. The differ-
ences in assumptions which we adopt in each chapter are to a large
extent idiosyncratic - they reflect the research questions we set out
to answer, the cultural and institutional background of the popula-
tions of interest, the limitations of our data, and the computational
complexity of the estimation methods we use. And even though tt
is true that the ordering of chapters reflects the relative complexity
of the employed models and the methods used to estimate them, it
would be misleading to claim that the assumptions used in Chapter 4
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are more preferable than the assumptions used in Chapter 3. Both
reflect the specific context of the pursued analyses, and this context-
dependence is likely to be present in any given empirical investigation
of household decision making.
In some cultures, the assumption postulating that men do not re-
spond to their partner’s labor choices will be fully justifiable, whereas
in other cultures it will not. Similarly, in some contexts we can abstract
from modeling the fertility decisions, and in others we cannot. The
practitioner has to decide which assumption is appropriate in the
current context, based on information and resources at her disposal.
This can be done by allowing for higher flexibility of the model and
testing the assumption in question. However, doing so can often prove
infeasible due to data limitations or other estimation issues. In such
situations, we have to make a judgment call, assessing the validity
of given assumption in light of our economic intuition or anecdotal
evidence.
As you will see, both of these approaches are exercised many times
in the chapters of this manuscript. I have made my best effort to
cross-reference individual chapters, highlighting the differences in
their respective assumptions. Often, the maintained assumptions are
assessed using various robustness checks. Other times, we discuss
potential extensions of our model, pointing out how would the results
change if the maintained assumptions proved unjustified. I hope
that this exposition will reflect both the merits and the limitations of
standard assumptions in the structural models of household decision
making, and that it will serve the interested practitioners as a useful
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This chapter is the reproduction of a paper written with Elena Stan-
canelli and Arthur van Soest, published in the Labour Economics.
2.1 introduction
Theoretical studies of income taxation conclude that income taxes
may affect not only individual labour supply but also the amount
of domestic work produced within the household. Income taxation
is likely to affect labour supply and housework hours in opposite
directions, because, for instance, downward changes in the individual
rewards from work reduce the individual opportunity cost of house-
work and thus, housework becomes more attractive than market work.
There is limited empirical evidence on this issue. This paper adds to
the literature by estimating a discrete choice model of both partners’
market and housework hours. Using these estimates, we simulate how
a change from joint to separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes
affects spouses’ hours of market and non-market work. This is espe-
cially interesting since France is one of the few OECD countries that
still taxes the incomes of couples jointly.
Apps and Rees (1988, 1999, 2011) argue that although household
production is not taxed (which is unavoidable since its output cannot
be observed), the taxation of market work is likely to affect housework
hours of spouses and, in particular, married women’s labour supply
is likely to increase when replacing joint taxation by separate income
taxation.1 Leuthold (1983) estimated the tax elasticities of housework
of husband and wife in one and two-earner US households using a
single equation framework, and found that (joint) income taxation
increases housework done by women and reduces housework done by
men. Gelber and Mitchell (2012), focusing on American single women,
concluded that when the economic rewards for participating in the
labour force increase, single women’s market work increases and
their housework decreases. Rogerson (2009) examined the effects of
taxation on housework and labour supply in the US and Europe from
a macroeconomic perspective, and found that when accounting for
1 See also Kleven et al. (2010) for a recent treatment of the optimal taxation of couples.
Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011) analyze how “selective” taxation, i.e., dif-
ferent income tax rates for secondary and primary earners, can affect the distribution
of market work and housework within the household.
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home production, the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure becomes almost irrelevant in determining the response of
market hours to higher taxes.
In this paper we estimate a discrete choice model of both partners’
market labour supply and housework hours. Partners’ time allocation
choices are modeled as the outcome of maximizing a household utility
function with four time uses (his and her market and non-market
hours) and household net income as its arguments. The model ac-
counts for (non-)participation in the labour market and housework
and incorporates fixed costs of paid work. To approximate continuous
hours decisions, each household’s choice set is discretized and has
2,401points. The use of a discrete choice specification enables us to
incorporate non-linear taxes and (social assistance) benefits.
The model is estimated on data drawn from the 1998-1999 French
Time Use Survey. This survey has the advantage of covering a period
during which the incomes of French married spouses were taxed
jointly and the incomes of cohabiting partners’ were taxed separately.
Moreover, a time diary was collected for both partners in the house-
hold on the same day, which was chosen by the interviewer - in
addition to a standard household questionnaire and an individual
questionnaire. We observe both partners’ market labour supply, house-
work hours, individual earnings, and household income, as well as
the presence and age of children and other individual and household
characteristics.
We find positive own net wage elasticities of market work (0.20 for
men, 0.55 for women in the baseline specification) and negative own
wage elasticities of housework hours (-0.34 for men, -0.36 for women).
In absolute terms, an increase in the own wage rate reduces housework
hours by less than the increase in own market hours, suggesting that
own leisure hours drop as well. An increase in the partner’s wage rate
reduces own market work hours and increases own housework hours.
The elasticities of the husband’s market work and housework for the
wife’s net wage rate are -0.10 and +0.12, respectively; the elasticities
of the wife’s market work and housework hours for the husband’s
net wage rate are -0.31 and +0.05, respectively. These cross effects
are smaller though than the own-wage effects, as usually found for
market work. Own and cross-wage effects on market work are larger
for women than for men, which is also a common finding in empirical
labour supply studies.
Finally, we simulate the effects of a shift from the current system of
joint taxation of married couples’ incomes to separate income taxation
of married partners.2 Joint taxation of married couples is mandatory
in France. Separate income taxation of married couples is applied in
2 This extends the work of, for example, Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) and Callan, van
Soest, and Walsh (2009), who estimated the influence of a similar reform of income
taxation for Germany and Ireland, respectively, but only looked at market work of
the two partners. It should be noted that the welfare system also has a strong “joint”
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most OECD countries. In some countries (for example, the US and
Spain), married couples have the option to choose between separate
or joint taxation. We find that moving from joint taxation to separate
taxation of married spouses’ incomes would lead to opposite effects
for the husband and the wife: her labour supply would increase while
his would fall; and her housework would fall while his would increase.
We conclude that replacing joint taxation with separate taxation of
married spouses’ incomes would increase the wife’s participation in
paid work by 2.3%-points and her average market hours by 3.7%,
while her housework hours would drop by 2.0%. The husband would
partly compensate for the changes in the wife’s time allocation by
increasing his housework hours by 1.3% and reducing his market
hours by 0.8%. These effects, though statistically significant, represent
only a small step towards balancing market and non-market work of
the husband and the wife.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The model is presented in
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the French income tax
system. The data are described in Section 2.4. The estimation results
and the simulations are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 the discrete choice model
Our model is an extension of the unitary discrete choice model of
household labour supply of van Soest (1995).3 Here we allow indi-
viduals in a couple to choose between market work, housework, and
leisure while the conventional model allows the individual to choose
between market work and everything else and thus, considers house-
work as “pure” leisure. Hours spent on housework by both spouses
enter now directly as arguments of the utility function as individuals
choose their hours of market work, housework, and leisure. Therefore,
household utility depends on both partners’ time allocation and on
after-tax household income, which varies with the allocation of hours
of market work chosen by the couple, before-tax (or gross) wage rates,
and the tax and benefits system. We specify fixed costs of market
work and allow for unobserved heterogeneity in partners’ preferences.
The choice set is discretized and we also include error terms that
are specific to each element of the choice set, using a random utility
framework.
aspect, since welfare payments are means-tested against total household income. Our
simulation leaves the nature of the welfare system unchanged.
3 A discrete choice model of labour supply has also been used by, for example, Aaberge
et al. (1995, 1999), Hoynes (1996), and Keane and Moffitt (1998). See also Dagsvik
(1994) on the theoretical foundation of the usual functional form assumptions in this
type of model.
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2.2.1 Theoretical setup and hypotheses
Formally, let m denote the husband and f the wife, let tlm and tlf
be the leisure hours of husband and wife, twm and twf their labour
supplies, and thm and thf their housework hours. Their gross wage rates
are denoted by wm and w f . The budget constraint (1) gives family
income y after taxes and benefits as a function of gross earnings,
total household non-labour income Y0, and the amount of taxes and
benefits T,4 which depends on the various income components, and
on household characteristics X:
y = wmtwm + w f twf + Y0 − T(Y0, wmtwm, w f twf , X)
−1{twm > 0}FCm − 1{twf > 0}FC f
(2.1)
The final two terms reflect potential fixed costs of market work,
separately for each partner. Fixed costs for the male or female partner
enter if that partner participates in market work (where 1{.} denotes
the indicator function). Non-convexities in the budget set due to taxes,
benefits, or fixed costs are allowed for.
The household faces two time constraints given by the total hours
endowment E (say 24 hours per day) for each partner:
tlm = E− twm − thm
tlf = E− twf − thf
(2.2)
The utility maximized by the household is a function of partners’
labour supply, housework, leisure and of after tax household income.
Because of the two time constraints, we can eliminate hours of market
work and write utility as a function V of five arguments:






f , y) (2.3)
Therefore, household production is not modeled explicitly as for
example in Apps and Rees (1999), but is incorporated implicitly by
allowing the partners’ paid and unpaid housework to enter the model
through thm and thf : their marginal utilities not only capture the inherent
utility difference between paid work and housework, but also the
utility that comes from the household product (which increases with
thm and thf ).
5 Moreover, the fact that market work is eliminated also
matters. In particular, the implications for the expected signs of the
partial derivatives of V are as follows:
• ∂V
∂tlm
> 0 if husband’s leisure is preferred to husband’s paid work,
keeping constant the other arguments of V (including husband’s
housework and after tax family income y).
4 T also captures welfare transfers (see Section 2.3), which can be seen as negative tax
payments.
5 This also implies that we cannot analyze the consequences of policy changes such
as a change in VAT that affect the prices of goods bought in the market but not the
shadow prices of home produced goods.
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• ∂V
∂tlf
> 0 if leisure of the wife is preferred to paid work of the
wife, keeping other factors constant.
• ∂V
∂thm
> 0 if housework done by the husband is preferred to
paid work done by the husband, keeping other arguments of V
constant, including and y. If paid and unpaid work hours are
equally attractive or unattractive, we expect [Warning: Image
ignored] because housework increases household production,
while income from paid work (y) is kept constant.
• ∂V
∂thf
> 0 if housework done by the wife is preferred to paid work
done by the wife, keeping other arguments of V constant.
• ∂V∂y > 0 if more household income is better, keeping the allocation
of hours chosen by the couple (and therefore also the household
production) constant.
only the final inequality is needed to ensure that the model is
consistent with the underlying theory as it excludes the possibility
that utility falls with income -we assume that the household chooses a
point on its budget frontier. There is no need to impose any restrictions
on the second order derivatives of V, such as quasi-concavity because
to estimate the model we do not have to recur to first and second
derivatives –we simply need to compare a finite number of utility
values. Finally, the model is static and we do not account for savings
(Blundell and Walker, 1986), for a two-stage budgeting approach).
2.2.2 Empirical specification
To implement the model empirically, we allow partners to choose their
time allocation as follows. We consider 7 discrete possible choices for
each activity and for each spouse, which results in a discrete choice
set for the household of 7*7*7*7 = 2,401 possible choices. For paid
work of men and women, the choices are 0, 1.6, 3.2, 4.8, 6.4, 8 and 9.6
hours per weekday (corresponding to 1, 2, . . . , 6 working days per
week). For housework, we use different choices for the two partners
(because of the large differences in the observed sample distributions
of housework hours of partners, see Section 2.3). We specify 0. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 and 6 hours per weekday for men, and 1, 2.5, 3.5, 4.5, 5.75,
7.5 and 9.5 hours per weekday for women. For each combination of
paid and unpaid work hours of the two partners and for given gross
wage rates and household non-labour income, we calculated income
taxes and welfare transfers (see Section 3) and therefore, after tax
income for each point in the choice set. We assume that partners can
choose any combination of hours and ignore possible demand side
restrictions (see, for example, Aaberge, Colombino, and Strom, 1999,
for an extensive and more complete approach to this issue). However,
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our baseline model does incorporate fixed costs of paid work which
may partly account for some of these rigidities.6 We use a flexible
quadratic objective function:7
We use flexible quadratic objective function:8








where A is a symmetric 5*5 matrix of unknown parameters with
entries αij (i,j=1,. . . ,5), and b=(b1, . . . , b5)’ is a five-dimensional vector.
We assume that b1, . . . , b4 are functions of a vector x of observed
household characteristics (such as partners’ ages, and the numbers
of children in several age groups) and of unobserved characteristics
using the following specification:9
bj = ∑
k
βkjxk + ξ j; j = 1, 2, 3, 4 , (2.5)
Here the four unobserved heterogeneity components are assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and arbitrary covariance
matrix, independent of the xk and of other exogenous components of
the model, such as the household’s non-labour income and the deter-
minants of gross wage rates. To keep the numerical optimization of the
likelihood practically feasible, we do not parameterize αij (i,j=1,. . . ,5)
or b5, but assume they are the same for all households.10 Fixed costs
of paid work are not observed but are modeled as two unknown
parameters to be estimated (one for each partner).
Random error terms are added to the utilities of all m=2,401 points
in the household’s choice set as in Van Soest (1995):






f j, yj) + ε j; j = 1, 2, ..., m;
ε j ∼ GEV(I); j = 1, 2, ..., m;
ε1, ε2, ....., εm independent of each other and of everything else
(2.6)
GEV(I) denotes the type I extreme value distribution with cumu-
lative density. It is assumed that each household chooses the option
j that maximizes Vj. The assumption on the error terms then im-
plies that the conditional probability that a given combination j is
chosen, given observed and unobserved characteristics, wage rates,
6 It may also be argued that each household needs to do a certain amount of housework,
particularly if there are children.
7 To simplify the computational burden, the coefficient of income squared is set to zero,
following, for example, Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002).
8 The coefficient of income squared is set to zero. See Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002),
for example, for a discussion of this specification.
9 The index of the household is suppressed.
10 As usual, the utility function is identified up to a monotonic transformation only.
This would make it hard to identify the parameters in a more general model.
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other household income, and determinants of taxes, is the following
(multinomial logit type) probability:11
Pr
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The scale of the utility function is thus fixed by the magnitude of
the common variance of the error terms. The errors can be interpreted
as unobserved utility components that make specific combinations of
hours in the choice set more attractive than others (in line with the
random utility concept in the standard multinomial logit model), or
as optimization errors (e.g., errors in the household’s perception of
the alternatives’ utilities).
The probabilities in (7) depend upon the values of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms. In order to construct the likelihood contribution
of a given household, these terms need to be integrated out. The
likelihood contribution then becomes:
Pr
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Pr(Vj > Vk ∀k 6= j|ξ, ....)p(ξ)dξ
(2.8)
Here p(ξ) is the density of the vector ξ of unobserved heterogene-
ity terms.12 This likelihood expression involves four-dimensional
integrals, which can be approximated using simulations, making it
straightforward to estimate the model by simulated maximum likeli-
hood; see, e.g., Train (2003).13
The likelihood contribution in equation (2.8) assumes gross wage
rates are observed and exogenous. In our data, gross wage rates are not
always observed for working individuals and never for non-working
individuals. Following most of the labour supply literature, we use
separate Heckman models for men and women to deal with unob-
served wage rates (see Section 2.4). We then replace either all wage
rates or only the unobserved wage rates by predictions based upon the
Heckman model estimates. In the first approach, our baseline model,
wage rates are allowed to be endogenous, and identification requires
variables used to predict wages that do not enter as taste shifters in the
labour supply model. Following many earlier studies, we use educa-
tional dummies for this purpose. In the second approach (a robustness
check discussed in Section 2.5.4), we assume that observed wage rates
11 If hours of work are unobserved but we know that they are positive, the sum of the
relevant probabilities is taken, so that the missing information is accounted for.
12 The notation here does not make the conditioning on observed variables explicit, for
simplicity.
13 We used 100 Halton draws for each household and each unobserved heterogeneity
term; see also Section 2.5.4 for a robustness check.
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are exogenous (and measured without error).14 The difference between
the results of the two approaches can be seen as a robustness check for
making this exogeneity assumption. Both approaches ignore the po-
tential bias due to prediction errors. In principle, this could be avoided
by (for example) estimating wage equations jointly with the structural
model. This would, however, substantially increase the computational
burden because of the multiple dimensions and because it would
require going through the tax and benefits algorithm during each
iteration of the maximum likelihood estimation process. Moreover,
we would not be able to use a larger sample to predict wage rates
(including singles etc.). We therefore could not follow this approach.
2.3 taxes and welfare benefits
Married spouses are subject to joint income taxation - their incomes
are added up for income tax purposes. This typically leads to a larger
tax rate for the secondary earner (often the wife) than under separate
income taxation. The tax revenue from the joint system is therefore
likely to be higher, which means that we could lower the effective
joint income tax rates while keeping the tax revenue as high as under
the separate income taxation.15 Most OECD countries have moved to
a system of individual taxation or allow couples to choose between
the two systems. In contrast to married spouses, cohabiting partners’
incomes were taxed separately in France at the time of our survey
data.16 Here we model the income tax system for both married and
cohabiting partners.17
A key feature of the French income tax scheme is the "quotient
familial" (“family quotient” q). Total taxable income is divided by q
before applying the tax brackets, and then the resulting amount is mul-
tiplied by 3 to give the income tax payable by the household. q gives
14 In this model we still impose the same exclusion restrictions, leading to overidentifi-
cation. An alternative estimation strategy would be to use data from different years
before and after a reform of the tax system, such as the 2000 reform changing the tax
treatment of unmarried couples. Our cross-section data did not allow for this.
15 In this revenue-neutral joint income tax system, the effective tax rate for most of the
primary earners would be lower than under the separate income taxation, however
the effective tax rate for most of the secondary earners would still be higher than
under the separate income taxation.
16 Only since the introduction of the “Pacte Civil de Solidarité et de concubinage (pacs)”
in 1999, unmarried couples can file jointly, after an initial waiting time of three years.
Thus, they could not file jointly before 2002.
17 Different treatment of married and cohabiting couples creates potential for selection
into marriage (depending on which form of partnership is more accommodating for
the work choices preferred by the spouses). We do not model this form of selection
explicitly, but we assess its importance in the policy simulations. We perform our
policy simulations separately for the cohabiting and the married households, so that
we would have two sets of comparable estimates. If these are sufficiently close to each
other, we can conclude that the two samples are not fundamentally different and that
the tax-reasons are not likely to play a major role for marriage decisions.
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weight one to each married spouse, weight 0.5 to the first and second
child, and weight one to children of birth order higher than two.18
Thus, for a married couple with two children, total taxable income
is divided by q=1+1+0.5+0.5=3 before applying the tax brackets, and
the resulting amount is multiplied by 3 to give the income which is
subject to taxation according to the corresponding tax bracket. In con-
trast, for an unmarried couple with two children, the two partners file
income taxes separately, and thus can choose how to report children
for tax purposes. If each of them reports one child, the family quotient
for each of them will be 1.5. Combined with the progressive income
tax brackets (see below), this system implies that keeping household
income constant, the tax paid by a married couple may well be lower
than that paid by a cohabiting couple. In particular, a married couple
in which only one spouse works and earns, say, y* will pay as much
income tax as a married couple in which both spouses work and
together earn y* (and much less income tax than a cohabiting couple
in which only one spouse works and earns y*). It follows that this
system may discourage participation of married secondary earners
(see, for example, Apps and Rees, 2011).
The 1998 French income tax brackets that applied to total taxable
household income are illustrated in Figure 2.1. There were six income
brackets with marginal rates increasing from zero to 54%. The base is
gross household income, which is already net of payroll taxes or social
security contributions (levied on employers and deducted at source,
which are roughly proportional to gross wages); these contributions
therefore play no role in the calculations.
Figure 2.1: Marginal income tax rates for France in 1998
18 Unmarried couples are treated separately with their own family quotients. In an
unmarried couple with two children, each partner may, for example, report one child
so that each partner’s taxable income will be divided by 1.5. Or, if one partner earns
more than the other, it may be more beneficial for them if the partner earning more
reports both children. In our tax calculations, we always assume that cohabiting
partners with children report children for tax purposes so that they minimize the
total tax and maximize after tax household income.
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1. Standard deductions (on average 28% of total household in-
come19) are subtracted from total household income to give
‘taxable’ household income.
2. Taxable income Y is divided by family quotient, q, which gives
the taxable income ratio Y’.
3. The tax rates shown in Figure 2.1 are applied to Y’ producing T’.
4. The amount T’ is multiplied by q and this gives the income tax
payable, T.
5. Low-income households benefit from an additional income tax
reduction according to a formula (“la decote”) that depends on
the income tax payable (T) itself.20
According to administrative sources21 the average (effective) income
tax rate for married couples aged less than 60 – the same age cut-off
that we use in our sample - is 5.34%, much lower than in most OECD
countries, and more than 25% did not pay any income taxes. This
is in line with our calculations. For example, a married couple with
two children and total annual income of €60,000 has an effective tax
rate of approximately 8%, which is low by international standards. It
should be noted that unlike in other countries, these French income
tax rates do not include social security premiums (which are levied at
the source by employers and thus not included in our simulations22).
Generally, a considerable part of government revenue in France is
raised by means of value added tax23 which we do not model here.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the average tax rate for the household
(calculated as the amount of total household tax payable, divided
by the total earnings of both partners) as a function of the woman’s
annual earnings, for various levels of the man’s annual earnings for
married and cohabiting couples without children (Figure 2.2) and with
two children (Figure 2.3). For married couples, the tax rate on each
additional euro depends on the earnings of both spouses.
For cohabiting couples, who are subject to individual taxation, the
income of the male partner does not matter for the tax rate on the
19 Following, for example, Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), itemized deductions are
ignored.
20 If the total income tax payable (T), was less than €508, it was reduced to max (0,
2T-508)., lLow-income cohabiting partners could both benefit from this tax reduction.
21 Enquête Revenus Fiscaux, drawn from administrative income tax files, INSEE, Paris,
1998.
22 The survey collects information on wages net of payroll contributions and gross of
income taxes.
23 The amount of revenue levied by means of value added taxes is equal to
about 7 per cent of GDP against 10.3 of GDP for income taxes revenue
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Tax_revenue_statistics).
Goods produced within the household such as home cooked meals are not subject to
value added tax since the output of household production is hard to measure. In
contrast, private goods bought from the market are subject to value added tax.
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Figure 2.2: Average income tax rates for French childless couples in 1998,
keeping men’s income fixed
Figure 2.3: Average income tax rates for French couples with two children in
1998, keeping men’s income fixed
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female’s earnings. As a consequence, cohabiting women pay no income
tax if their earnings are very low. However, the average household tax
rate as a function of her earnings (which is depicted in Figures 2.2 and
2.3), is higher at lower earnings of the female partner in (childless)
cohabiting couples than in (childless) married couples (see panels 2, 3
and 4 in Figure 2.2), simply because in married couples the couple’s
earnings are divided by two (q=2) before applying the tax schedule
(see discussion above). If there are children, cohabiting partners can
choose who reports them in order to minimize their income tax burden
(see also Figure 2.3), and this is the assumption we make in our model,
in which we assume that cohabiting couples report their children for
tax file purposes so as to minimize the total tax burden. It follows that
for various combinations of partners’ earnings and family composition,
the couple may pay a different income tax for similar total household
level depending on marital status (which we take as given here).
In line with the literature on static labour supply models (see,
for example, Van Soest, 1995), we do not account for unemployment
benefits (which are temporary and depend upon labour market history
and involuntary job loss), but we do incorporate the basic social
welfare benefits. Their level depends upon the number of children
and the benefits are fully means tested on the basis of total household
income, regardless of whether partners are married or cohabiting.
We do not explicitly incorporate the costs of child care but control
for the presence and ages of children in the model and we include
fixed costs of work for both partners.24
2.4 data
The data for the analysis are drawn from the 1998-99 French Time
Use Survey, carried out by the National Statistical offices (INSEE).
This survey is a representative sample of more than 8,000 French
households with over 20,000 individuals of all ages. Selecting couples,
married or unmarried but living together, gave a sample of 5,287
couples with and without children. We further selected couples in
which both partners were younger than 60 – the legal minimum
retirement age for most workers in France in 1998-99 – and neither
spouse was in full-time education, in the military, on disability benefits,
or in early retirement.25 We kept self-employed individuals in the
24 Child care costs of children younger than three vary with the form of child care used
by the household but are all tax deductible. Children of age three to six are enrolled
in maternal school, which is open 10h a day and free of charge (a symbolic fee is paid
for meals, proportional to household income) and almost 100% of French children
in this age range are enrolled into maternal school. Older children are enrolled in
elementary school which is also open 10h a day and free of charge (a symbolic fee is
paid for meals, proportional to household income)
25 We kept housewives as well as men who report that housework is their main occupa-
tion (less than ten cases).
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sample (whose hours, earnings and total household income were
reported in the same way as for employees).
Three questionnaires were collected: a household and an individual
questionnaire, and the time use diary. The diary was filled in for
one day, chosen by the interviewer, the same day for all household
members. About two thirds of the sample filled in the time diary on
a week day, and less than a third on a weekend day. We dropped
all households who filled in the diary on a weekend day (on which
housework is typically not constrained by hours of paid work26) or on
an atypical day (like a vacation day, a day of a wedding or a funeral,
or a sick leave day.), as well as households in which either partner
did not fill in the diary. Dropping observations of households who
were chosen to complete their time use diaries at the weekend diaries
implies that our results refer to partners’ time use on week days only.
We do not analyze possible (spillover) effects of wages or taxes on
house workhousework done in weekends, essentially because we do
not observe the same couple on both a week day and a weekend day.
Our final sample for analysis contains 2,141 couples. Table 2.1 shows
how many households are deleted from the sample in each of the
selection steps described above.






Original sample size 8186
Dropping single people 5287
Dropping couples with one or two spouses
older than 59 years
3819
Keeping in households where both spouses
filled in the time diary
3564 245
Dropping spouses that filled in the time
diary on an exceptional day
3269 295
Dropping spouses that filled in the time
diary on a Saturday or Sunday
2407 862
Dropping people in full-time education or
(early)-retirees or doing military service
2141 266
2.4.1 Sample descriptives, wages and income variables
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present descriptive statistics. The average number
of dependent children younger than 18 years in the household was
slightly over one, implying that 39% of couples in the sample had no
children. Only 6% of the sample were not French nationals. Approx-
imately 18% lived in the region of Paris (“Ile-de-France”). Married
couples represented 79% of the sample while the remaining 21% were
cohabiting. Hourly earnings were computed for respondents who
26 Very few individuals reported any paid work in weekends.
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reported continuous (monthly) earnings information, dividing (gross
of income tax and net of social security contributions) earnings by
usual hours of paid work. The observed average gross wage rates were
€9.83 per hour for men and €8.24 for women. Approximately 94% of
the men and 70% of the women were engaged in gainful employment
at the time of the survey.
Approximately 20% of men and women were self-employed. Av-
erage usual hours worked per week were approximately 29 for men
and 19 for women, including the zeros for non-workers. Moreover,
360 men and 240 women did not report usual hours, but did report
that they were involved in gainful employment. In this case we know
that their usual hours are positive and thus, account for this when
specifying their likelihood contribution (see Section 2.2 for details).
We predicted wage rates for non-participants as well as for those that
did not report continuous wages by estimating a Heckman selection
model for men and women separately.27 See Appendix 2.A for the
results. To predict gross (before income tax) hourly wages we use a
larger sample than the one used to estimate the model, as we also
include individuals that answered the diary on a weekend day or
an exceptional day. For estimation of female wages we also include
single women in the dataset, assuming that their earnings patterns
are similar to those of partnered women. The presence of children
and other adults in the household were used to identify the male
selection equation from the wage equation.28 To identify the female
selection equation we additionally used marital status dummies, as
marital status turned out not to affect female (hourly) wage rates.29
The presence of children also proved to be insignificant in the wage
equations, however the presence of other adults was found to be
significantly negative for women. These variables are quite powerful in
the participation equation for women but much less so in the equation
for men. The selection term is small and insignificant for men, but
larger and significantly positive for women, implying that women with
unobserved characteristics that make them more productive also have
a larger participation probability. The wage equation results are fairly
standard, with a mainly increasing quadratic effect of diminishing
returns to potential experience and large positive effects of higher
education for both men and women. The lack of exogenous source
of variation in wages is a drawback of using cross-sectional dataset,
which on the other hand is one of the rare surveys to provide detailed
27 Joint wage selection model is in principle feasible, but using it would require discard-
ing part of the female dataset, which we prefer to avoid.
28 Wage rates below half the legal minimum were set to missing (since in some specific
jobs it is legal to pay less than the minimum). Wage rate predictions were never below
the minimum wage.
29 This is in line with earlier literature that suggests that employers expect all women to
marry at some stage and thus apply the same wage ‘penalty’ to all women, regardless
of marital status. Indeed, we found significant wage premiums for married men but
not for married women.
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information on both partners’ time allocation and income. We test for
the sensitivity of the estimation results to using observed wages for
individuals that reported continuous wages or replacing wages with
predicted wages for everyone in the sample.30
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Husbands Wives
Variables Mean St dev Mean St dev
Age 41.55 9.01 39.25 8.98
Elementary school 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30
Lower secondary, vocational 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30
Lower secondary 0.37 0.48 0.28 0.45
Upper secondary vocational 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Upper secondary 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.28
University short degree 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34
University degree or higher 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30
French nationality 0.94 0.23 0.95 0.22
Employed 0.94 0.32 0.70 0.47
Self-employed 0.19 0.40 0.21 0.40
Ile-de-France 0.18 0.39
Regional unemployment rate 11.28 2.35
Married 0.79 0.41
Number of children <18 years 1.10 1.12
Dummy child <3 years 0.16 0.37
Dummy child 3-5 years 0.15 0.36
Gross hourly wage predicted 9.77 3.67 6.23 2.55
Gross hourly wage actual 9.85 5.94 8.35 4.92
Usual paid work hours, weekly 29.30 16.57 19.52 17.63
Usual paid work hours, weekly
(excluding zeros)
37.94 5.30 32.98 9.01
Paid work (diary), hours - daily 6.97 3.76 4.02 3.93
Paid work, (diary) minutes -
daily
418.70 225.51 241.34 235.81
House work, minutes 65.27 85.45 272.49 169.26
Total work, minutes 483.97 196.92 513.84 163.55
“Leisure” (including sleep time
and personal care), minutes
956.03 196.92 926.17 163.55
|The sample size is 2,141 couples. Hourly wages are gross of taxes. Total
work includes paid work, and unpaid housework.
30 The use of observed wages can be desirable, as the observed wages contain more
precise information about the incentives faced by individual households. However,
their use mandates stronger modeling assumptions - namely, that the part of the wages
which is not attributable to observed factors is also uncorrelated with unobservables
in the discrete choice model. Such assumption has to be evaluated by comparing the
results of models with the observed wages and with the predicted wages.
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More than 25% of the sample reported zero non-labour household
income (see Table 2.3). Non-labour household income represents ap-
proximately 25% of total household income before taxes.31 The average
effective tax rate (the ratio of total household income tax and total
household before tax income) is approximately 5.6% of total household
before tax income, which is well in line with the administrative data
(see also Table 2.1 and Section 2.3). The average effective income tax
rate is lower for married couples (5.5% on average) than for cohabiting
couples (6.1%).










12806 21953 32014 23876
Non-labour household in-
come (€ per year)
0 1829 9513 7537
Total household income
before tax (€ per year)
21953 28813 37137 31717
Total household income
after tax (€ per year)
21108 26783 34426 29187
Total tax burden (€ per
year)
0 987 3136 2416
Effective tax rate (%) 1.39 4.49 8.64 5.63
|Sample: 2,141 couples. The effective tax rate is defined as the tax amount
paid as a proportion of total household income.
2.4.2 Paid work and housework
The diary was filled in by each partner on the same week day, which
was chosen by the interviewer, spanning 24 hours. Activities were
coded in ten minutes slots and approximately 140 possible activities
were distinguished by the survey coders. Here, we distinguish the
following ‘primary’32 activities
1. Paid work, carried out either at home or at an outside work
place.
31 This is before accounting for welfare benefits that are included in our simulation
model (see Section 2.3 for details).
32 Respondents were also asked to fill in “secondary” activities which are activities
carried out simultaneously, such as cooking while taking care of children. The
respondent may report childcare as primary activity and cooking as secondary activity
or vice versa. Generally, ignoring secondary activities is likely to underestimate the
amount of unpaid work. However, very few respondents in the sample reported some
secondary activities, and thus, we resolved to ignore secondary activities. Moreover,
if we counted in also time spent on secondary activities, the time budget would not
satisfy the 24 hours constraint any longer.
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2. Housework, defined to include cleaning, shopping, cooking,
doing the laundry, setting and unsetting the table, doing the
dishes, doing administrative work for the household as well as
any (primary) time spent caring for children.
3. “Leisure” time, defined as any time devoted to leisure (watching
television, doing sports, socializing and recreational activities),
’semi-leisure activities’ (such as gardening or taking care of pets),
as well as personal care and sleeping time.
The distribution of partners’ time allocations is illustrated in Table
2.4, which shows that men do the bulk of paid work: the median “hus-
band” in the sample spends approximately 480 minutes (8 hours) on
market work, compared to 240 minutes (4 hours) for the median “wife”
–denoting the male partner as the husband and the female partner as
the wife, for simplicity, even if we included cohabiting couples in the
sample. In contrast, women perform most of the housework: with the
median “wife” doing 240 minutes of housework against 30 minutes
for the median “husband”.33 Interestingly, a comparison of total paid
and unpaid work time of men and women in a couple shows that the
median “wife” works 10 minutes more than the median “husband”
(see also Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil, 2013, on total work load by
gender). In the empirical analysis, the time spent on paid work and
housework, respectively, by each partner, is rounded to the nearest of
the seven discrete point intervals in the choice set (see Section 2.2).
Table 2.4: Time Allocation of Spouses (in minutes on the diary day)
10% Q1 Median Q3 90%
Husband paid work 0 360 480 550 640
Wife paid work 0 0 240 480 520
Husband housework 0 0 30 100 180
Wife housework 70 140 240 390 510
Husband “Total work” 130 420 530 610 680
Wife “Total work” 280 410 540 630 700
Husband “leisure” 740 810 880 970 1170
Wife Total “leisure” 730 790 880 1000 1120
|Note: “Total work” time includes paid work and housework. Sample size:
2,141 couples; week day diaries only.
To better grasp within-couple differences in the division of paid and
unpaid work, we present the share of the husband’s time in the total
time devoted by the couple to each activity (see Table 2.5). This shows
that the husband provides on average 61% of the paid work done by
33 See also Frazis and Stewart (2012) for a discussion of the limitations of using distribu-
tional comparisons.
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the couple (and 67% of the median). In contrast, the median husband
performs only 12.5% of the couple’s housework load. The husband
performs on average 45% of the total market and non-market work
carried out by the couple (and 47% if we consider the median). To sum
up, the wife tends to perform a little more work than the husband
(and we have ignored here multi-tasking which is disproportionately
done by women, as shown, for example, by Sayer, 2007). Our model
will focus on whether this division of time allocations is sensitive to
changes in tax rates and other financial incentives.
Table 2.5: The Share of the Husband in Total Spousal Activity Time
Percentages
Mean St. deviation Median
Paid work 66.88 30.96 61.07
House work 19.82 22.69 12.5
“Total work” 46.76 15.38 48.78
Leisure 50.08 4.94 50.27
|Notes: The shares are calculated only for couples where at least one spouse
spends some time on the activity. “Total Work” time includes paid work,
housework, and childcare time.
Finally, it should be noted that the number of altenative choices
in our empirical specification is rather large compared to the num-
ber of households which we observe. This may lead to problems
with identification of empirical frequencies of work and housework
combinations which are only scarcely chosen (and therefore possibly
missing in our data). Potential remedy to this problem is to restrict
available choices in the choice set. This can be done either by making
the grid of rarely-observed choice combinations coarser, or by dis-
carding certain choices which are, to our conviction, irrelevant for the
household decision making. In our study we wanted to avoid these
discretional measures, although we admit that there is an ample scope
for restricting the choice sets. This can be seen from the Figures 2.A.1
and 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.B where we present frequencies of work and
housework intensity levels chosen by men and women in our sample.
Particularly for men, the grid of choice combinations contains patches
wof combinations with very low frequencies. These parts of the grid
could be made coarser without putting excessive restrictions on the
flexibility of male decision making.
2.5 results
In Section 2.5.1 we discuss the estimation results and goodness of fit
for the baseline model presented in Section 2.2. Section 2.5.2 presents
the wage and income elasticities for this model and Section 2.5.3
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discusses the results of the policy simulation of changes in the income
tax system. Section 2.5.4 summarizes some robustness checks.
2.5.1 Parameter estimates and goodness of fit
We have allowed the parameters of the utility function (b1, . . . ,b4 in
Section 2.2.2) vary with some covariates characterizing the individual
and the household (see equation (2.5) in Section 2.2): the age of the
individual, marital status, the number of dependent children, and
dummies for the presence of children less than three years old or
from three to five years old. The systematic part of the utility function
therefore contains interactions of leisure and unpaid housework of
both partners with these covariates. The parameter estimates of the
systematic part of the utility function are given in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Estimation Results: Direct Utility functions
Explanatory variables Coefficient St. error
(Husband’s leisure)ˆ2 -0.3057 0.0251 **
(Husband’s housework)ˆ2 -0.263 0.0171 **
(Wife’s leisure)ˆ2 -0.2131 0.0147 **
(Wife’s housework)ˆ2 -0.0742 0.0111 **
Income*Husband’s leisure 0.0846 0.0089 **
Income*Husband’s housework 0.0276 0.005 **
Income*Wife’s leisure 0.0564 0.0061 **
Income*Wife’s housework 0.0278 0.0038 **
Husband’s leisure* Husband’s housework -0.1468 0.0223 **
Husband’s leisure* Wife’s leisure -0.0249 0.0068 **
Husband’s leisure* Wife’s housework -0.0068 0.0085
Wife’s leisure* Husband’s housework -0.0157 0.0105
Wife’s leisure* Wife’s housework -0.0264 0.006 **
Wife’s housework* Husband’s housework -0.0983 0.0118 **
Income -2.1476 0.4353 **
Husband’s leisure 41.7887 7.663 **
Husband’s leisure* log age -17.3115 4.0494 **
Husband’s leisure* log ageˆ2 2.4329 0.5536 **
Husband’s leisure* married -0.2621 0.0829 **
Husband’s leisure* number children 0.0459 0.0368
Husband’s leisure* any child younger than 3 -0.2048 0.1036 **
Husband’s leisure* any child age 3-5 years 0.0341 0.0969
Husband’s housework 15.4829 5.6088 **
Husband’s housework* log age -5.5149 2.8852 *
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Husband’s housework* log ageˆ2 0.7975 0.3965 **
Husband’s housework* married -0.1988 0.0542 **
Husband’s housework* number children 0.114 0.0249 **
Husband’s housework* any child younger
than 3
0.1786 0.0668 **
Husband’s housework* any child age 3-5
years
0.0844 0.0626
Wife’s leisure 52.8154 6.8603 **
Wife’s leisure* log age -25.0188 3.7753 **
Wife’s leisure* log ageˆ2 3.4764 0.5264 **
Wife’s leisure* married -0.2381 0.0763 **
Wife’s leisure* number children 0.1815 0.0378 **
Wife’s leisure* any child younger than 3 -0.1012 0.0876
Wife’s leisure* any child age 3-5 years 0.1924 0.0865 **
Wife’s housework 24.4425 4.7226 **
Wife’s housework* log age -11.8946 2.5555 **
Wife’s housework* log ageˆ2 1.6968 0.3555 **
Wife’s housework* married -0.0311 0.0489
Wife’s housework* number children 0.2376 0.0243 **
Wife’s housework* any child younger than 3 0.2196 0.0536 **
Wife’s housework* any child age 3-5 years 0.1558 0.0521 **
Husband’s fixed costs of market work -1.9277 0.1312 **
Wife’s fixed costs of market work -1.3231 0.0945 **
|**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
The first block of coefficients in Table 2.6 is hard to interpret due
to the squares and interactions. Therefore, Table 2.7 presents the
average marginal derivatives of the utility function with respect to
its five arguments, as well as the fractions of sample observations
where the predicted marginal derivative is negative. We find that the
objective function increases with the level of household income at
every observation in the sample, something that is required for the
economic interpretation of the model. For the other marginal utilities,
the interpretation in Section 2.2 should be kept in mind. The marginal
utility of leisure is negative for almost 27 percent of men and almost
42 percent of women. This indicates that most couples will choose
an option with more leisure than paid work if everything else is kept
constant (including household income and hours spent on housework).
The estimates imply that many respondents would be willing to do
some market work for free if there were no fixed costs of work; the
substantial fixed costs (cf. Table 2.6) prevent them from doing so.
38 Income taxation, labour supply and housework






Husband’s leisure 0.5049 0.2662
Husband’s housework 0.0952 0.3092
Wife’s leisure 0.3489 0.4199
Wife’s housework 0.3546 0.3480
|Note: The marginal utilities keep other arguments of the utility function
constant. Since paid work is the residual time use category, an increase of
husband’s leisure implies a fall in husband’s paid work, etc.
The marginal utility of housework is positive for 65.2% of women
and 69.1% of men, suggesting that, keeping household income con-
stant, non-market work is more attractive than paid work, possibly
because of the implied household production output (which is not
kept constant; see Section 2.2).
The coefficients on the interactions of exogenous characteristics with
the four time amounts in Table 2.6 can be interpreted in a similar way
as in van Soest (1995). A positive coefficient on the interaction of a
covariate with leisure (of either partner) implies a positive effect of the
covariate on the marginal utility of leisure (of that partner) versus paid
work, leading to a negative effect on paid hours, ceteris paribus. A
positive coefficient on one of the interactions with housework similarly
implies a positive effect on the marginal utility of housework versus
paid work. For example, the fact that the couple is married rather than
cohabiting reduces the marginal utility of the male partners’ house-
work, suggesting that cohabiting men will perform more housework
than married men. A plausible explanation is that cohabiting couples
are less traditional and have different norms concerning the roles of
men and women in the family. As expected, children - and young
children in particular - strongly and significantly increase the marginal
utilities of both spouses’ housework (which includes taking care of
children), although the effects are smaller for men than for women.
Table 2.8 gives the estimates of the distribution of the four-dimension
vector of random effects in the marginal utilities of leisure and house-
work time of both partners (cf. Equation (2.5)). The top panel shows
that all variances are significantly positive, but their magnitude varies,
suggesting that there is more unobserved variation in preferences for
leisure (compared to paid work) than in preferences for housework.
The bottom panel shows that all correlations are significantly positive,
implying, for example, that time use and preferences of both partners
are positively correlated, suggesting positive assortative matching.
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House work husband 0.3418** 0.1353**
(0.0835) (0.0388)
Leisure wife 0.7078** 0.3169** 0.7999**
(0.0656) (0.0506) (0.0649)
House work wife 0.3144** 0.1788** 0.4683** 0.3051**












House work husband 0.7764** 1.0000
(0.0868) (0.0000)
Leisure wife 0.6622** 0.9733** 1.0000
(0.0325) (0.0253) (0.0000)
House work wife 0.4754** 0.8905** 0.9483** 1.0000
(0.0707) (0.0568) (0.0174) (0.0000)
|**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
Predicted and observed participation rates and mean hours of mar-
ket and housework are presented in Table 2.9. A comparison of actual
and predicted distributions is presented in Figure 2.4. The fit of the
distribution of hours spent on housework seems quite good, while that
of market work is somewhat less satisfactory, especially for over-time
work. It should be mentioned here that incorporating fixed costs helps
to fit the participation rates for paid work – models without fixed
costs under predict non-participation and over-predict small part-time
jobs. The fact that working more than 40 hours is under predicted is
probably due to the fact that individuals cannot freely choose to work
over time.
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Table 2.9: Predicted and Actual Discrete Choice Frequencies
Husband Wife
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
Market work
0 hours 0.0542 0.0594 0.2938 0.2947
Mean hours 6.8213 6.9106 4.3170 4.6285
Non-market work
0 hours 0.4016 0.4340 0.1681 0.1845
Mean hours 1.2943 1.1345 4.6826 4.5636
|Note: Hours are per working day (week days only). Market hours are based on
usual hours of work per week, divided by five. Actual hours set to missing for
those observations reporting no usual market hours but declaring to be in paid
employment (360 men and 245 women).
2.5.2 Wage and income elasticities
To estimate the sensitivity of the spouses’ time allocation decisions
to changes in (own or partner’s) wage rates and other household
income, we have used the estimated model parameters to simulate the
distribution of hours of paid and unpaid work of both partners under
various scenarios. In each scenario, the discrete distribution (with
2,401 mass points) of time spent by each partner on each activity is
simulated for all couples in the sample, accounting for all details of the
model such as unobserved heterogeneity and error terms. Unobserved
heterogeneity terms are drawn from their estimated distributions, and
given the parameters, the unobserved heterogeneity terms, and the
budget set in each scenario, the probability distribution over the 2,401
outcomes is calculated for each household in the sample. Based upon
these, participation rates in all activities and average hours spent on
each activity are computed.
The baseline scenario corresponds to the budget sets used for estima-
tion; this is also the scenario that was used to simulate the predictions
in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.4. The other scenarios change the budget sets,
either through a change in the net wage rates or through a change
in non-labour incomes. For example, raising the net wage rates of
all women gives the uncompensated own wage elasticities of paid
and unpaid work hours and participation rates for women and cross
wage elasticities for men.34 The net wage elasticities are computed
by increasing the net reward for each additional hour of work (by
either the male or the female partner) by 1% and comparing the out-
comes for these new budget sets with the outcomes of the benchmark
simulation. The tax brackets are kept constant under the alternative
34 Changing gross instead of net wage rates gives similar elasticities (somewhat smaller
in absolute magnitude).
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regime. The net income elasticities are computed by first computing
each household’s expected income in the benchmark scenario and
then raising non-labour income by 1% of this amount for all points
in the choice set. Standard errors are obtained by repeating the same
simulations for 500 draws of the vector of all estimated parameters
from the estimated distribution of the simulated maximum likelihood
estimator.
Figure 2.4: Predicted and actual hour frequencies for the (7*7*7*7) discrete
choices
Table 2.10 summarizes the results. The estimated female own wage
elasticity of market work is 0.55, much larger than the estimate of
Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014) but smaller than some of the other
elasticities found for France (see Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque, 2013
and the survey in Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl, 2014, Appendix 2.A.1). ).
The own elasticity is 0.20 for men, which is also larger than in earlier
studies. More than half of the estimated responses of the own labour
supply to changes in the own wage rate are due to changes in the own
participation rate, which is in line with the findings of Bargain, Orsini,
and Peichl, 2014.35
35 Note that the participation changes are in percentage points; for women (men), the
elasticity of participation is about 1.42 (1.05) times as large.
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Market work Market work
a)Wife’s net wage -0.0087 -0.1039 ** 0.2945 ** 0.5516 **
1% increase (0.0085) (0.0099) (0.0123) (0.0371)
b)Husband’s net 0.1104 ** 0.2025 ** -0.1213 ** -0.3093 **
wage 1% increase (0.0062) (0.0184) (0.0127) (0.0254)
c)Net family in- -0.0777 ** -0.1252 ** -0.1628** -0.2479 **
come 1% increase (0.0079) (0.0184) (0.0203) (0.0414)
Non-market work Non-market work
a)Wife’s net wage 0.0412 ** 0.1168 ** -0.1734 ** -0.3623 **
1% increase (0.0079) (0.0287) (0.0081) (0.0225)
b)Husband’s net -0.1940 ** -0.3368 ** 0.0344 ** 0.0539 *
wage 1% increase (0.0103) (0.0564) (0.0071) (0.0286)
c)Net family in- -0.1093 ** -0.3967 ** -0.005 0.0009
come 1% increase (0.0185) (0.0568) (0.0133) (0.0296)
|Notes: **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. Interpretation: In response to an increase of 1% of
all women’s net wage rates, the women’s participation in paid work increases by
0.29%-points and women’s hours of paid work increases by 0.55%.
Cross wage elasticities of market hours are negative and smaller
in absolute size than the own wage elasticity, but still substantial
(and statistically significant): -0.10 for market hours of the husband in
response to a change in the wife’s wage rate and -0.31 for market hours
of the wife in response to a change in the husband’s wage rate (again,
for simplicity, we denote the female partner as the “wife” and the male
partner as the “husband”, regardless of the couple’s marital status).
Also in this case, our estimates are larger than the cross-elasticities
found by Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014). For men, most of the
cross elasticity is due to changes at the intensive margin; for women,
somewhat more than half of the cross elasticity is due to changes at
the extensive margin. Estimated income elasticities of market hours
are also negative for both partners and equal, respectively, to -0.125
for the husband, and -0.248 for the wife. These are mainly due to
responses at the extensive margin.36 The standard errors indicate that
the elasticities of paid work are generally quite precisely determined
and statistically significant.
The second panel of the table presents the elasticities of partners’
housework to changes in partners’ wage rates and net household
36 Income elasticities are not comparable to those in Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014)
who only consider changes in capital income and find very small responses.
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income. The wife responds to an increase in her wage rate by reducing
the time allocated to non-market work - the elasticity is equal to -0.362.
In absolute terms, following an upward change in the own wage,
the reduction in unpaid work is smaller than the increase of market
work, which implies a drop in her leisure hours. Only a small (but
statistically significant) part of the reduction in the wife’s housework
is compensated by more housework been performed by the husband
(the cross elasticity of the husband’s housework to a change in the
wife’s wage rate is 0.117), which gives a rather small overall effect
as the husband spends little time on housework in the baseline (1.29
hours per weekday). The significantly positive effect of an increase
in the wife’s wage rate on the husbands’ non-market work is in line
with earlier findings by Bloemen and Stancanelli (2014), who did not
account for income taxation.
The estimated elasticity of the husband’s unpaid work to his own
wage rate is negative (-0.337) and larger in absolute value than the
corresponding elasticity for his paid work. However, because men
perform more hours of paid than unpaid work, the overall effect is
smaller in absolute terms for housework than for paid work. It follows
that an increase in the husband’s wage rate leads also to a reduction
in his leisure hours. The cross-effect of the husband’s wage rate on
the wife’s unpaid work hours is only marginally significant and quite
small (the estimated elasticity is 0.054). In particular, following an
increase in his wage rate, his housework drops and hers increases
-not enough though to compensate for the reduction in his housework
hours, so that the total housework done by the couple falls. Thus, an
increase of either the male or the female partner’s wage rate reduces
the total housework done by the couple, and possibly leads to more
outsourcing of household chores.37
Finally, the income elasticity of the housework done by the husband
is negative and large in absolute value. In contrast, the wife’s house-
work response to a change in non-labour income is virtually zero and
insignificant. Thus, total housework falls if other income increases
which may suggest perhaps more outsourcing of housework tasks or,
possibly, more “multi-tasking” or “leaving housework undone” (see
Sayer, 2007, for more insights into all these options).
2.5.3 Joint versus separate taxation
Table 2.11 summarizes the effects of a change in the tax system for
married couples, from joint taxation (the actual system) to separate
taxation (the system in place for cohabiting couples). Cohabiting
couples are not included in this simulation for obvious reasons, as
nothing changes for them. As anticipated (see Section 2.3), the reform
37 An analysis of outsourcing of housework is given in Stancanelli and Stratton (2014).
It is outside the scope of the current paper.
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increases participation and hours of market work of married women,
and it reduces market work of married men: average hours of paid
work fall by 0.75% for the husband while increasing by 3.66% for the
wife. In contrast, housework hours increase by 1.28% for the husband
and drop by 2.01% for the wife. Thus, these results suggest that a shift
from joint to separate taxation would lead to a slightly more balanced
distribution of market and non-market work between the spouses.
However, these conclusions are driven by few partners that change
their time allocation in response to the reform (less than ten per cent
of the couples in our sample; results not shown).














Market work Market work
Separate taxation -0.1881 * -0.7513 ** 2.3137 * 3.6599 **
for the married (0. 1209) (0. 0066) (1. 3095) (0. 0213)
Joint taxation for 0.1627 * 1.0413 ** -2.2528 * -3.5184 **
the cohabiting (0. 1149) (0. 0075) (1. 2848) (0. 0189)
Non-market work Non-market work
Separate taxation 0.6473 * 1.2767 ** -0.8445 ** -2.0147 **
for the married (0. 3770) (0. 0203) (0. 3822) (0. 0267)
Joint taxation for -0.7949 * -1.7559 ** 1.1285 * 2.1869 **
the cohabiting (0. 4618) (0. 0261) (0. 5262) (0. 0259)
|Notes: **: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
Standard errors in parentheses. We only consider couples who are affected by the
reform (married couples for the first reform, cohabiting couples for the second
reform).
Second, we considered cohabiting couples and simulated their re-
sponses to a change in the income tax system for cohabiting couples
from separate to joint taxation of partners’ incomes. As expected, we
find opposite patterns than above (see Table 11): cohabiting women
are found to reduce their labour supply and increase their house-
work hours while the opposite is true for cohabiting men. The size of
the responses of married and cohabiting partners differ, though, and
this may be explained by compositional effects -cohabiting couples




Various robustness checks were carried out presented in Table 2.12.
We tested the stability of our estimation results by using a new set of
Halton draws to estimate the distribution of the random coefficients.
Next, we checked the robustness of the estimates to using the observed
wages for individuals that reported continuous wages and replaced
wages with predicted wages only for observations with missing wage
information - this alternative approach implicitly assumes that the
errors of the wage equation are independent of the unobservables of
the discrete choice model of partners’ time allocation.











Market work husband -0.1252 -0.0418 -0.2053 -0.1813
Non-market work husband -0.3967 -0.3347 -0.4099 -0.4276
Market work wife -0.2479 -0.2488 -0.2172 -0.3172
Non-market work wife 0.0009 0.0115 0.027 0.0155











Market work husband 0.2025 0.2124 0.226 0.2465
Non-market work husband -0.3368 -0.4087 0.0094 -0.1265
Market work wife -0.3093 -0.3049 -0.2392 -0.1348
Non-market work wife 0.0539 0.0217 0.0485 0.0178











Market work husband -0.1039 -0.0938 -0.0895 -0.0194
Non-market work husband 0.1168 0.105 -0.0723 -0.0549
Market work wife 0.5516 0.5567 0.4556 0.464












Market work husband -0.0751 -0.0752 -0.0603 -0.0601
Non-market work husband 0.1277 0.1425 -0.0069 0.0261
Market work wife 0.366 0.3614 0.2839 0.2628
Non-market work wife -0.2015 -0.168 -0.192 -0.1714
|Notes: Each column presents one model. The first model is the baseline model
discussed in the remainder of Section 2.5. See Tables 10 and 11 for explanations of
the elasticities and policy effects.








Market work husband -0.1252 -0.0248 -0.0418
Non-market work husband -0.3967 -0.2984 -0.3347
Market work wife -0.2479 -0.2683 -0.2488
Non-market work wife 0.0009 0.0117 0.0115








Market work husband 0.2025 0.1352 0.1258
Non-market work husband -0.3368 -0.1663 -0.2391
Market work wife -0.3093 -0.2623 -0.2086
Non-market work wife 0.0539 0.0412 0.0138








Market work husband -0.1039 -0.0608 -0.0416
Non-market work husband 0.1168 0.0234 0.0395
Market work wife 0.5516 0.4446 0.3829









Market work husband -0.0751 -0.0423 -0.0363
Non-market work husband 0.1277 0.0437 0.0765
Market work wife 0.366 0.3073 0.2612
Non-market work wife -0.2015 -0.1514 -0.13
|Notes: Each column presents one model. The first model is the baseline model
discussed in the remainder of Section 2.5. See Tables 10 and 11 for explanations of
the elasticities and policy effects.
Furthermore, we re-estimated the model without allowing for fixed
costs of work. Alternatively, we modeled restrictions to the availability
of part-time jobs, including and excluding fixed costs of work. Finally,
we estimated a simplified version of the model without housework,
letting partners choose between leisure and market hours, ignoring
housework in the model.
Using a new set of Halton draws (see Column 2 of Table 2.12), some
of the estimated elasticities are slightly different but the qualitative
conclusions are not affected. Column 3 shows the results if we use
actual wage rates for workers whose wage rates are observed (see
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discussion in Section 2.2), requiring the additional assumption that
errors in the wage equation are independent of the unobservables in
the model. The main differences with column 1 are the wage effects
on the male partner’s housework which seem counterintuitive: a
positive (but virtually zero) elasticity for the male’s own wage rate
and a negative elasticity for the female’s wage rate. Accordingly, the
policy effect on the husbands’ housework is also negative. A possible
explanation is that the exogeneity assumption on wages is not satisfied,
which would make these estimates inconsistent. The errors in the wage
equation are therefore not independent of unobservables both in the
first-stage of Heckman model, as well as in the discrete choice model.
Assuming the absence of fixed costs of work (see Column 4 of Ta-
ble 12), the results are not affected in terms of the direction of the
effects but their size differs quite substantially, relative to our favorite
specification. Moreover, this specification fits the data worse than our
preferred model (see earlier working paper version of the paper that
did not account for fixed costs of work). In contrast, simulating restric-
tions in the availability of part-time jobs (as in Aaberge, Dagsvik, and
Strom 1995), including or excluding fixed costs of work, improves the
fit of the model (results not shown). Under this scenario, the direction
of the effects studies is the same as in our preferred specification
but the size of the estimates varies some time quite substantially (see
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 12). However, this specification results in
more frequent negative marginal utilities of leisure and housework
(results not shown) than for our baseline specification, and it is unclear
whether this framework would be reasonable to assume here, as while
in other countries like, for example, Italy there is a reported lack of
part-time jobs, we are not aware of similar issues for France. Therefore,
we prefer to retain our main specification. Finally, we assumed that
partners only choose between various combinations of paid-work and
leisure, ignoring housework (which is then taken as equivalent to
leisure), as in most earlier discrete choice models of family labour
supply (such as, for example, Callan, van Soest, and Walsh 2009). This
simplified model leads to estimated elasticities that have the same sign
as those in our preferred model though the size of the effects varies
somewhat (see Column 7 of Table 12).
2.6 conclusions
We study the impact of income taxation on partners’ hours of market
work and domestic work in French couples. The theoretical household
taxation literature concludes that income taxation is likely to affect not
only market labour supply but also housework. However, it is difficult
to sign a priori the effect of income taxation on partners’ housework.
Income taxation is likely to affect labour supply and housework hours
in opposite directions because, for instance, downward changes in
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the net rewards from work reduce the opportunity cost of housework,
making market work less attractive than housework.
There is limited empirical evidence available of the effects of income
taxation on housework. Our model extends earlier work on discrete
choice family labour supply models by modeling not only partners’
market work but also partner’s housework. The model accounts for
participation as well as hours decisions. The use of a discrete choice
specification enables us to incorporate non-linear taxes and welfare
benefits in the household budget set. The choice set has 2,401 points
for each couple in the sample, since we have allowed for seven discrete
paid market-work intervals and seven discrete unpaid-work intervals,
for each spouse. Using French time use data to estimate the model,
we find that both partners’ time allocation decisions are responsive to
changes in wage rates, household non-labour income, and the income
tax system. In particular, we simulate a change from joint taxation of
the incomes of married spouses, which is mandatory in France for
married couples, to separate taxation, which was mandatory at the
time of the survey for cohabiting couples.
We find that partners’ housework responds significantly to changes
in the own and the partner’s wage rate. The wage elasticities of
partners’ housework hours are generally smaller in absolute value
than those of paid work. We also conclude that replacing joint taxation
with separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes, would increase
the wife’s participation in paid work by 2.3%-points and her average
market hours by 3.7%, while her housework hours would drop by
2.0%. The husband would partly compensate for the changes in the
wife’s time allocation by increasing his housework hours by 1.3% and
reducing his market hours by 0.8%. These effects, though statistically
significant, represent only a small step towards balancing market and
non-market work of the husband and the wife. Had we not allowed
for housework in the model, we would conclude that the husband’s
leisure time increases while the wife’s leisure time drops following
the tax reform.
To sum up, we find sizable wage elasticities of partners’ hours of
market and non-market work but only small responses of partners’
hours to the simulated change in the income tax system, from joint
to separate taxation of married spouses’ incomes. This may perhaps
be due to the small effective income tax paid by French households
on average, equal to approximately 5 per cent, on average –social
security contributions are levied on the employers’ payroll and not
accounted for in our model. Having some policy change at hand would
enable one to better identify the causal relations at stake, possibly also
allowing one to endogenize marital status, which was taken here as
given. Future studies should tackle these issues, as well as perhaps
model weekend hours (spill-over) effects, which are neglected due to
the data availability. We can speculate what would happen had we
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observed the weekend time-use patterns for the analyzed families: It
may be the case that the couples where both spouses are full-time
employed will leave most of their housework for weekends, whereas
the couples with one spouse in the household will prefer to spend their
weekends enjoying leisure time. This intertemporal substitution of
housework would then lead our model to overpredict the substitution
patterns between work and housework. Consequently, the wage and
tax changes simulated by the model with housework hours would
prove to have weaker housework effects than the ones we measure here.
Another potential extension is to allow for labor demand constraints
- one method to do so would be to generalize our model using the
random opportunity specification of Aaberge, Colombino, and Strom
(1999). This model allows part-time jobs to differ in their availability
from full-time jobs, reflecting the fact that women may be facing more
(or less) job opportunities depending on the desired work hours. This
extension is pursued as one of the robustness checks in Chapter 3.
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2.a heckman selection models for wage rates
Table 2.A.1: Heckman selection model for men
Wage Equation Coefficient St. error
Potential experience 0.0457 0.0038 **
Potential experience squared -0.0005 0.0001 **
Elementary school 0.0635 0.0359 *
Lower secondary, vocational 0.3110 0.0491 **
Lower secondary 0.2334 0.0376 **
Upper secondary vocational 0.4805 0.0553 **
Upper secondary 0.4998 0.0565 **
University short degree 0.7352 0.0580 **
University degree or higher 1.1217 0.0527 **
Dummy Single -0.1037 0.0395 **
Dummy Cohabiting -0.0879 0.0296 **
Constant 2.9003 0.1021 **
Participation Equation
Potential experience 0.0278 0.0160 *
Potential experience squared -0.0006 0.0002 **
Elementary school 0.1610 0.1327
Lower secondary, vocational 0.4884 0.1619 **
Lower secondary 0.3575 0.1074 **
Upper secondary vocational 0.5912 0.1959 **
Upper secondary 0.6287 0.1992 **
University short degree 0.7709 0.1699 **
University degree or higher 0.6137 0.1601 **
Dummy Single -0.5950 0.1073 **
Dummy Cohabiting -0.3696 0.0929 **
Dummy child <3 years -0.1824 0.1051 *
Dummy child 3-5 years -0.0921 0.1076
Dummy child 6-10 years 0.0398 0.0947
Dummy child 11-16 years 0.0179 0.0936
Number of adults in the household 0.0410 0.0563
Constant 0.6562 0.2990 **
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0224 0.1732
Implied correlation between error terms -0.0713
Standard deviation error wage equation 0.3139
Observations 2193
|**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
|The dependent variable in the wage equation is the gross hourly wage rate.
Regional controls are included in both equations.
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Table 2.A.2: Heckman selection model for women
Wage Equation Coefficient St. error
Potential experience 0.0409 0.0036 **
Potential experience squared -0.0004 0.0001 **
Elementary school 0.0982 0.0364 **
Lower secondary, vocational 0.2714 0.0390 **
Lower secondary 0.2960 0.0339 **
Upper secondary vocational 0.4291 0.0471 **
Upper secondary 0.5536 0.0414 **
University short degree 0.8458 0.0421 **
University degree or higher 1.2190 0.0447 **
Constant 2.7120 0.0775 **
Participation Equation
Potential experience 0.0606 0.0119 **
Potential experience squared -0.0012 0.0002 **
Elementary school 0.3586 0.0927 **
Lower secondary, vocational 0.4606 0.1011 **
Lower secondary 0.4097 0.0833 **
Upper secondary vocational 0.6459 0.1339 **
Upper secondary 0.5527 0.1100 **
University short degree 0.8452 0.1088 **
University degree or higher 0.8370 0.1211 **
Dummy Single 0.4280 0.0720 **
Dummy Cohabiting 0.1811 0.0718 **
Dummy child <3 years -0.5643 0.0776 **
Dummy child 3-5 years -0.4890 0.0756 **
Dummy child 6-10 years -0.3029 0.0626 **
Dummy child 11-16 years -0.1165 0.0607 *
Number of adults in the household -0.0655 0.0361 *
Constant -0.5646 0.2163 **
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0940 0.0419 **
Implied correlation between error terms 0.2879
Standard deviation error wage equation 0.3264
Observations 3406
|**: significant at two-sided 5% level; *: significant at two-sided 10% level.
|The dependent variable in the wage equation is the gross hourly wage rate.
Regional controls are included in both equations. Dummy Single and Dummy
Cohabiting were dropped from the wage equation since they were insignificant.
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2.b empirical frequencies of work and housework com-
binations
The empirical frequencies are expressed as shares of all observed work














L A B O R S U P P LY H E T E R O G E N E I T Y A N D D E M A N D
F O R C H I L D C A R E O F M O T H E R S W I T H Y O U N G
C H I L D R E N
This chapter is the reproduction of a paper written with Patricia Apps,
Ray Rees and Arthur van Soest, currently being revised for publication
in Empirical Economics.
3.1 introduction
One of the most striking, and still largely unexplained, facts about
female labor supply in the developed countries is its heterogeneity
across households, and indeed across countries. In many OECD coun-
tries, on average around one third of partnered women work full time
in the labor force, one third do various amounts of part time work,
and one third work solely in household production. Very little of the
aggregate heterogeneity across all households in any one country is
explained by wage rate differences and by the number of children
present in the household. Moreover, the correlation between female
labor supply and fertility across these countries is strongly positive,
even though historically, in any one country, there has been an inverse
relationship between them.
Some insight is gained by organizing the data in terms of life cycle
phases based on the number and age of children in the household. In
the pre-children phase, there is very little difference between male and
female labor supply distributions. This changes dramatically when
children arrive, and this is when the heterogeneity in female labour
supply essentially sets in. Though there is a trend of return to the labor
force over subsequent phases of the life cycle as the children reach
school age and beyond, the basic pattern of heterogeneity persists.
Such findings suggest that for the theoretical and empirical analysis
of female labor supply it is fruitful to focus on the life cycle phase in
which households have young children.
The dramatic change in female labour supply with the birth of the
first child reflects the additional work choice created by that event. At
least one parent, typically the mother, can choose between working at
home providing her own child care or working in the market and buy-
ing in care from formal care providers, such as kindergartens and child
care centres, or by engaging other care givers, including relatives and
friends. The importance of the availability and cost of child care for
the labor supply of mothers with young children has been confirmed
by theoretical Apps and Rees (2009) and empirical studies, includ-
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ing Ribar (1995), Blau (2003), Connelly and Kimmel (2003), Doiron
and Kalb (2005), Kalenkoski, Ribar, and Stratton (2005), Kornstad and
Thoresen (2007), Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008), and Blundell and
Shephard (2012). If the mothers are not able to obtain child care from
other sources than their own, they will cease working in the market.
This lapse in their labor engagement is going to have lasting impact
on their later employment decisions. Their human capital depreciates
and they become less flexible in their time-use decisions, which lowers
their chances of finding a desirable employment opportunity (Apps
and Rees, 2009). Accordingly, child care has the potential to be one of
the sources of household-level heterogeneity of female labor supply
which we observe in the data. That is why we build our analysis of
maternal labor supply around the concept of child care, accounting
for heterogeneity in attitudes and availability of different modes of
child care.
The current paper presents a structural discrete choice model of
the time allocation choices of partnered mothers with pre-school aged
children. The main advantage of the discrete choice approach is that it
can account for the non-convex nature of the household budget sets.
Within this model, we analyze the decisions of mothers on hours of
market work, time spent on child care and domestic work, and hours
of formal child care. The main goal is to assess the sensitivity of choices
at the intensive and extensive margin of female labor supply, and to
capture underlying substitution patterns between the alternative uses
of maternal time.
Similar models are employed by Doiron and Kalb (2005), Kornstad
and Thoresen (2007), and Blundell and Shephard (2012). We allow
for a more flexible household utility function than previous studies
(following Van Soest, 1995 and Kabatek, van Soest, and Stancanelli,
2014 and include both formal child care and maternal care in the utility
function. Informal child care is also accounted for. Bought in child care
can be incorporated in two ways - either indirectly, subtracting child
care costs from disposable household income (Doiron and Kalb, 2005;
Kornstad and Thoresen, 2007), or directly, with the hours of bought
in child care taken as an additional argument of the utility function
(Ribar, 1995; Bernal, 2008). We follow the direct approach, implying
that formal child care and maternal care can be imperfect substitutes,
with their own effects on household utility.1
An important aspect of our empirical model is that we incorpo-
rate unobserved heterogeneity in the flexible form of latent classes,
following Train (2008) and Pacifico (2012). We thus extend the treat-
ment of unobserved heterogeneity beyond the traditional framework
1 Apart from including formal child care parameters in the utility function, we also
subtract the child care costs from the household’s disposable income. That way, we
account for the income effects of child care utilization.
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of random coefficient models,2 avoiding restrictive assumptions on
the distribution of the population parameters of the utility function,
which we show has a pronounced effect on estimated labor supply
elasticities.3
The model is estimated on data drawn from the Household, Income
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey which provides
detailed information on time use and child care use and corresponding
prices. Simulations based on the estimated parameters show that the
time allocations of partnered mothers with pre-school children are
highly sensitive to changes in net wages and the cost of child care. A
policy simulation also suggests that lowering effective tax rates faced
by partnered mothers as second earners, by switching from joint to
individual taxation, would lead to a substantial increase in their labor
force participation and hours of work.4
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set out the
underlying theoretical model. In Section 3.3 we present the economet-
ric specification that we take to the data. Section 3.4 discusses our data
set and Section 3.5 presents parameter estimates. Section 3.6 reports
the results of policy simulations. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 economic model
We construct a one period model of mother’s time use and child
care decisions during the preschool phase of the life cycle of a two-
parent family. The time use decisions of the father, taken to be the
"primary " earner, are treated as exogenous.5 In a one period model,
potentially important intertemporal effects, such as the anticipated loss
of future human capital and employment possibilities from reducing
current labour supply, cannot be incorporated explicitly. A mother
may continue to work throughout the preschool phase despite facing
a very low net wage or negative net earnings after child care costs,
as an investment in her long-term career prospects. We can however
2 Applications using this approach include Ribar (1995), Doiron and Kalb (2005) and
Kabatek, van Soest, and Stancanelli (2014).
3 Several studies of female labor supply allow for more flexible treatment of the
unobserved heterogeneity (Ribar, 1995; Blau and Hagy, 1998; Tekin, 2007), building
on seminal works of Heckman and Singer (1984) and Mroz (1999). The latent class
approach can be considered a generalization of these models, allowing for additional
flexibility.
4 The policy counterfactual in this simulation is the Australian taxation system which
was effective throughout the observed period.
5 By treating father’s choices as exogenous, we depart from the assumption of full
Pareto efficiency that underlies for example the collective model There is however
a growing literature that seeks to relax this assumption, for example that based on
non-cooperative rather than cooperative household equilibria. The assumption of
exogenous male choices would seem to us to be an acceptable approximation in
the light of the results of time use studies showing relatively little variation in male
time choices in the early child rearing years, with the vast majority of male primary
earners working full time.
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partially capture these effects in a reduced form sense, through their
impact on the marginal utility of market work vis á vis leisure or home
child care and domestic work. We also take the number of children
in the household as exogenous and therefore do not model fertility
decisions. Household h = 1, 2, ...H, chooses:
• its consumption of a market good xih, with i = 1, 2, .., n denoting
the individuals within the household;
• the mother’s leisure consumption l2h;
• consumption of a composite household good, yh, representing
child care and domestic work;
• the mother’s time input to the production of the household good,
ty2h;
• purchases of the market child care good mch.
Consumption is a composite market good with price 1, the mother’s
gross wage rate is w2h, and the hourly price of the market child care
good is pch, which varies across households.
6 This variation may reflect
age of the children in child care, regional price differences, and other
factors such as quality of the service. The father’s leisure and time
allocation to household production are taken to be exogenous and
therefore denoted by l̂1h and t̂
y
1h. Given the time endowment constraint,
his market labor supply, L1h = L̂1h, is also exogenous.7 The sum of
the parents’ gross incomes from market supply, ∑i wihLih, is denoted
by Ih(w1h, w2h). Their utility functions are uih(xih, yh, lih), i = 1, 2. The
children have utilities uih(xih, yh), i = 3, .., n, and are modeled as a
household public good.
The household is assumed to maximize a household welfare func-
tion, concave in utilities,
Wh = Ψh(u1h(.), ..., unh(.); eh) h = 1, 2, ...H (3.1)
where eh is a vector of exogenously given “environmental" or “distri-
butional" factors which can be interpreted as determining the house-
hold’s preferences over the utility profiles of its members.8 This func-
tion is based upon some household choice process which need not be
further specified.9
6 Every variable or function with subscript h can vary across households. Each of these
is therefore in principle a contributor to across-household heterogeneity in choices.
7 The exogeneity of husband’s labor supply and income is a strong assumption, how-
ever as reported later the data indicate that vast majority of Australian men are
working full-time. For that reason, we consider the exogeneity assumption justifiable.
8 In principle, the distributional factors could also include the wage rates, but this will
not be allowed for in the empirical model.
9 For a detailed exposition of the economics of this type of household model, see Apps
and Rees (2009), Ch 3.
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h ≤ Ih(w1h, w2h)− T(Ih(w1h, w2h), pchmch; n, ..) (3.2)
where T(.) is a tax-benefit function which may contain as arguments
demographic variables as well as gross incomes and expenditure on
bought-in child care.10 The technology of the household production





2h) h = 1, 2, ...H (3.3)
and there is a time constraint
l2h + t
y
2h + L2h = T (3.4)
where T is a given time endowment. Because we will be adopting
a discrete optimization approach, directly comparing values of the
household welfare function at all choice opportunities (see Van Soest,
1995), we do not need to impose conditions of convexity or even
differentiability on the function in (3). Thus the household can be





consumptions, market labor supplies and income via the constraints
(2) - (4) in such a way as to yield a global maximum of the function
Ψh(.). We can obtain a reduced form of this function by substituting
from (2) - (4) into (1) to obtain a utility function that depends on these
three choice variables as well as net household income Y. This then
forms the basis for the empirical model specification.11
3.3 econometric specification
In order to specify a discrete choice model we restrict the values of
the three choice variables, the mother’s labor supply, L2h, her time
allocated to household production, ty2h, and the hours of bought-in
child care, mch, to take one of five possible values which can be char-
acterized as “low", “low-medium", “medium", “high-medium" and
“high" according to their observed distributions.12 The five values of
each variable yields a grid of 53 = 125 possible discrete choice points
from which the household can choose its optimal allocation. The only
restriction we impose on the household-specific choice set is that we
exclude alternatives which would imply bought in child care costs
exceed family income. This restriction applies mainly to households
with the lowest disposable incomes and long hours of formal care.13
10 For example there may be tax offsets for expenditure on market child care.
11 This substitution requires additional assumption that the goods which are private
enter the utility function additively, reducing them into a composite good.
12 For detailed discussion and applications of the discrete approach adopted here see,
for example, Van Soest (1995), Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002) and Pacifico (2012).
13 In other empirical studies, additional household-specific restrictions are often needed
to account for infeasibility of certain choices. Kornstad and Thoresen (2007), for
example, constrain choice sets of selected households to account for high degree of
rationing in Norwegian day care centers.
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Dropping the household subscript, we specify for the purposes
of our model the vector ¯ = [l2, t
y
2, m
c, Y]. The leisure variable, l2,
is the residual of the daily time constraint in (4) with T = 24. The
mother’s household production time, ty2, is computed as the sum of
hours allocated to child care and to other home production activities,
many of which may simultaneously include child care.14 The leisure
time can be then interpreted as free time which is reported not to
be spent with children (playing with child is encoded as household
production). That being said, since we observe only one activity per
diary record, we cannot guarantee that parents do not engage in child
care as a secondary activity while enjoying their leisure time.
Net household income, Y, is calculated as gross income net of taxes,
family tax benefits and expenditure on child care. Gross income is
the sum of each partner’s earnings and the family’s non-labor in-
come. Since household income does not include the implicit value of
household production it does not depend on ty2. There are therefore
25 possible values of net household income for each household, corre-
sponding to combinations of the five choices of L2 and the five choices
of mc.
The mother’s gross earnings are calculated as the product of her
gross wage and hours of market work. Unobserved wages are pre-
dicted by a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), with the
exclusion restrictions being number of children in the household and
the sum of husband’s income and family non-wage income.15 Expendi-
ture on child care is calculated as the product of a household-specific
child care price and the household’s choice of formal child care hours.
Both characteristics are observed for the families who use formal child
care. To account for families who do not use formal child care (and
therefore do not report a corresponding price), we follow Connelly
(1992) and use a predicted price derived from a Heckman selection
model with the exclusion restrictions being number of adults in the
household (excluding spouses) and distance from grandparents.16
Sample selection criteria and regression results for both selection
models are presented in the Appendix 3.A.
14 A limitation of the HILDA time use data is that only one activity is reported for
each episode. In contrast, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Time Use Surveys
report a second activity when relevant. Child care is almost always a second activity
during housework and related activities.
15 Similar income-based exclusion restrictions are used by, e.g., Blundell, MaCurdy, and
Meghir (2007) and Sorensen (1993).
16 The imputation of child care prices should be approached with caution because the
observed prices can reflect variation in quality of the service. The quality of child
care can be endogenous to the regressors used in the Heckman selection model, and
hence can distort reliability of the imputed prices. To address these concerns, we
estimate an alternative specification of the model which uses imputed prices of child
care for all families in the sample. Relative differences in the predictions made by the
original model and the alternative specification can be used to assess whether the
endogeneity is likely to play a role here.
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Unlike formal child care, the informal child care is not treated as
a choice, but it enters utility function as a fixed household charac-
teristic which does not vary with choices made by the household.
Empirically, informal child care, because of its low cost, is essentially
intra-marginal. Working mothers who cannot obtain enough infor-
mal care buy additional care from the market and so respond at the
margin to its price and quality. If informal child care were unlimited,
households would not use market child care but the constraints on
the availability of informal care means that the marginal cost of child
care is given by the (quality adjusted) price of market care. Among
robustness checks we also estimate an alternative specification of the
model which does not maintain that informal child care provision is
kept fixed.
3.3.1 Baseline Model without Unobserved Heterogeneity
We first present the model without unobserved heterogeneity. We take
a reduced form of the household welfare function introduced in the
previous section, specified as a flexible quadratic function
Ψ(µ) = µ′Aµ + b′µ (3.5)
where A is a symmetric 4× 4 coefficient matrix, and b is a 4-component









βkjXk, j = 1, .., 3 (3.6)
where the Xk denote respectively a constant term and variables rep-
resenting observed household characteristics: wife’s age; wife’s age
squared; number of pre-school age children; number of school-age chil-
dren; and hours of informal child care provided by relatives, friends or
the husband. These represent sources of observed heterogeneity. The
elements of the matrix A as well as the component b4 are assumed the
same for all households.17 Furthermore, in order to prevent marginal
utility of income turning negative, we restrict the quadratic coefficient
of income to be zero.
The household welfare function in reduced form does not explicitly
separate the parameters of the household production function, the
utility functions of the household members, or the household process
which combines the utilities of the members. This should be kept
in mind when interpreting the parameters. For example, the partial
derivative of Ψ(.) with respect to ty2 is the marginal change in house-
hold welfare with the other components of ¯ - l2, mc and Y - held
17 This helps to reduce the computational complexity of the problem. Given that the
utility function is identified up to a monotonic transformation only, it does not seem
overly restrictive.
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constant, that is, when an hour of market work is replaced by an hour
of work at home without changing income. This captures the (positive)
effect of additional home production as well as the potential (positive
or negative) effect of a higher or lower preference for home rather
than market work, not accounting for the value of home production
or the wage for market work. Differences in b1 across households
may therefore reflect either differences in productivity in household
production or differences in preferences, or both. Conceptually, these
are of course two quite distinct sources of heterogeneity, but they
cannot be separately identified in the available data.
We introduce randomness in the value of the household welfare
function at each possible choice point (l2, t
y
2, m
c, Y) by specifying:
Ψr = Ψ(.) + εr, r = 1, 2, .., 125 (3.7)
We can rationalize these errors as being errors of optimization or as
being due to unobserved alternative specific characteristics that make
each alternative more or less attractive than predicted by the systematic
part. They can be due to factors that make a specific alternative more
(less) attractive because of high (low) productivity or other, possibly
preference-related, factors. The εr are assumed to be independent of
each other and identically distributed and to follow the Type 1 Extreme
Value Distribution. This implies that the conditional probability that
point r∗ is chosen as the optimal point is
P[Ψr∗ > Ψr, ∀r 6= r∗ | µ, A, b]=
exp Ψ(µr∗ , A, b)
∑125r=1 exp Ψ(µr, A, b)
(3.8)
Finally, to guarantee that household welfare always increases with
household income (an assumption which is needed for economic inter-
pretation of the estimates) we penalize the likelihood when necessary
by adding points inside the budget frontier as additional choices that
are never chosen by the household18.
3.3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity
It is likely that different households within the selected sample of
families with young children have different unobserved attributes,
for example in human and physical capital, which may impact on
home productivity, measured, for example, by child outcomes. There
may also be unobserved variation in the quality of market child care.
Unobserved heterogeneity, whether in home productivity, in market
child care or in preferences, is captured by the specification of error
18 The penalized choices are identical to the standard choices in all respects other than
household income, which is lower for penalized choices. Inclusion of such choices in
the choice set forces the marginal utility of income to be positive. Negative marginal
utility would imply that the penalized choices should be favored by the decision
makers, but this is, by construction, never observed.
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terms εr in the model as interdependent across alternatives. This
contrasts with the basic model in which the errors are alternative-
specific, which implies independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Several alternative approaches have been developed to allow for
unobserved heterogeneity in the context of discrete choice labor supply
models. The most prominent one is the parametric random coefficients
model (see Van Soest, 1995, or Keane and Moffitt, 1998). This method
has been criticized for the restrictive assumptions imposed on the
distribution of stochastic terms (see Burda, Harding, and Hausman,
2008; Train, 2008; Pacifico, 2012). The distributions are predominantly
assumed to be multivariate normal or log-normal, which implies that
the corresponding density of parameter values is unimodal, that is,
it has one peak characterizing the most frequent household welfare
function. The restrictiveness of the unimodality assumption is well
documented in Burda, Harding, and Hausman (2008) who show that
the standard random coefficients models perform poorly when the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity has multiple modes. This
is not well captured by standard models, rendering the resulting
preference ordering too uniform. This issue is of particular importance
for our analysis, because previous theoretical work (Apps and Rees,
2009) suggests that multimodal parameter distributions might well be
present in the context of female labor supply.
A small body of literature on female labor supply allows for more
flexible treatment of unobserved heterogeneity (Bernal, 2008; Blau and
Hagy, 1998; Tekin, 2007). These studies draw on Heckman and Singer
(1984) and Mroz (1999), using a step function to model the unknown
distribution of the key random coefficient. This random coefficient
therefore follows a discrete distribution and if enough mass points are
allowed for, this distribution is very flexible and can approximate any
underlying distribution.
The latent class model can be seen as a tractable generalization of
this approach, allowing for flexible discrete distributions of all param-
eters of the utility function. The underlying assumption is that the
population consists of a number of different homogeneous populations
(or classes) Kc, c = 1, ..., C, characterized by utility functions with pa-
rameters Ac, bc (see Train, 2008). The parameterization is class-specific,
implying that the probability mass is assigned to the whole set of pa-
rameters. This allows individual random coefficients to be correlated,
although the correlation structure is not explicitly modeled.
Given the probability P(h ∈ Kc) that a household h = 1, ..., H is in
the class Kc, c = 1, ..., C, and writing the probability that point r∗ is
chosen by this household as
P[Ψr∗ > Ψr, ∀r 6= r∗ | µ, Ac, bc, X]=
exp Ψ(µr∗ , Ac, bc, X)
∑125r=1 exp Ψ(µr, Ac, bc, X)
(3.9)
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P(h ∈ Kc)× P[Ψr∗ > Ψr, ∀r 6= r∗ | µ, Ac, bc, X] , c = 1, ..., C (3.10)
The importance of treatment of unobserved heterogeneity is indica-
tive of misspecification of the baseline model. In other words, the
true effects of covariates in the baseline model are confounded by
variables which are not included in the model. Naturally, there are
alternative ways to improve the inference of the model. For exam-
ple, we can add more covariates into the utility function, or we can
estimate the model for isolated subsets of population which can be
distinguished by their observable characteristics.19 Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that all the factors influencing the maternal decision making
(including child care quality, or cultural norms) would be rendered
available to the econometrician. Many of these factors are difficult (or
impossible) to observe and therefore they are not included in the con-
ventional datasets. This omission makes the treatment of unobserved
heterogeneity a particularly important part of our analysis.
Allowing for multiple latent classes makes the model more difficult
to estimate, with the traditional maximum likelihood optimization
methods often failing to converge. Train (2008) and Pacifico (2012)
show that in such cases we can take advantage of the well-known
EM algorithm. This estimation procedure is considerably faster and
more stable than the traditional methods, which makes it feasible to
estimate flexible models even with a large number of latent classes.
3.4 data
The HILDA panel survey provides data on a wide range of variables
for a representative sample (17,000 respondents) of the Australian
population interviewed annually since the year 2001. Particularly
relevant to this study are the detailed data on time use and cost and
utilization of formal and informal child care.
Mothers with pre-school aged children represent only a small frac-
tion of each wave of the HILDA survey. To increase sample size we
construct a pooled cross-section using the four consecutive waves of
HILDA from 2005 to 2008. From each wave we select partnered moth-
ers with pre-school children. We exclude couples in which a partner is
disabled, retired, or a full-time student, the husband is unemployed or
the family lives in a multi-family household. We also exclude records
with incomplete or implausible survey responses (usually on the rele-
19 These methods can be also combined with the methods designed to treat unobserved
heterogeneity, as illustrated in Chapter 4, where we estimate separate latent class
models for families with children aged 0-3 and families with children aged 4-11.
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vant time use variables). The self-employed women are kept in the
sample, representing 12% of working mothers.20
The final sample contains 1465 records. Descriptive statistics for
the dependent variables and the socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics entering as independent variables in X are reported in
Table 3.1. To enable comparisons by gender, the table also includes
descriptive statistics for male wage rates and time use.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics, Sample of Couples with Preschool Children
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Mother’s age 32.9 5.6 16 48
Father’s age 34.9 6.3 18 58
Marital status (dummy) 0.82 0.4 0 1
Mother’s employment status (dummy) 0.55 0.5 0 1
Father’s employment status (dummy) 1 0 1 1
Number of children aged 0-4 1.39 0.6 1 4
Number of children aged 5-9 0.47 0.7 0 4
Total number of children 2.01 0.96 1 6
Mother’s market work, weekly hours 13.9 15.8 0 80
Father’s market work, weekly hours 44.5 11.3 0 128
Mother’s h’hold production, weekly hours 71.6 31.2 0 166.8
Father’s h’hold production, weekly hours 31.2 17.5 0 120
Mother’s leisure, weekly hours 82.3 27.6 0 160
Father’s leisure, weekly hours 91.9 18.01 10 150.5
Formal child care, weekly hours 8.3 12.8 0 100
Formal child care price, in AUD, hourly 8.7 3.5 1.583 23.8
Informal child care, weekly hours 6.9 13.6 0 120
Mother’s annual earnings in AUD 18514 23570 0 182256
Father’s annual earnings in AUD 63373 35736 5136 357216
Annual non-labor family income in AUD 6617 31778 0 683974
Number of observations 1465
20 This subset of workers is generally excluded from the labor supply analyses, since it
is difficult to determine effective wage rates for self-employed workers. The HILDA
survey however contains very detailed income section which lists household earnings
from a multitude of possible sources, allowing us to approximate earnings even for
the self-employed. The inclusion of self-employed may well prove beneficial for the
sake of our analysis, because self-employment allows for more flexible working hours,
enabling women to combine child care and market work. It should be however noted
that since we observe relatively few cases of self-employed women, we do not account
for selection into self-employment in the context of our model.
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On average, parents of pre-school children are in their early thirties,
with the father around two years older than the mother. Only 56
percent of mothers in the sample are employed and, as we would
expect, market hours distributions differ dramatically by gender, as
shown in Figure 3.1. The result is a gap of over 30 hours per week
between average female and male labor supplies. The vast majority
of men work full-time (more than 35 hours per week21) while women
have a distribution of market hours that is relatively uniform apart
from a large spike at zero hours. There are 83 mothers who report
working more than 18 hours a day for seven days a week.22 In these
cases we scale down the reported hours to satisfy a time constraint of
18 hours of market work and house work per day while retaining the
same relative time allocations as in the original data.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Weekly Hours of Market Work in Families with
Preschool Children
Figure 3.2 compares hours spent on household production activi-
ties by gender. As noted above, household production is defined to
include the allocation of time to activities involving direct interaction
with children, such as "playing with your children", and domestic
work, much of which may also involve supervision of children aged
0 - 4. As we would expect, household production hours are higher
for females than for males, as shown in Figure 3.3, and their leisure
hours23 are more dispersed, with substantially higher frequencies at
the lower levels of weekly leisure time. It is clear that for this group of
households with young children, the total work burden is on average
21 “Full-time" employment is defined by the ABS as 35 hours or more per week.
22 The time use data are collected by questionnaire and reported as weekly time uses.
Unlike diary data, questionnaire data are typically subject to larger reporting er-
rors, and as a result the sum of individual time allocations to the various activities
sometimes fails to satisfy the time constraint.
23 Leisure is computed as the remainder of the daily time endowment after subtracting
market work and household production hours, which may be adjusted to satisfy the
total time constraint. The 42-hours threshold is following from an assumption that
everyone needs at least 6 hours per day for sleep and personal care.
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greater for mothers than for fathers.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Weekly Hours of Household Production in Fami-
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Weekly Hours Spent on Leisure in Families with
Preschool Children
We differentiate between formal child care provided by recognized
institutions, such as kindergartens and care centers, and informal
care provided by the father, grandparents or other relatives, and
friends, for two reasons. First, formal child care differs from informal
child care in that it is recognized as incurring costs by the Australian
fiscal authorities, and the family is eligible for reimbursement of a
considerable part of these costs. Second, the price data on informal
care is rather unreliable. The price of formal child care is reported for
all children in registered care. In contrast, informal child care is often
provided with no charge, or at a price that implies an unobserved
subsidy from the carer. The lack of more detailed information about the
costs of informal child care makes any effort to impute corresponding
prices infeasible. Nevertheless, since the informal child care provision
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is assumed to be fixed at the observed levels, we do not need to specify
the costs of the service.24
Formal care is used by 43% of the families, while the use of informal
child care is almost universal (only 9 families report that they used no
form of informal child care). The distributions of the weekly hours of
child care are presented in Figure 3.4. The profiles for both types of
care are relatively similar, although the formal care distribution does
not go far above 60 hours per week. This reflects the fact that formal
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Weekly Hours of Informal and Formal Child Care,
Families with Preschool Children Using Child Care
Annual labor incomes are derived from reported weekly gross
salaries from all jobs. The annual non-labor income of the couple
is computed as the sum of each partner’s business income, invest-
ment income, private domestic pensions and overseas pensions.25
Figure 3.5 presents distributions of male and female labor incomes
and household non-labor income. According to these data, around
45% of mothers have zero labor income, while 54% of families in the
sample have zero non-wage income. The distribution of non-labor
income for the subsample of families with non-negative incomes is
skewed towards zero. At the same time several outliers report very
large incomes from business and investments.
These income data are used to derive the set of 25 family incomes,
net of the taxes and benefits and cost of child care, associated with
the discrete time use choices. All incomes are deflated to 2005, the
selected base year, using the Australian consumer price index.
24 The costs of informal child care will be reflected only in the informal care parameters
included in the utility function. The parameters will however also reflect pure pref-
erences for the informal service, making the separation of informal child care costs
infeasible.
25 These pensions are financial transfers which are provided to the male partners prior
to retiring officially in the Australian system, while they are still actively working.
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Figure 3.5: Annual Labor and Non-Labor Gross Incomes of Families with
Preschool Children, 2008, AUD
Income taxes and Family Benefits
The Australian income tax system is based on individual incomes and
the formal rate scale is strictly progressive. However strict progressivity
is partially lost with the phasing out of a low income tax offset. While
tax rates and the offset vary across the four waves of HILDA, the basic
structure of the system is essentially the same in each year. For the
purpose of illustration, Figure 3.6 plots the profiles of marginal and
average tax rates with respect to individual taxable income for the
2007-08 financial year. Details of the rate scale and offset for that year
are provided in Appendix 3.B.
Figure 3.6: Marginal and Average Income Tax Rates, 2007-08, and Annual
Incomes, 2008
Because the system is based on individual incomes the marginal
rates faced by partners are independent. This means that under a
progressive rate scale a married mother who decides to switch from
untaxed home production to taxed market work faces a lower marginal
tax rate, and therefore a lower average tax rate, than her husband if
she earns a lower income. In contrast, under a system of joint taxation
the tax rates faced by partners are interdependent. For the mother
who decides to go out to work, the first dollar of her earnings is
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taxed at the rate applying to the last dollar of her husband’s income.
This "tax penalty" on the second earner’s income under joint taxation
explains why switching from a joint to a purely individual based
system stimulates the participation of the second earner (see, for
example, Steiner and Whrohlich, 2004).
While the Australia’s income tax is based on individual incomes,
families are taxed effectively under a system of "quasi-joint" taxation.
This is due to the withdrawal of child payments at various thresholds
defined on joint income under a complex "Family Tax Benefit" system.
The effective marginal tax rate, obtained by adding the withdrawal
rate of payments to the income tax rate, varies widely across the
distribution of earnings and can be well above the top rate of the
formal rate scale at relatively low incomes levels. This is illustrated
in Figure 3.7 for the 2007-08 financial year, for a family with two
children aged under 13, with one under 5 years.26 The figure plots the
profiles of effective marginal and average tax rates with respect to the
income of the primary earner for two limiting cases: a single income
family and a two income family in which both partners earn the same
income. For the latter case, the figure plots the effective marginal and
average tax rates applying to the income of the second earner.27 The
higher rates on the second income indicate the tax penalty married
mothers can face on entering the workforce under a system of joint
taxation.
Figure 3.7: Effective Marginal and Average Tax Rates (Including Income
Taxes and Family Payments) by Primary Income, 2007-08
The pattern of marginal tax rates in Figure 3.7 implies a budget set
with many non-convexities28 and would make the traditional approach
of finding the optimum in the complete budget set infeasible. This
makes the discrete approach, approximating the complicated budget
frontier with a small finite set of points, particularly useful.
26 The details of the tax rates, family payments and income thresholds on which the
figure is based are set out in Appendix 3.B.
27 For a graphical analysis of cases in which the second earner has lower income than
the primary earner, see Apps and Rees (2009), Ch 6.
28 For detailed explanation why these non-convexities arise, see Appendix 3.B.
3.5 results
We first report the results for the baseline homogeneous specification
presented in subsection 3.3.1, and then discuss those for the model
with unobserved heterogeneity introduced in subsection 3.3.2.
3.5.1 Baseline Model without Unobserved Heterogeneity
The estimated parameters of the baseline model are reported in Table
3.2. If the homogeneity assumption were found to be valid, the results
would be consistent and more efficient than the latent class model.
The coefficients indicate that several of the interaction terms yield
intuitively plausible results. An increase in the number of pre-school
aged children in the household raises the marginal utility of formal
child care, and therefore strengthens the demand for it. On the other
hand, an increase in the (assumed exogenous) availability of informal
child care weakens it. The same is true for the allocation of time to
household production.
The estimated marginal utilities of the choice variables, the compo-
nents of the vector ¯, are central to our analysis, but their evaluation is
more complex than consideration of the simple regression coefficients
in isolation, since the marginal utilities depend upon the entire ma-
trix A and the vector b. They also vary with the household-specific
socio-demographic characteristics, X, and with the values of the choice
variables ¯ themselves. In Table 3.3 we summarize the distribution of
the estimated marginal utilities at the observed choices, presenting first
their sample averages and second, the proportion of households that
have negative marginal utilities. We do this for the full sample as well
as for the subsample of households that actually buy formal child care.
As expected, marginal utilities of income, household production
and leisure are on average positive, with only a very small fraction of
households having a negative value in each case. On the other hand,
around 90% of households have a negative marginal utility of formal
child care. This is of course not a problem for those households that
do not use formal child care, but the last column of the table shows
that households that do buy formal care have, on average, negative
marginal utilities. This implies that this model is not successful in
explaining the use of formal child care from economic arguments. For
most households, the use of formal child care can only be predicted
with the inclusion of error terms εr, reflecting optimization errors or
unobserved factors that make specific choices more or less attractive.
This counter-intuitive result could be due to unobserved hetero-
geneity. Our sample contains a large proportion (57%) of households
that do not use formal child care. This can be problematic for the
homogeneous model if the decision to use formal child is influenced
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Table 3.2: Regression Results for the Baseline Homogeneous Model
Matrix A Vector b
Income .199 Formal care*log(age) -.613
(.092)∗∗ (3.63)
Formal care 2.23 Formal care*log(age)2 .130
(6.20) (.529)
Household production 4.71 Formal care*married -.031
(3.42) (.057)
Leisure 7.59 Formal care*No. dependent children -.127
(3.52)∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗
Formal care2 .128 Formal care*children aged 0-4 .329
(.014)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗
Household production2 .066 Formal care*children aged 5-9 .093
(.005)∗∗∗ (.049)∗
Leisure2 .022 Formal care*informal care -.009
(.006)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Income*formal care .011 H’hold prod.*log(age) -4.07
(.004)∗∗ (2.01)∗∗
Income*h’hold prod. .019 H’hold prod.*log(age)2 .607
(.002)∗∗∗ (.294)∗∗
Income*leisure .020 H’hold prod.*married .026
(.002)∗∗∗ (.032)
Formal care*h’hold prod. -.066 H’hold prod.*No. dependent children -.112
(.004)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗
Formal care*leisure -.064 H’hold prod.*children aged 0-4 .336
(.005)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗
H’hold prod.*leisure -.050 H’hold prod.*children aged 5-9 .148
(.005)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗








Leisure*No. dependent children -.053
(.023)∗∗
Leisure*children aged 0-4 .231
(.034)∗∗∗






Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***.
71
72 Labor Supply Heterogeneity and Demand for Child Care of Mothers with Young Children
Table 3.3: Average Marginal Utilities of the Main Regressors and Fraction of
the Population Sample with Negative Marginal Utilities, Homoge-
neous Model
Average Marginal Utility Negative Fraction
Full Sample Child Care Users Full Sample Child Care Users
Income 1.06 1.04 0 0
Formal care -0.69 -0.05 0.83 0.58
H’hold prod. 0.63 0.26 0.17 0.37
Leisure 0.64 0.33 0.24 0.28
by, for example, unobserved differences in home productivity. The
model tries to explain this relation in terms of the variables included
in the utility function, assigning strong disutility to formal child care.
Since the majority of familes do not use formal care, the failure to take
account of unobserved heterogeneity forces the common coefficient to
be negative. Introducing unobserved heterogeneity may help to solve
this problem.
3.5.2 Latent Class Models
A key step in the EM estimation procedure is the initial selection of
the number of latent classes. This decision involves a trade-off. On
the one hand, the higher the number of heterogeneous groups, the
better is the fit of the model because we account for unobserved het-
erogeneity in a more flexible form. On the other hand, more stratified
models are bound to be estimated less precisely because the number
of unknown parameters rises proportionally to the number of allowed
latent classes. The determination of the optimal number of classes is
therefore crucial.
Following Train (2008), we compare the models with varying clas-
sification choices on the basis of their Schwarz-Bayesian information
criteria (BIC)
BIC = −2 log(L) + k log(n) (3.11)
where L is the likelihood, k is the number of free parameters in
the model and n is the number of observations in our sample. The
multiple-class models yield the statistics in Table 3.4. The table shows
that the 8-class model attains the lowest BIC, and should therefore be
considered as the most reliable specification for further analysis.
In order to examine whether our models actually fit the data, we
simulate individual time use allocations using the estimated models
and compare the simulated aggregated distributions to their observed
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Table 3.4: Bayesian Information Criteria for Multi-Class Models










counterpart. Figure 3.8 presents this comparison both for the baseline
model and the model with 8 latent classes.
As expected, the 8-class model replicates the empirical distributions
very well, attaining almost identical shares of intensity levels among all
three time use choices. The homogeneous model performs much worse
and essentially fails to capture the distribution of market work hours.
In particular, the model underestimates the proportion of mothers
with zero market hours and overestimates the proportion with low
hours in part-time work. The distributions of the other two choice
variables are replicated well even by the homogeneous model, though
the latent class model still provides more precise approximations.
We do not present the regression coefficients for the 8-class model be-
cause the class-level stratification makes their interpretation practically
impossible. However, one statistic which can be readily interpreted is
the fraction of the sample with negative marginal utilities (see Table
3.5).
Table 3.5: Fraction of the Population Sample with Negative Marginal Utilities
of the Main Regressors, Model with 8 Latent Classes
Whole Sample Child Care Users
Income 0 0
Formal care 0.53 0.31
Household production 0.24 0.41
Leisure 0.23 0.38
The only result which exhibits a substantial change compared to the
baseline specification (see Table 3.3) is that for formal child care. The
proportion of mothers with disutility from additional formal child care
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drops by 30 percentage points, to 53% in total and to 31% when we
restrict the sample to mothers who are using formal child care.29 This
is a considerable improvement over the homogeneous specification.
The relative performance of the models with varying numbers of la-
tent classes is further tested through a series of simulations in the next
section. The aim of these simulations is to predict how people respond
to selected changes within their economic environment. By predicting
(and comparing) the behavioral responses for different model specifi-
cations, we can analyze the importance of unobserved heterogeneity
and assess the limitations of the homogeneity assumption.
3.6 microsimulations
First, to analyze the sensitivity of choices to wages and prices, we
simulate a 10% increase in the net wages of all mothers, and a 10%
increase in the net prices of formal child care. Second, we carry out a
policy simulation in the spirit of Apps and Rees (2009), building on
their critique of joint taxation (as discussed in the previous section). We
propose an alternative system of taxes and benefits designed to have a
less distortionary effect on female labor supply than the actual system
and we estimate its impact on the choices of the type of households
we consider.
3.6.1 Changing Net Wages and Child Care Prices
The impact of wage and price changes is measured in terms of aggre-
gate elasticities. We compute the percentage changes in total hours of
market work, total hours of household production, and total hours
of formal child care with respect to changes in the net wage rates of
all mothers, or all net child care prices, holding all other variables
constant. Changing net rather than gross wages has the advantage of
circumventing secondary effects caused by changes in the effective tax
rates: increasing net wages by 10% results in 10% higher disposable
incomes from the mother’s market work across all households.30
The resulting income changes are proportional to the net earnings
of mothers so that those working earn more while non-participants
retain their original disposable incomes. Since the 10% increase in the
wage makes participation more attractive, we can expect an increase
both in market hours of employed mothers and in the labor market
29 The latter is obtained by taking weighted means over all classes, where the weights
are the class probabilities given the observed choice.
30 We decided to present net elasticities here, because they are more reflective of people’s
attitudes. Gross elasticities render the estimates of labor flexibility specific to the tax
system in place (which is often subject to change), making it difficult to compare
our results across different studies - especially if the other studies focus on different
countries. Interested reader can find the comparison of gross and net elasticities in
Appendix 3.C.
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participation rate. Similarly, an increase in net child care prices results
in an income reduction that is proportional to the cost of bought-in
child care, and we can expect that it leads to a reduction in bought in
hours and in the fraction of the sample using formal child care.
We compute aggregate elasticities as the ratios of percentage changes
in the relevant time or care use to the percentage changes in the wages
and prices (where the latter are 10 percent, by construction). This is
done as follows. We first derive the benchmark time use allocations
(using the same wages and prices that are used for estimation) by
averaging individual choice probabilities predicted by the model and
using these to compute the average hours of each activity.
A similar procedure is applied to calculate the average hours of
activities after the wage or price increase. The only difference is that
the choice probabilities are derived using adjusted disposable income
for each alternative in the choice set. This changes the utility val-
ues for some of the choice alternatives but not for others, and, as a
consequence, changes the probabilities of all choices. Using the new
probabilities we recompute average hours. Finally, we compute the
percentage deviations in the new averages compared to the bench-
mark. The elasticities for models with a varying number of classes are
provided in Table 3.6.31
Table 3.6: Elasticities of Time Use Allocations with Respect to Changes in
Net Wages and Net Child Care Prices
Mothers’ Net Wage Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Formal care hrs. 1.01 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.50 0.51 0.42 0.49
(0.051)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.096)∗∗∗ (0.101) ∗∗∗ (0.070)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗ (0.095)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗∗ (0.097)∗∗∗
Market work hrs. 1.35 0.77 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.62 0.52 0.43 0.68
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗ (0.088)∗∗∗ (0.067)∗∗∗ (0.126)∗∗∗ (0.134)∗∗∗ (0.086)∗∗ (0.149)∗∗∗
H’hold prod. hrs. -0.23 -0.10 -.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗
Net Child Care Price Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Formal care hrs. -0.51 -0.51 -0.48 -0.52 -0.47 -0.45 -0.50 -0.42 -0.38
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.043)∗∗∗ (0.033)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗
Market work hrs. -0.17 -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.018)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.023)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗
H’hold prod. hrs. 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***.
The first panel gives the responses to the increase in all mothers’
net wage rates. The first thing to note is the large difference between
the homogeneous (one class) model and the models with unobserved
31 Standard errors on the elasticities were computed through 199 Monte Carlo sim-
ulations, recomputing the percentage changes with simulated sets of parameters
determining A and b. These parameters were drawn from the estimated (multivariate
normal) distribution of the ML estimates. See Ruud (1991).
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heterogeneity (two or more latent classes), demonstrating the impor-
tance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. When we allow for
unobserved heterogeneity, the predicted responses fall substantially,
and remain relatively stable among models with different numbers of
classes.
Standard errors tend to increase as we allow for more classes, mak-
ing some of the effects less significant for heavily stratified models.
This reflects the fact that these models are more flexible and therefore
require more data for accurate estimation. Nevertheless, there are also
cases where standard errors fall as we move to the more stratified
models. We attribute this effect to the increased goodness of fit of the
latter specifications.
Given the results of the BIC selection procedure discussed in the
previous section, our discussion of simulation outcomes now focuses
on the 8-class model. The net wage increase leads to time use shifts
that correspond to intuition. A 10% increase of all net wage rates
results in a (significant) 4.3% rise in average working hours, implying
a positive uncompensated own labor supply elasticity of 0.43 for this
group of mothers with young children. This is well in line with the
large literature on female labor supply. The positive substitution effect
(the price of leisure increases) dominates the negative income effect.
Moreover, the 10% wage increase leads to a (significant) 4.2% increase
in hours of formal child care (a “cross" elasticity of 0.42). First, the
higher demand on time due to increasing hours of market work leads
to substitution of own child care for bought-in child care. Second,
higher earnings lead to higher family income, increasing the demand
for formal child care if this is a normal good.
The elasticity of time allocated to household production is signifi-
cantly negative, at -0.08. The negative sign implies that higher wages
lead mothers to work less in the household. However, the actual
change in home production hours is not large enough to compensate
for the increase market hours, implying that mothers also reduce their
leisure in order to do more market work.32
Turning to the impact of the rise in child care prices in the second
panel, it is not surprising that the highest elasticity is that of formal
child care itself. With a 10% rise in child care prices, the demand
for formal child care falls significantly, by 4.2%. This in turn causes
mothers to work less in the market - market hours drop significantly,
by 0.8%, as they have to substitute their own time for bought-in
services.33 Accordingly, the hours of household production increase
32 In absolute terms, the wage increase induces the average mother to spend about 0.55
hours per week more on market work, 0.40 hours less on household production, and
0.15 hours less on leisure.
33 This elasticity is well in line with that of Gong and Breunig (2011) but smaller than
that in Gong and Breunig (2012).
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by 0.2%, replacing almost all of the forgone time formerly spent on
market work.34
3.6.2 Simulation of a Tax and Benefit Reform
As discussed in section 3.4, the phasing out of family benefits on
household income creates high effective marginal tax rates for many
mothers as secondary earners. To investigate the impact of these
high rates on their labor supply and participation, and also on the
demand for formal child care, we simulate the effects of switching to
an individual based income tax with universal payments. The reform
replaces the marginal rate scale depicted in Figure 3.7 with one that
applies to individual taxable incomes, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. To
fund the increase in benefit payments we increase proportionally (by
26.76 percent) all marginal tax rates of the system in Figure 3.6 to
achieve a reform which is ex ante (that is, before behavioral responses)
revenue neutral.35 An alternative to this reform would be to discard
family tax benefits, and decrease the income taxes to compensate
families for the forgone benefit.
Figure 3.9 shows graphically the differences in the net tax positions
of households resulting from the reform (assuming no behavioral
responses). The differentials are ordered by the corresponding pre-
reform net household incomes, so that we can see how the shift in
the tax burden varies with household income. Since the reform is ex
ante revenue neutral, the changes for all families in the sample sum to
zero. The figure shows that when benefits are universal families with
average joint incomes gain. It is important to keep in mind that this
is due to gains for relatively low to average two earner families who
previously lost the joint income tested benefits. The proportionally
higher marginal tax rates shift the tax burden towards the higher
income groups, in effect shifting the burden from lower wage two
earner families to those with higher wage rates.
Table 3.7 summarizes the simulated changes in time allocations
and hours of formal child care in response to the reform. As in the
previous simulations, we observe a large discrepancy between the
changes predicted by the homogeneous model and those predicted
by the models with more than one latent class, with the results of the
latter proving relatively stable across different specifications. Again
34 On average mothers spend about 0.10 hours per week longer on household production
and reduce their market work by 0.10 hours and bought-in child care by 0.05 hours.
35 The reform is based on the population with preschool children. However, in the
context of the Australian family tax system for two-parent families with dependent
children, it can be viewed as one that needs to be considered for the full-population.
The extremely large child payments increase further for older children, extending
the problem of high effective marginal tax rates on secondary earners across the
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Figure 3.9: Post-Reform Differences in the Net Tax Positions of Families,
Ordered by Pre-Reform Net Household Incomes
this implies that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is important
not only to improve the fit of the model but also from a substantive
point of view.
Table 3.7: Percentage Changes in Time Allocations after FTB Reform
No. of classes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Formal care hrs. 3.90% 2.77% 2.77% 3.52% 3.78% 1.57% 2.24% 1.75% 2.74%
(0.243)∗∗∗ (0.234)∗∗∗ (0.648)∗∗∗ (0.634)∗∗∗ (0.54)∗∗∗ (0.422)∗∗∗ (0.511)∗∗ (0.38)∗∗∗ (0.564)∗∗∗
Market work hrs. 6.49% 4.43% 3.54% 4.16% 3.96% 2.99% 2.77% 3.11% 3.41%
(0.337)∗∗∗ (0.262)∗∗∗ (0.627)∗∗∗ (0.616) ∗∗∗ (0.62)∗∗∗ (0.83)∗∗∗ (0.885)∗∗ (0.684)∗∗∗ (0.915 )∗∗∗
H’hold prod. hrs. -1.11% -0.6% -0.57% -0.63% -0.39% -0.38% -0.66% -0.63% -0.61%
(0.091)∗∗∗ (0.076)∗∗∗ (0.155)∗∗∗ (0.113)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗ (0.136)∗∗∗ (0.191)∗∗ (0.133)∗∗∗ (0.152)∗∗∗
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***.
We again focus on the outcomes for the 8-class specification. We
observe that the reform would lead to a 3.11% increase in average
hours of work (about 0.43 hours per week, using the average hours
in Table 3.1), a 1.75% increase in average hours of formal child care
(0.15 hours per week), and a 0.63% decrease in the average hours
of home production (about 0.45 hours per week). All these effects
are statistically significant. On average, the positive effect on market
work of not phasing out family benefits is more important than the
negative effect due to the increase in the marginal tax rates. Market
hours of work therefore increase and, as a consequence, hours of home
production fall and demand for formal child care increases.
Heterogeneity of the Behavioral Responses
The behavioral effects induced by the reform appear to be highly
heterogeneous across population groups and latent classes. Closer
analysis of our results reveals positive effects at the extensive margin
of female market labor supply, with the predicted labor market partic-
ipation rate rising by 4.4% (to about 58%). On the other hand, these
80 Labor Supply Heterogeneity and Demand for Child Care of Mothers with Young Children
effects are mitigated by responses at the intensive margin, with some
employed mothers choosing to work fewer hours under the reform.
Average hours of market work (conditional on being employed) fall
by 1.3%, with individual responses showing considerable variation. In
fact, expected hours of market work increase for 69% of all women in
the sample. The 1.3% decline in the aggregate work at the intensive
margin is driven by the response of mothers on higher wages and
in full-time employment. Clearly these women are not among the
prospective beneficiaries of the reform because the extra family benefit
payments are not sufficient to compensate them for their higher tax
burdens. Facing lower net incomes they substitute away from market
work towards non-market time uses.
Such behavioral heterogeneity is crucial for successful targeting
of policy reforms, as it helps to identify the potential impact on dif-
ferent subsamples of the population. It is also interesting from the
perspective of economic modeling, as we can compare the relative
performance of homogeneous and latent-class models. In order to
do so, we split the sample into two groups according to actual em-
ployment status, and compute the elasticities separately for the two
groups, using both the homogeneous model and the latent class model
with eight classes. Using the homogeneous specification, the effects
prove to be almost identical for both groups, as this model captures
only a small part of the differences in productivity and preferences
between the groups (the "observed heterogeneity" part captured by the
covariates in the model). According to the eight class model results,
the simulated increase of aggregate working hours is much stronger
for non-employed mothers, with the absolute increase of market work
hours being 28% larger. As for the change of formal child care hours,
the non-employed mothers exhibit a rather modest increase in abso-
lute terms (70% lower than employed mothers), but in relative terms
their bought-in child care rises more than for employed women (the
initial level of formal child care utilization is substantially lower for
non-employed mothers).
The failure to capture heterogeneity in responses of the homoge-
neous model is further illustrated by the fact that this model cannot
replicate observed differences in reported time use allocations between
the two groups, overestimating work and formal child care allocations
of non-employed mothers and underestimating them for employed
mothers. On the other hand, the 8-class model produces almost iden-
tical time use patterns as observed in the data. For these reasons,
it is hard to maintain that the homogeneous model would be able
to provide reliable predictions of the responses to proposed policy
changes.
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Net Fiscal Effect of the Reform
We also analyze the net revenue effect of the reform taking account
for behavioral changes predicted by our 8-class model. Changes in
time allocations can affect government revenue through two distinct
channels: by increasing (reducing) their hours of work mothers are
also increasing (reducing) income tax revenues, and by buying in
longer (shorter) hours of formal child care, child care benefits rise
(decline).
The key result in this context is that the government marginally
improves its net fiscal position. Income tax revenue from mothers
rises by only 0.5%, which seems low compared to the 3.1% increase in
aggregate working hours. The reason is the heterogeneity in responses
discussed above: mothers with higher wages tend to reduce their
hours of market work, and the progressive nature of the income tax
system makes the fall in tax revenues from this group relatively large,
substantially offsetting the additional revenue from low and middle
income households. More specifically, mothers who increase their
market hours (69% of the sample) are predicted to pay an average of
$151 more in annual income taxes (a 5.6% increase) whereas those who
reduce their hours reduce their income tax liabilities by a predicted
average of $261 per annum (a 2.3% reduction). The net result is an
aggregate increase of the income taxes by $25 per household (which
translates into the aforementioned 0.5% revenue gain).
The situation is very similar for the child care benefits, which in-
crease only slightly in aggregate: on average, a household gets an
additional $2 (0.1% of the initial payments), which is small compared
with the 1.75% change of formal child care hours. Analogously to
the income tax effects, this outcome reflects the heterogeneity in be-
havioral responses.36 Combining the two effects, we estimate that
on average households will contribute an additional $23 to govern-
ment tax revenue, an increase that represents 0.2% of their original
contribution.
3.6.3 Robustness Checks
In order to assess the stability of our results, we run a series of
sensitivity checks, altering the econometric specification of our model
in the following ways. First, to achieve a more flexible specification, we
divide the time use variables into a finer grid (63) of discrete points,
allowing a greater degree of choice in household decision making.
Second, we experiment with the composition of time use variables,
36 In our sample, 65% of mothers are predicted to increase their hours of formal child
care (typically the mothers who increase their hours of market work). Once again,
a key role is played by mothers with higher wages who reduce their market work
hours and also their utilization of formal care. The relatively large fall in their claimed
benefits is sufficient to offset most of the rise in benefit claims by other households.
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reducing the mother’s household production decision to a single
maternal child care choice.37 Third extension augments the model by a
fixed disutility of work which is estimated as an additional parameter
of the utility function.38 Fourth, in order to account for potential
dependence of child care prices on the quality of the service, and
for misreporting in the individual household accounts, we estimate
a model with imputed wages and child care prices for everyone
(instead of just for the households where wages or prices are not
observed). Fifth extension investigates plausibility of the assumption
that post-reform informal child care use remains fixed at the pre-
reform levels. We do so by estimating a model which does not allow
for interactions of choice variables with informal childcare. Therefore,
this model does not assume that the provision of informal childcare
remains unchanged, and the potential effects of substitution between
informal and formal childcare are contained within the formal child
care coefficients included in the utility function. Sixth robustness check
generalizes our model using the random opportunity specification
of Aaberge, Colombino, and Strom (1999). This model allows part-
time jobs to differ in their availability from full-time jobs, reflecting
the fact that women may be facing more (or less) job opportunities
depending on their desired work hours. Unlike Aaberge, Colombino,
and Strom (1999), we do not allow for availability of jobs to depend
on the corresponding wages, as this adjustment proves cumbersome
in our model specification. Last extension evaluates the maintained
assumption that women’s leisure is consumed privately, yielding the
same utility irrespective of the leisure choices of their partners. To
check its plausibility, we augment the utility function specification with
an interaction term for male and female leisure time. The male leisure
time is treated as given for the sake of the model. The interaction term
allows for preference for shared spousal leisure time, so that women
can attribute higher utility to leisure when their partners are enjoying
it as well. The next step in loosening the assumptions imposed on
father’s time use would be to allow him to respond to the choices
made by his partner, altering his own labor engagement and own
child care provision. Here we do not pursue this extension since a
host of empirical literature (see Doiron and Kalb, 2005 or Apps and
37 This allows us to examine direct substitution effects between maternal and formal
child care.
38 There is no clear consensus with respect to which form the working indicator should
take on. Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007) put the employment dummy
into the budget constraint, so that it represents fixed monetary costs of working.
Donald and Hamermesh (2009) interact the dummy with time use variables entering
the utility function, referring to the corresponding parameters as shifters of time
use efficiency. We choose to add the employment dummy into the individual utility
function in a non-interacted form, which allows us to model fixed disutility from
work without substantially increasing the computational burden.
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Rees, 2009) showed that such responses are unlikely to occur in the
Australian context.39
Table 3.8: Robustness Check - Elasticities and Reform Responses Derived by
Alternative Model Specifications with 8 Latent Classes
Mothers’ Net Wage Increased by 10%
Original Model 6 Brackets Maternal Care Fixed Disutility
Formal care hrs. 0.42 (0.065)∗∗∗ 0.51 0.43 0.42
Market work hrs. 0.43 (0.086)∗∗ 0.61 0.57 0.57
H’hold prod. hrs. -0.08 (0.015)∗∗∗ -0.12 -0.07 -0.09
Imputed No Inf. Care Random Opportunity Interacted Leisure
Formal care hrs. 0.36 0.35 0.51 0.55
Market work hrs. 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.76
H’hold prod. hrs. -0.06 -0.10 -0.14 -0.11
Net Child Care Prices Increased by 10%
Original Model 6 Brackets Maternal Care Fixed Disutility
Formal care hrs. -0.42 (0.081)∗∗∗ -0.45 -0.44 -0.35
Market work hrs. -0.08 (0.021)∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.09 -0.11
H’hold prod. hrs. 0.02 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.01
Imputed No Inf. Care Random Opportunity Interacted Leisure
Formal care hrs. -0.40 -0.42 -0.43 -0.39
Market work hrs. -0.10 -0.07 -0.09 -0.11
H’hold prod. hrs. 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
FTB Reform - Percentage Changes
Original Model 6 Brackets Maternal Care Fixed Disutility
Formal care hrs. 1.75% (0.380)∗∗∗ 1.94% 2.29% 2.68%
Market work hrs. 3.11% (0.684)∗∗∗ 3.18% 3.01% 4.26%
H’hold prod. hrs. -0.61% (0.133)∗∗∗ -0.77% -0.37% -0.96%
Imputed No Inf. Care Random Opportunity Interacted Leisure
Formal care hrs. 1.92% 1.14% 2.58% 2.18%
Market work hrs. 3.25% 3.45% 4.23% 3.73%
H’hold prod. hrs. -0.58% -0.83% -0.87% -0.76%
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***.
39 Nevertheless, in other countries the father’s behavior may be of considerable impor-
tance - if father is likely to lower his labor supply and increase his child care provision
in response to his partner’s increased work engagement, then our model would be
misspecified. The model would not be able to account for in-house substitution of
child care sources, assigning too much importance to the arrangement of formal
child care for newly employed mothers. Accounting for flexibility of father’s choices
would then drive down mother’s wage elasticity of formal child care use. Mother’s
own wage elasticity of labor supply would increase because the woman would have
another source of child care at her disposal, making her work decision more flexible.
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Table 3.8 shows that changes in the econometric specification induce
changes in the exact values of the elasticities, but their relative sizes
and signs remain similar to those in the original model. Most of the
values remain within the 95% confidence interval of the corresponding
baseline elasticities. This finding is particularly important in the con-
text of child care quality concerns, as it suggests that the differences
in service quality reflected by variation in observed prices are unlikely
to distort our estimates.
The stability of the elasticities is also interesting in the context of
the model containing maternal child care decisions, as it suggests that
changes in the hours of home production are proportional, irrespective
of the distinction between child care-related and other household
activities. Women who engage in the labor market will therefore work
less in the household, delegating part of their chores either to the
husband or buying in the services from the market.
We also check the validity of standard errors corresponding to the
measured elasticities without changing the specification of the model
itself, but calculating standard errors in a robust way, controlling
for general heteroskedasticity and household-specific clustering (con-
sidering the estimates as pseudo maximum likelihood estimates). In
both cases the newly derived standard errors preserve the signifi-
cance levels attained by the benchmark approach, suggesting that the
heteroskedasticity or clustering is not likely to distort our results.
3.7 conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the time allocation decisions of mothers
with pre-school children, with emphasis on the influence of a non-
convex tax and benefit system on labor supply, household production
and the use of formal child care. We have focused on incorporating
unobserved heterogeneity, originating possibly from differences in
productivities and preferences. Our findings show this plays a domi-
nant role in analyzing the mothers’ decisions in our data. Our results
cast strong doubts on the usefulness of the homogeneous model with
no unobserved heterogeneity. The parameters fail to capture the true
effects of factors driving household decision making, and hence simu-
lations based on the baseline homogeneous model specification give
misleading results.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we estimated a series
of latent-class models, among which the 8-class model was found
to perform best, balancing goodness of fit against parsimony. To
assess the responsiveness to changes in the family tax system and in
child care prices, we conducted several simulations based upon our
estimated models, increasing net wages of mothers or net child care
prices, and altering the joint-income structure of the existing tax and
benefit system in the third reform.
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The simulations show that mothers are responsive to changes in
wages as well as changes in child care prices. The results suggests
that market work and formal child care tend to be complements,
and respond significantly to wage and price changes. The results also
indicate that significant changes in labor supply and child care demand
can remain unidentified when the unobserved heterogeneity is not
accounted for, since the homogeneous model leads to significantly
distorted female labor supply elasticities.
In the third simulation we show that the phasing-out of family
benefits on the basis of joint income increases marginal tax rates on
the incomes of mothers as second earners, with a negative impact
on their labor supply. The tax system can be made more favorable
for mothers by switching to a fully individual based system. In such
a setting, women are predicted to increase their labour supply and
use of formal child care. The net effect of these responses is to raise
additional tax revenue which could be used to lower tax rates and
therefore achieve efficiency gains. The gains from the reforms we have
simulated arise from changing the structure of effective marginal tax
rates under the Australian “quasi-joint” family tax system. Running a
similar policy simulation on data for countries with full joint taxation
may yield considerably stronger behavioral responses.
A number of improvements and extensions are of course possible.
First, our analysis would benefit from exploiting the panel structure
of the HILDA data set, controlling for time-stable individual effects.
Secondly, although we consider the current method of treating unob-
served heterogeneity to perform well, it could be worthwhile to assess
the stability of our results by using alternative ways of controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity, such as the random coefficient mixed logit
model, or the approaches utilizing Bayesian nonparametric methods.
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3.a heckman selection models
Here we present details of the Heckman selection models used to
predict missing wages and child care prices. The wage regressions are
estimated on a sample of partnered women aged 55 years and under,
with those reported as full-time students or disabled excluded. The
exclusion restrictions used in the participation equation are non-wage
income and number of children.
Table 3.A.1: Mothers’ Wage Estimation, Heckman Selection Model. The De-
pendent Variable Is Gross Hourly Wage.





Urbanization index .100 1.086
(.028)∗∗∗ (.730)
Non-English ethnicity -.287 -4.351
(.046)∗∗∗ (1.176)∗∗∗
Mother’s age .033 .265
(.015)∗∗ (.366)
Mother’s age squared -.0009 -.006
(.0002)∗∗∗ (.005)
Mother’s tenure .032 .404
(.004)∗∗∗ (.113)∗∗∗
Mother’s tenure squared .0005 .0001
(.0001)∗∗∗ (.003)
Other household income (log) -.100
(.012)∗∗∗
No. of children aged 0-4 -.574
(.024)∗∗∗
No. of children aged 5-9 -.226
(.025)∗∗∗
No. of children aged 10-14 -.149
(.026)∗∗∗
No. of children aged 15-18 .019
(.032)
Inverse Mills Ratio 13.121
(1.994)∗∗∗
Obs. 9324 9324
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***. Additional con-
trols include regional, educational and yearly dummies.
Both of these exclusion restrictions are standard in the literature40,
however irrespective of their prevalence, it is beneficial to discuss their
limitations. Traditionally, there has been a lack of robust exclusion
restrictions for selection models of female wages, since most of the
variables which influence women’s labor participation do influence
their wages as well. Our two restrictions may prove susceptible to this
40 Among others, they are used in Connelly, 1992, Kornstad and Thoresen, 2007, or
Doiron and Kalb, 2005
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critique as well: The non-wage income is likely to influence wages if
men match with women of similar earnings potential. The number
of children can have also non-trivial effects on wages, either through
selection into fertility, or if childbearing is causing women to lose
human capital. Some of these issues are addressed in Chapter 5 where
we use an alternative approach for modeling female wages.
The child care price regressions are estimated on a sample limited
to mothers with pre-school children. This subsample is larger than
the sample used for estimating our discrete choice model because the
time-use data in HILDA was collected for a randomized subsample
only. The exclusion restrictions in the child care participation equation
are number of adults in the household (excluding the spouses), and
residential distance from grandparents (the base group represents
families without grandparents).
Table 3.A.2: Child Care Price Estimation, Heckman Selection Model. The
Dependent Variable Is Gross Hourly Price of Formal Child Care.
Wage equation Participation Equation Price Equation
Const. -2.645 8.090
(.968)∗∗∗ (6.187)
Mother’s gross hourly wage .003 -.008
(.0009)∗∗∗ (.008)




Urbanization index .096 .354
(.068) (.288)
Non-English ethnicity -.197 -.195
(.125) (.586)
Mother’s age .069 .001
(.055) (.273)
Mother’s age squared -.0003 -.0002
(.0008) (.004)
No. of children aged 0-4 .174 -.276
(.059)∗∗∗ (.294)
No. of children aged 5-9 -.084 -.130
(.051)∗ (.229)
No. of children aged 10-14 -.274 -.981
(.087)∗∗∗ (.471)∗∗
No. of children aged 15-18 -.277 -1.683
(.143)∗ (.652)∗∗∗
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No. of other adults in the household .015
(.131)
Distance to grandparents: Same household -.730
(.376)∗
Distance to grandparents: Less than 1 km -.408
(.147)∗∗∗
Distance to grandparents: 1 to 4 kms -.243
(.144)∗
Distance to grandparents: 5 to 9 kms -.091
(.135)
Distance to grandparents: 10 to 19 kms -.086
(.138)
Distance to grandparents: 20 to 49 kms -.297
(.153)∗
Distance to grandparents: 50 to 99 kms -.025
(.210)
Distance to grandparents: 100 to 499 kms -.068
(.166)
Distance to grandparents: 500 kms or more -.030
(.154)
Distance to grandparents: Overseas -.413
(.218)∗
Inverse Mills Ratio .932
( 1.498)
Obs. 1725 1725
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***. Additional con-
trols include regional, educational and yearly dummies.
3.b australian family income taxes and child care sub-
sidies
Net household income is calculated as gross income net of tax lia-
bilities and family payments. We compute tax liabilities under the
Personal Income Tax (PIT), Low Income Tax Offset (LITO), Medicare
Levy (ML),41 and family payments under Family Tax Benefit Part A
(FTB-A) and Family Tax Benefit Part B (FTB-B). The calculation of the
net price of formal child care takes account of the two main subsidies
for child care, Child Care Benefit (CCB) and the Child Care Rebate
(CCR). Each of these component of the overall system is described be-
low. We also report details of the tax-benefit system used to construct
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 for a family with two children under 13, with one
under 5, in the 2007-08 financial year.
Personal Income Tax and LITO
The 2007-08 marginal rate scale of the PIT begins with a zero rated
threshold of $6,000, followed by rates of 15%, 30% and 40% up to an
income of $150,000, and thereafter a top rate of 45%. The LITO in
the same financial year provided a tax offset of $750, phased out at 4
41 Despite its title, the ML is entirely an income tax. It is not tied to funding any aspect
of the health system.
3.B australian family income taxes and child care subsidies 89
cents in the dollar on individual incomes above $30,000. The resulting
effective rate scale was therefore a zero rated threshold of $11,000 and
a higher rate of 34 cents in the dollar on incomes from $30,001 to
$48,750, as depicted in Figure 3.6.
Medicare Levy
A Medicare Levy (ML) applies at a rate of 1.5% of income, with
exemptions defined on family income and varying with the number
of children. In 2007-08 the family income limit for a full reduction
for a two-parent family was $29,207, plus $2,682 for each dependent
child. The exemption was withdrawn at a rate of 8.5 cents in the dollar
above this limit, with the effect of raising the marginal rate above
that limit to 44 cents in the dollar. Thus the ML introduces a further
nonconvexity in the effective rate scale and also shifts the tax base
towards joint income.
FTB-A and FTB-B
FTB-A provides a payments for each dependent child. The size of the
payment varies with the age of the child. The “Maximum Rate" of FTB-
A in 2007-08 for a child under 13 years was $4,460.30. This maximum
payment was withdrawn at 20 cents in the dollar on a family income
over $41,318 up to the “Base Rate" of $1,890.70 per annum. The Base
Rate was withdrawn at 30 cents in the dollar at a higher family income
threshold that depends on the number of dependent children. For
a family with two dependent children, the income threshold for the
Base Rate was $95,192.
FTB-B provides an annual payment of $3,584.30 for a family with a
child under 5 years. The payment was withdrawn at a rate of 20 cents
in the dollar on a second income above $4,380. It can therefore be clas-
sified as a “gender based tax” (see Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis,
2011) with, paradoxically, the higher rate applying to the income of
the mother as second earner.
Child Care Benefit and Child Care Rebate
Child Care Benefit depends (among other things) on the ages of
children, number of children, type of child care and the hours of
child care used. The benefit is phased out with rising family income
according to the age of the child and the number of children receiving
child care.
The Child Care Rebate reimburses families for their claimed child
care expenses. It can cover up to 50% of the net child care expenses
(that is, after subtracting CCB). The CCR rate is not income-tested,
but it has an upper cap on the amount of expenses which can be
reimbursed. For the year 2008, this cap was $4,354 per year.
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3.c comparison of gross and net elasticities
Table 3.A.3: Elasticities of Time Use Allocations with Respect to Changes in
Wages and Child Care Prices, Partnered Mothers with Pre-school
children
Mothers’ Net Wage Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 class 8 classes
Formal care hours 1.01 0.42
(0.051)∗∗∗ (0.065)∗∗∗
Market work hours 1.35 0.43
(0.043)∗∗∗ (0.086)∗∗∗
Household production hours -0.23 -0.08
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.015)∗∗∗
Mothers’ Gross Wage Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 class 8 classes
Formal care hours 0.70 0.25
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.069)∗∗∗
Market work hours 1.02 0.31
(0.031)∗∗∗ (0.099)∗∗∗
Household production hours -0.17 -0.05
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗
Net Child Care Price Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 class 8 classes
Formal care hours -0.51 -0.42
(0.017)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗
Market work hours -0.17 -0.08
(0.01)∗∗∗ (0.021)∗∗∗
Household production hours 0.03 0.02
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
Gross Child Care Price Increased by 10%
No. of classes 1 class 8 classes
Formal care hours -0.78 -0.71
(0.027)∗∗∗ (0.159)∗∗∗
Market work hours -0.25 -0.16
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.060)∗∗∗
Household production hours 0.04 0.03
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
Standard errors in the parentheses, significance levels: 90*, 95**, 99***.
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T H E E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F F I S C A L S T I M U L I F O R
W O R K I N G PA R E N T S
The content of this chapter is based on joint work with Henk-Wim de
Boer and Egbert Jongen that previously appeared in the CPB Discussion
Paper Series (286).
4.1 introduction
In this chapter we compare the effectiveness of fiscal policies targeted
at working families with children which aim to promote parental
labour participation. There are large differences in the mix of fiscal
support for these families across countries. For example, Scandinavian
countries direct much of their public support for working parents
to childcare subsidies (OECD, 2014; Kleven, 2014), whereas the US
and Canada rely more on in-work benefits to support this group
(Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Although these policies in part differ in
their objectives, e.g. promoting skill formation among disadvantaged
children versus income support for disadvantaged families, a common
goal is that they aim to stimulate employment. There is a large body of
literature studying the employment effects of childcare subsidies (and
pre-kindergarten and pre-school programs),1 and there is large body
of literature studying the employment effects of in-work benefits for
families with children.2 However, we know very little on the relative
effectiveness of these policies in terms of additional employment per
additional dollar or euro spent, and hence the policy mix that works
best for employment. Furthermore, there are large differences across
countries when it comes to the targeting of these policies. For example,
in-work benefits for families in the US and the UK are primarily
targeted at low incomes (Brewer, Francesconi, Gregg, and Grogger,
2009), whereas in-work benefits for families in the Netherlands are
targeted more at middle and high incomes (see below). Targeting
childcare subsidies and in-work benefits at working parents with low
incomes may cause a loss in efficiency. This, however, depends on
the relative importance of labour supply responses on the extensive
(participation) and intensive (hours worked per employed) margin
1 See Blau (2003) for an excellent overview, and Lokshin (2004), Tekin (2007), Baker, Gru-
ber, and Milligan (2008), Cascio (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2011) and Fitzpatrick
(2012) for some recent analyses.
2 Two major in-work benefit programs that have received much attention in the litera-
ture are the EITC in the US and the WFTC in the UK. See Hotz, Mullin, and Scholz
(2010) and Brewer and Browne (2006) and the references therein for the impact of the
EITC and WFTC on employment, respectively.
94
4.1 introduction 95
(Saez, 2002). Also here, we know very little on the efficiency loss (if
any) of targeting income support more at working parents with low
incomes rather than middle and high incomes.
We offer a systematic analysis of the effectiveness of childcare subsi-
dies and in-work benefits for families with children in terms of labour
participation. Specifically, we consider how these policies compare
to each other in terms of additional public spending per additional
(fulltime equivalent) employed, where we show that it is crucial to take
into account the effects of behavioural responses on the government
budget. Furthermore, we consider to what extent targeting these fiscal
policies at different income groups affects their effectiveness, to study
the equity-efficiency trade-off for these policies.
To study the effectiveness of fiscal policies targeted at working par-
ents we develop and estimate a structural model of parental labour
supply and childcare demand in the Netherlands. We use a large and
rich administrative household dataset3 for the period 2006–2009 to
estimate the preferences of couples with a youngest child 0–3 years
of age (pre primary school age) and couples with a youngest child
4–11 years of age (primary school age). Specifically, we estimate the
preferences using a static discrete choice model for the simultaneous
choice of labour supply by the mother and the father, and the use of
childcare. 4 An advantage of the discrete choice approach is that it
does not require convex or piece-wise linear budget sets, so that we
can take all the complexities of the tax-benefit system into account
(Van Soest, Das, and Gong, 2002). Furthermore, quasi-concavity of
preferences need not be imposed ex ante, and therefore coherency of
the model does not implicitly limit the range of behavioural responses
that can be obtained (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990). We model
unobserved heterogeneity using the latent classes approach as out-
lined in Train (2008) and Pacifico (2012), and recently applied to a
model with maternal labour supply and childcare choices by Apps,
Kabátek, Rees, and Van Soest (2012). Latent classes are a flexible way
of modelling unobserved heterogeneity, which can prove important for
inference of the model (Pacifico, 2012). The identification of the struc-
tural parameters benefits from a large reform in childcare subsidies
and in-work benefits for working parents in the sample period, which
generates large exogenous variation in the budget sets. Hence, we
go beyond an identification based solely on cross-sectional variation,
which may in part be endogenous, resulting in poor identification of
3 The Labour Market Panel (Arbeidsmarktpanel in Dutch) of Statistics Netherlands (2012).
4 Building on the work by Van Soest (1995), discrete choice models have become a
popular tool for the structural modelling of labour supply, see e.g. Keane and Moffitt
(1998), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), Gong and Van Soest (2002),
Blundell and Shephard (2012) and Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014). For an overview
of discrete choice models that explicitly include childcare see Blau (2003). Recent
applications include Lokshin (2004), Kornstad and Thoresen (2006) Kornstad and
Thoresen (2007), Tekin (2007), Blundell and Shephard (2012), Gong and Breunig (2012)
and Apps, Kabátek, Rees, and Van Soest (2012).
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the structural parameters and a wide range of potential biases (Blau,
2003). The reform also allows us to do a ‘reality check’ (Blundell, 2012)
on the behavioural responses of the structural model, by comparing
the simulated responses to the reform with the findings of a difference-
in-differences analysis on the same reform but using a different data
set (Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller, 2012).5
Our main findings are as follows. First, with latent classes, the
structural model predicts labour supply responses for fiscal reforms
over the period 2005–2009 very much in line with the results from the
difference-in-differences analysis on the same reforms. When we do
not allow for latent classes, the structural model predicts behavioural
responses that are smaller than those of the difference-in-differences
analysis. Second, we find that a universal increase in childcare sub-
sidies is more effective in raising labour participation than in-work
benefits targeted at both primary and secondary earners, and about
equally cost-effective as a universal increase of in-work benefits for
secondary earners. Third, we find that the effect of childcare subsidies
on total hours worked is not much lower when targeted more at low
incomes than when targeted at middle and high incomes.6 However,
the so-called knock-on effects, changes in government expenditures
and receipts due to behavioural changes, are more favourable when
we target childcare subsidies more at middle and higher incomes,
making them more cost-effective. Fourth, the most cost-effective fiscal
stimulus for working parents is an in-work benefit targeted at sec-
ondary earners that rises with income. This provides incentives both
on the extensive and intensive margin to a group of workers that is
relatively responsive on both margins.
The paper makes several contributions to the existing literature.
First of all, we have a large policy reform in our data period. This
arguably leads to more credible exogenous variation in budget sets
than previous structural analyses of labour supply and childcare that
relied on cross-sectional variation only. Second, the policy reform
also allows for a quasi-experimental check on the behavioural re-
sponses of the structural model, and we contribute to a small but
growing literature that evaluates the performance of structural models
5 Our approach satisfies all the requirements set out by Meghir and Phillips (2010,
p. 227) "[E]stimating incentive effects in a convincing way thus requires us to find
solutions to all these problems at the same time. This calls for a sufficiently flexible
approach, that allows for fixed costs of work, does not impose theory a priori every-
where in the sample (thus in a sense increasing model flexibility), uses exogenous
changes to work incentives to identify their effect, and allows for taxes and benefits.
This is of course a large set of requirements, but all have been shown to be important
empirically; in our review of empirical results we will use these criteria to judge the
value of the estimates."
6 The case for targeting childcare subsidies at low incomes is reinforced when par-
ticipation in childcare benefits children from low incomes more than children from
middle and high incomes, as suggested by e.g. Blau and Currie (2006) and Havnes
and Mogstad (2014).
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by comparing simulated policy responses with the results from quasi-
experimental studies (Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Hansen and Liu, 2011;
Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich, 2014). Third, with the structural model,
we can also study a number of issues that were not possible in the
quasi-experimental analysis. We decompose the labour participation
effect of the 2005–2009 reform package into the effect of changes in
childcare subsidies and the effect of changes in in-work benefits. We
also do counterfactual policy analysis, including a prediction for the
labour participation effects of a recent cut in childcare subsidies in the
Netherlands. Because our structural model is fully integrated with a
detailed tax-benefit calculator, we can study the effectiveness of fiscal
stimuli for working parents in terms of additional employment gener-
ated per additional public dollar or euro spent. The integrated model
also allows us to go beyond back-of-the-envelope calculations on the
effectiveness of different types of family policies using population
averages for e.g. taxes and childcare subsidies as in Blau (2003) and
Lokshin (2004). Although we focus on the impact of policy reforms
in the Netherlands, we argue that our findings are also relevant for
the effectiveness of these policies in other developed OECD countries.
Indeed, the participation rate of mothers and fathers in the Nether-
lands, as well as public spending on formal childcare and pre-primary
education, takes an intermediate position between Scandinavia and
Anglo-Saxon countries. Finally, our data set is exceptionally large
and rich. Hence, we can identify preferences for a large number of
subgroups, including couples with a youngest child that is in primary
school. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate a
structural model for labour supply and out-of-school care, next to a
model for labour supply and daycare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the policy
environment and the evolution of labour market participation by men
and women in the Netherlands in an international context. Section
3 develops the structural model and outlines the empirical strategy.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the estimation results
and the corresponding labour supply and childcare elasticities. In this
section we also present a comparison of the simulated employment
effects of the structural model for the 2005–2009 reform package with
the estimated employment effects of a quasi-experimental study. In
Section 6 we use the structural model to compare the effectiveness of
different fiscal stimuli for working parents. In Section 7 we simulate
the employment effects of recent cuts in childcare subsidies. Section 8
concludes. Supplementary material is given in the appendix.
4.2 labour market and policy environment
In the mid 1970s, the participation rate of women (15–64 years of age)
in the Netherlands was rather low by international standards, close
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to 30% (OECD, 2013).7 However, following the economic crisis in the
early 1980s, the participation rate of women in the Netherlands started
to rise. The rise in participation by mothers of young children was
particularly strong (Euwals, Knoef, and van Vuuren, 2011). By 2004,
the Netherlands, with a participation rate of women close to 70%, took
an intermediate position between the higher participation rates in e.g.
Norway and Sweden, and the lower participation rates in e.g. the US
and the UK.8
The participation rate of men in the Netherlands dropped from
the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. In the face of adverse labour market
conditions, many men were sent into early retirement and disability.
However, in the 1990s and 2000s the generosity of early retirement
and disability was cut back, and participation rates returned to levels
comparable to other developed OECD countries.9
To further promote the labour participation (in persons but also in
hours worked per week) by families with children, and of mothers
in particular, the Dutch government implemented a series of reforms
over the period 2005–2009. Following a brief introduction into the
pre-reform childcare market in the Netherlands, below we give a short
historical account of the policy changes over the period 2005–2009.
Children in the Netherlands go to primary school when they turn
4 (the legal obligation is in place from the age of 5 on), and most
children are 12 years old when they go to secondary school. Before the
age of 4, children can go to centre-based daycare, so-called playgroups
(peuterspeelzalen) and informal care. Before the introduction of the
Law on Childcare (Wet kinderopvang) in 2005, centre-based daycare
was subsidized at varying rates.10 The majority (76%) of places was
subsidized directly by employers and local governments.11 These
places had lower effective parental fees than so-called ‘unsubsidized’
places (24%), the costs of which were however partly tax deductible
for parents. To qualify for the subsidies and tax deduction, both
parents for two-parent households and one parent for single-parent
households need to work. The total enrollment rate of children 0–3
years of age in centre-based care was 25% in 2004 (see Figure 4.1). Next
to centre-based care, a large number of children also go to playgroups.
7 This section draws heavily on Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012).
8 Whereas the participation rate of women in the Netherlands has converged to other
well-developed OECD countries, there remains a sizeable and stable gap in hours
worked by employed women (OECD, 2013). In 2004, employed women in the Nether-
lands worked on average approximately 24 hours per week, while their counterparts
in other OECD countries worked 5 to 10 hours per week more. Indeed, in 2004, the
share of women working part-time in the Netherlands was 60%, by far the largest
share in the OECD (OECD, 2013).
9 Hours worked per week by employed men (36 hours per week in 2004) is also
somewhat lower in the Netherlands than in other well-developed OECD countries,
but the difference is much less pronounced than for women (OECD, 2013).
10 All the data on the use of formal childcare in this section are from Statistics Nether-
lands (http://statline.cbs.nl).
11 The subsidy is per hour of formal childcare.
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This is part-time care for less than 4 hours per day, mostly used by
families in which one of the parents does not work. Playgroups are not
a subsitute for centre-based care as they do not cover enough hours
of care for the parents to work. The enrollment rate of children 0–3
in playgroups was also close to 25%. Children that are in primary
school (4–12 years of age) can go to centre-based out-of-school care
and informal care. Similar to daycare, before the introduction of the
Law on Childcare, subsidized and unsubsidized centre-based out-of-
school care places co-existed, where the costs of unsubsidized places
were partly tax deductible for parents. The pre-reform enrollment rate
of 4–12 year olds in centre-based care was 6% in 2004.
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Source: Statistics Netherlands.
The series of reforms started with the introduction of the Law on
Childcare in 2005. This law unified the subsidies for childcare places.
From 2005 onwards, all formal places qualified for the same subsidy
from the central government. This increased the subsidy somewhat for
parents with children going to an unsubsidized place before 2005. Care
by childminders, at the home of the childminder or of the children,
also became eligible for subsidies under this law. But the unification
of the subsidies and the extension to care by childminders had only
a minor effect on public spending on formal childcare. Indeed, the
subsidy was actually reduced somewhat for the highest incomes12,
public spending actually fell slightly from 2004 to 2005, see Table 4.1.
More important were the changes that followed in 2006 and 2007.
In these years the subsidy rate was increased drastically, in particular
in 2007. Figure 5.1 shows the changes in the parental contribution rate
12 See Plantenga, Wever, Rijkers, and de Haan (2005).
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Table 4.1: Public spending on childcare and in-work benefits for parents (millions of euro)
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Childcare subsidies 725 755 1,028 1,001 1,343 2,058 2,825 3,034
In-work benefits for parents 410 460 738 830 871 984 971 1,290
– Combinatiekortinga 410 460 479 484 314 324 247 0
– Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekortingb 0 0 259 346 557 660 724 1,290
Source: Ministry of Finance (2010) and own calculations (imputation of employers’ contribution for childcare up to
2007 with data from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (personal communication) and split of the in-
work benefits for parents in its two components using the MIMOSI model of CPB). aThe Combinatiekorting applies to
primary earners, secondary earners and working single parents with a youngest child up to 12 years of age. bThe
Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting applies to secondary earners and working single parents with a youngest child up
to 12 years of age.
for the ‘first child’.13 The parental fee depends on the income of the
household. In all years, households with the lowest income receive the
highest subsidy (up to 96% of the full price). For the lowest income
households the subsidy rate hardly changed. For the middle income
households the subsidy rate went up by 20 to 40%-points, whereas
the increase in the subsidy for the highest income households was
somewhat smaller than for middle income households. On average,
the parental cost share in the full price dropped from 37% in 2005
to 18% in 2007.14,15 Next to the drop in parental fees, from 2007
onwards schools were obliged to act as an intermediary for parents
and childcare institutions to arrange out-of-school care.
In 2008 there were virtually no changes in childcare subsidies. 2009
then witnessed a partial reversal of the increase in childcare subsidies,
as subsidies were cut back somewhat, see again Figure 5.1. Over the
period 2005–2009, public spending on formal childcare went from
1 to 3 billion euro. By 2009, with public spending on childcare and
pre-primary education of 0.5% of GDP, the Netherlands took an inter-
mediate position between Sweden and Norway that spent respectively
1.4 and 1.2% of GDP on these policies on the one hand, and the US
and Canada that spent just 0.4 and 0.2% of GDP on these policies on
the other (OECD, 2014). Figure 4.1 shows the corresponding rise in the
use of formal childcare over the period 2001–2009 in the Netherlands.
Following the steep drop in the parental fee in 2006 and 2007, there
was a steep rise in the use of formal childcare, both for children 0–3
years of age (daycare) and for children 4–12 years of age (out-of-school
care).
13 The Tax Office defines the first child as the child for which the parents have the
highest childcare expenditures. For most households the first child is the youngest
child since more hours are needed for daycare (0–3 years of age) than for out-of-school
care (4–11 years of age).
14 Source: Tax Office data provided by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
(personal communication).
15 Despite the steep increase in the subsidy rate, the average prices of formal childcare
places grew more or less in line with the CPI.
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Source: own calculations using publicly available subsidy tables.
The period 2005–2009 also witnessed a number of changes in in-
work benefits for working parents. Figure 5.3 shows the level of the
Combination Credit (Combinatiekorting) per year over this period. All
working parents with a youngest child less than 12 years of age
qualified for the Combination Credit.16 Furthermore, the in-work
benefit was independent of earned income, provided earned income
was above a certain (low) threshold. This benefit was introduced in
the major tax reform of 2001, but was phased out over the period 2005–
2009. There was a reduction in 2006, and then a smaller reduction in
2008 before it was eventually abolished in 2009.
Figure 5.4 shows the level of the Income-Dependent Combination
Credit (Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting) per year by earned in-
come over the period 2005–2009.17 Secondary earners (and single
parents) qualify for this in-work benefit, but the primary earners of
secondary earners do not. This benefit was introduced in 2004. Up to
2008, there was a gradual increase in the tax credit, and the credit did
not depend on earned income (again provided that earned income
exceeded a certain threshold). In 2009 this tax credit became income
dependent, with a phase-in rate of 3.8% for income above the thresh-
old. The maximum credit in 2009 was 1,765 euro, where the maximum
was reached at a gross individual income of 30,803 euro.18
As Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show, there was a shift from the Combination
Credit, for which both primary and secondary earners were eligi-
ble, to the Income-Dependent Combination Credit, for which only
16 The name refers to the combination of work and care.
17 Up to 2008 the Inkomensafhankelijke Combinatiekorting was called the Aanvullende
Combinatiekorting (Additional Combination Credit).
18 For comparison, in 2009 the minimum wage of a fulltime worker was 16,776 euro.
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secondary earners19 (typically mothers) were eligible. Indeed, public
expenditures on the Combination Credit dropped from 484 million
euro in 2005 to 0 in 2009, whereas public expenditures on the Income-
Dependent Combination Credit rose from 346 million euro in 2005 to
724 million euro in 2008, and then to 1,290 million euro in 2009 as the
income dependent part was added, see Table 4.1.20 The motivation for
these changes in in-work benefits was that secondary earners were
believed to be more responsive to financial incentives than primary
earners, and that policymakers wanted to stimulate mothers in the
Netherlands to work more hours per week.
The reforms we simulate below are motivated by the policy reforms
we witnessed in the Netherlands over the past decade. Indeed, in the
analysis below we want to determine what policy seems to be the most
effective in terms of labour participation. Furthermore, we want to
quantify the trade-off between efficiency and equity by considering the
redistributional and efficiency effects of targeting childcare subsidies
and tax credits at different income groups.
4.3 structural model and empirical methodology
Households are assumed to maximize a unitary household utility
function. The systematic part of household utility, Us, depends on
disposable income y, hours worked by the male hm, hours worked by
the female h f , and hours of formal childcare used c.21 The functional
form of Us is log-quadratic,
Us(ν) = ν′Aν + b′ν + d′1[µ > 0],
ν = (log(y), log(1− hm/T), log(1− h f /T), log(c)),
µ = (hm, h f , c), (4.1)
with A being a symmetric matrix of quadratic coefficients and b
being a vector of linear coefficients corresponding to the vector of
the aforementioned variables ν.22 The vector d captures fixed costs of
work for men and women and fixed costs of using formal childcare.
Since these fixed costs are specified in the utility metric, they represent
an amalgamation of different factors such as intrinsic disutility from
19 And single parents.
20 Unfortunately, we could not find internationally comparable data on total public
spending on in-work benefits for families with children.
21 Unfortunately we do not observe informal childcare in our administrative dataset.
In a robustness check we include a proxy for the use of informal childcare as an
additional argument in the utility function. In the robustness check we assume that
the total demand for childcare equals ctot = max((hm + h f − T), 0). We then use the
following proxy for informal childcare cin f = max((ctot − c), 0). Using this extended
specification leads to similar labour supply and childcare elasticities, see the appendix.
22 Note that the parental work variables hm and h f in the vector ν have been trans-
formed into indicators of leisure utilization, representing the fraction of weekly time
endowment T which is spent on activities unrelated to work (including self-provided
childcare and household maintenance).
104 The effectiveness of fiscal stimuli for working parents
work, or market frictions and other costs related to job search and
childcare use. We allow for preference variation through observed
individual and household characteristics x2, x3 and x4 in parameters
b2, b3 and b4
b2 = x′2fi2, b3 = x′3fi3, b4 = x′4fi4, (4.2)
which are the linear utility terms in leisure of the male, leisure of
the female, and hours of formal childcare, respectively. The same
variation is also allowed for the fixed costs parameters d (for a full list
of covariates used, see appendix 4.D).
The budget constraint takes the following form
y = wmhm +w f h f − T(wm, hm, w f , h f ; q)− TC(pc, c; q)+ S(pc, c, yt; q),
(4.3)
where wm and w f denote the gross hourly wage for the male and the
female,23 T(.) denotes taxes and employees’ premiums, q denotes indi-
vidual and household characteristics, TC(.) is the total cost of formal
childcare, with pc denoting the price per hour of formal childcare, and
S(.) is the childcare subsidy, which depends on the hourly price of
formal childcare, the hours of formal childcare, taxable income yt and
household characteristics like the age distribution of the children.
Our econometric specification is based on a discrete choice model.
Parents choose their preferred combination of hours of work and the
hours of formal childcare from a finite set of alternatives j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Disposable household income depends on these choices, rising in
hours worked and falling in formal childcare demanded. For workers
we observe gross wages which are used to compute the work-related
part of income for each alternative in their choice sets. For non-workers
we estimate a Heckman-type wage equation which is used to simulate
their wages. We account for wage heterogeneity by taking multiple
draws from the wage error distribution. Similarly, for households
that use formal childcare we use observed hourly prices of formal
childcare, and for non-users we simulate hourly prices using the same
estimation strategy as for hourly wages. A detailed description of both
simulation exercises can be found in the appendix.
Next to the systematic part Us(νj), the utility function also contains
alternative-specific stochastic terms ε j:
U(νj) = Us(νj) + ε j. (4.4)
The stochastic terms are assumed to be i.i.d. across alternatives, and
to be drawn from the Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. This leads to
a multinomial logit specification of the discrete choice model.
We also allow for the possibility that families which are observation-
ally equivalent might have different tastes for work and formal child-
care. We assume that there is a finite number K of latent household
23 We assume that the gross hourly wage does not depend on the hours worked.
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classes (or types), with households having homogeneous preferences
within each class but heterogeneous preferences across classes. In
practice, this means that we estimate a finite mixture model with K
parametrizations of the utility function, corresponding to K distinct
subsets of our data. All the preference parameters therefore become
class-specific, which is equivalent to the assumption that they are
drawn from a mass-point distribution.24 The full set of parameters to
be estimated is then
θ = (θ1, ..., θK) = (A1, b1, d1, ..., AK, bK, dK). (4.5)
Since the classes are by definition unobservable, we cannot deter-
mine whether a given household belongs to a specific class or not.
Instead, we have to construct household-level probabilities of class
membership Pi(class = k), which reflect how likely is household i to
be driven by the preferences corresponding to class k, conditional on
the household’s choices and other observable characteristics. These
probabilities are then used as individual weights for a set of class-
specific multinomial logit models with separate parameter vectors θk.





























where R denotes the number of draws from the estimated wage and
price equation for non-workers and non-users of formal childcare.25
Dij is an indicator function which takes the value 1 for the observed
choice, and zero otherwise.
To solve the model, we use the EM algorithm, as proposed by
Train (2008). This approach has been chosen since the likelihood
frontier is likely to violate global concavity, which renders the solution
by conventional methods based on maximum likelihood practically
infeasible.
24 Limiting the distributional assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity by using mass
points was pioneered by Heckman and Singer (1984). Recently, Train (2008) introduced
a tractable way of estimating latent class discrete choice models using the EM
algorithm. For a discussion of the benefits of latent class models within the domain
of structural labour supply modelling, see Apps, Kabátek, Rees, and Van Soest (2012).
For an overview of their implementation and potential computational improvements,
see Kabátek (2013).
25 The number of draws in our specification is 10, and it is kept relatively low to limit
the computational complexity of the model. We argue that this is sufficient since the
unobserved component in the childcare price equation is negligible compared to the
actual values - reflecting the fact that the majority of childcare centres charge the
same price for their services. Increasing the number of draws does not qualitatively
change predictions of our model.
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4.4 data
We use the Labour Market Panel (in Dutch: Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statis-
tics Netherlands (2012). The backbone of the Labour Market Panel
are the annual observations of the Labour Force Survey (in Dutch:
Enquete Beroepsbevolking) for the period 1999–2009, which contains the
education level of adult members of the household. Statistics Nether-
lands supplements this data set with three additional data sources.
First, administrative data from municipalities for the period 1999–2009
(in Dutch: Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie) that contains information
on individual and household characteristics like age, ethnicity, ages
of the children and area of residence. Second, administrative data
from the Social Statistical Panel for the period 1999–2009 (in Dutch:
Sociaal Statistisch Bestand) on hours worked and gross income. The
hours worked are observed both in their nominal value and also ex-
pressed as a share of the full-time work equivalent spent in a given
job. Third, administrative data on formal childcare from the Formal
Childcare Database of the Tax Office for the shorter period 2006–2009
(in Dutch: Wet Kinderopvangtoeslag). With respect to formal childcare, a
distinction is made between daycare (children 0–3 years of age26) and
out-of-school care (children 4–11 years of age).
From the Labour Market Panel we make the following selections to
arrive at the sample we use in the estimations. Childcare subsidies are
available to parents up to the point where the child goes to secondary
school. Most children are 12 when they go to secondary school27, and
therefore we restrict the sample to households with a youngest child 0
up to and including 11 years of age. Because we only have data on the
use of formal childcare for the period 2006–2009, we further need to
restrict the sample to this period.
We only model the labour supply choice of couples, and hence
also drop single parents. Next, we exclude couples in which at least
one parent is either self-employed or has multiple sources of income,
because we can not determine their budget constraint.28 Furthermore,
we exclude couples in which at least one of the partners is on disability
or unemployment benefits, assuming that they are constrained in their
labour supply choice. After these selections are made, we further drop
households with missing information on individual or household
26 Maternity leave in the Netherlands is rather short, 3 months after the birth of the
child, which can be supplemented with 3 months of parental leave for which the
replacement rate is rather low however (OECD, 2014). Hence, we also include parents
with a youngest child less than 1 years old in the analysis.
27 We do not observe whether a child is in secondary school or not.
28 The self-employed account for 8.1% of working mothers, which is a lower share than
the one observed in the Australian data (13%). We argue that unlike in the Australian
case, here we are not fundamentally limiting the flexibility of maternal work choices
by excluding self-employed mothers. The Dutch labor markets are known to be very
accomodating to part-time work appointments, so that mothers do not need to opt
for self-employment in order to reach out for more flexible labor engagement.
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characteristics. This leaves us with approximately 60 thousand obser-
vations (households times periods in the sample). Given the large set
of discrete choices we allow (see below), and the large set of preference
parameters for each latent class, estimating the preference parameters
results in a considerable computational burden. We therefore take a
random subsample of 15%.29 This leaves us with 4,170 observations for
couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age, and 5,013 observations
for couples with a youngest child 4–11 years of age.
Table 4.2 gives descriptive statistics of our sample. Fathers in our
sample are on average a few years older than mothers. Fathers and
mothers in our sample are predominantly born in the Netherlands,
and most of them have a level of education classified as middle.
Furthermore, whereas fathers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age
are slightly more likely to be higher educated than fathers with a
youngest child 4–11 years of age, mothers with a youngest child 0–3
years of age are considerably more likely to be higher educated than
mothers with a youngest child 4–11 years of age (a cohort effect). The
majority of households lives in smaller cities and towns (<150,000
inhabitants). There is a considerable gap in the gross hourly wage
between fathers and mothers, with fathers earning on average 4 to
6 euros per hour more than mothers in couples with a youngest
child 0–3 and 4–11 years of age, respectively. The labour participation
rate is much higher for fathers than for mothers. Furthermore, the
participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 0–3 is higher than
the participation rate of mothers with a youngest child 4–11. Finally,
households with a youngest child 0–3 years of age are more likely
to use formal childcare than households with older children. 50% of
the households with a youngest child 0–3 years of age sends their
children to formal childcare, compared to just 13% for households
with a youngest child 4–11 years of age. A typical school day is from
8:30 to 15:00, and many families are able to cover the remaining hours
with parental time or informal care. This is also reflected in the average
hours of formal childcare used per week by households that do use
formal childcare. It remains to be added that the differences between
the statistics observed within the two samples of mothers are also
likely to reflect the cohort effects. The education levels of women with
older children are considerably lower than those attained by women
with children aged 0–3. Part of the differences observed might be
hence related to the educational differences, and potentially also the
different labor prospects stemming therefrom. These cohort effects
sohuld be also borne in mind when interpreting the estimation results
for the both samples.
29 We have tested the stability of the preferences and the elasticities using different sub-
sample sizes. Moving from smaller to larger sample sizes, preferences and elasticities
appear to stabilize once we take a 15% subsample.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics by sex and age of the youngest child
Men Women
0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs 0-3 yrs 4-11 yrs
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 36.8 4.90 43.3 5.10 34.1 4.40 40.8 4.60
Native 0.84 0.36 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37
Western immigrant 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
Non-Western immigrant 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.26
Lower educateda 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.34 0.22 0.42
Middle educateda 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50
Higher educateda 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.26 0.44
Large cityb 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36
Small cityb 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.36 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.36
Hourly gross wage 20.2 10.0 22.2 11.2 16.3 6.30 16.1 7.60
Participation rate 0.96 0.19 0.95 0.21 0.82 0.39 0.75 0.43
Hours worked per weekc 38.7 5.20 38.7 5.50 23.0 8.20 21.2 8.50
Using formal childcared 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.34 0.50 0.50 0.13 0.34
Hours formal childcare per weeke 27.1 16.2 14.4 11.1 27.1 16.2 14.4 11.1
Number of observations 4,170 5,013 4,170 5,013
aEducation is classified as follows (using the Dutch abbreviations): i) lower educated = BO and VMBO, ii) middle
educated = MBO, HAVO and VWO, iii) higher education = HBO and WO. bA city is defined as large (small)
when it has 150,000 inhabitants or more (less than 150,000 inhabitants). cHours worked per week per employed.
dThe share of households using formal childcare is higher than the share of children in formal childcare in Figure
4.1. First, Figure 4.1 includes more households who are not eligible for childcare subsidy such as households
with unemployment or disability benefits. Second, households with many children use less formal childcare on
average. eHours of formal childcare per week per household using formal childcare.
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For our discrete choice model we discretize the data. Men and
women are both allowed to choose from 6 labour supply options.
Labour supply is discretized in 0 to 5 days, where each day equals 8
hours.30 For childcare, we allow for 0, 1, 2 and 3 days, where the data
show that a typical day in a daycare centre equals 10 hours,31 and a
typical day in out-of-school care equals 5 hours.32 The full choice set
for each household is 6 X 6 X 4 = 144 alternatives.
To determine disposable household income in each discrete option
for labour supply and formal childcare we use the MIMOSI model
(Romijn, Goes, Dekker, Gielen, and van Es, 2008). MIMOSI is the
official tax-benefit calculator of the Dutch government for the (non-
behavioural) analysis of the redistributional and budgetary effects of
reform proposals. MIMOSI allows for a very accurate calculation of
the budget constraints. Indeed, it takes into account all (national33)
taxes, social security premiums, and income independent subsidies
and tax credits. Furthermore, MIMOSI also calculates the childcare
subsidy applicable for each household in each option. The subsidy
depends on the full hourly price of childcare per type of childcare (e.g.
daycare or out-of-school care) up to a maximum price beyond which
parents receive no additional subsidy, household income (subsidies
are lower for higher incomes), the number of children (the subsidy
is higher for the second, third etc. child in formal childcare), and
whether or not both parents work (both parents need to work to receive
the subsidy34). Income that enters the household utility function is
disposable household income defined as gross household income
plus childcare subsidies minus taxes, employees’ premiums (for the
employed), the nominal health care fee, and expenditures on formal
childcare.35 We ensure that household disposable income (excluding
childcare costs and childcare subsidies) can not fall below the social
assistance level for couples with children. For each discrete option we
also calculate the net transfer from the household to the government
(positive or negative). This allows for an accurate calculation of the net
budgetary costs of the reforms excluding and including behavioural
responses. This is crucial for the comparison of the effectiveness of
different fiscal stimuli for working parents.
30 Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 5), 8 ∈ [5, 13), 16 ∈ [13, 21), 24 ∈ [21, 29), 32 ∈ [29, 37), 40 ∈
[37, ∞).
31 Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 0], 10 ∈ [0, 15), 20 ∈ [15, 25), 30 ∈ [25, ∞).
32 Classified as: 0 ∈ [0, 0], 5 ∈ [0, 7.5), 10 ∈ [7.5, 12.5), 15 ∈ [12.5, ∞).
33 In the Netherlands local taxes account for only a small portion of total taxes (3.3% in
2007, European Union (2014)).
34 When one of the partners becomes unemployed, they are still eligible for childcare
subsidies for a limited period of time.
35 Disposable income in the estimations and simulations is in 2006 prices. We use the
CPI to convert prices in later years to 2006.
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4.5 estimation results
We estimate the preferences separately for couples with a youngest
child 0–3 years of age, and for couples with a youngest child 4–11
years of age. This is to acknowledge that there can be non-trivial
differences in childcare requirements and labour supply incentives
faced by the two groups of households (Bernal, 2008).
As discussed in Section 5.2, to account for unobserved heterogeneity,
we allow each subpopulation to consist of a number of latent classes.
In order to assess how many latent classes should be used, we have
estimated a set of models allowing for 1, 2, 3 or 4 latent classes
(the model with one class being a homogenous specification). The key
variables of interest, the labour supply and formal childcare elasticities,
prove to be fairly stable for specifications with two and more latent
classes. These can be found in the appendix (see Table 4.A.3).
In contrast to Chapter 3, here we do not use Bayesian Information
Criteria (BIC) to select the optimal number of latent classes. The BIC
criteria which we derived in an earlier version of this paper would
lead us to employ highly-stratified models, even though we found
that inclusion of all the additional classes had little to no impact on
measured elasticities and reform simulations.36. Therefore we have
decided to use the most parsimonious model which would generate
elasticities qualitatively similar to those of more-stratified models,
opting for the specification with 2 latent classes. Another way to select
the optimal number of latent classes would be to use a problem-
specific version of the information criterion, following the work of
Claeskens and Hjort (2003). The authors advocate the use of Focused
Information Criterion, which aims to assess the stability of a problem-
specific parameter of interest (such as wage elasticity), rather than the
stability of penalized log-likelihood as is the case with BIC.
The estimated preference parameters and aggregate class shares for
the models with 2 latent classes can be found in the appendix (Table
4.A.5 and 4.A.6). However, rather than interpreting the individual
coefficients, we focus on elasticities derived from the estimated struc-
tural parameters. First, consider the labour supply elasticities in Table
4.3. For an increase in the gross hourly wage of the men, we find a
total hours worked elasticity for men (‘Labour supply men’) of 0.06
(youngest child 4–11) and 0.08 (youngest child 0–3), where most of the
response is on the decision whether or not to participate (‘Extensive
margin’) and not on the decision on how many hours per week to
36 This undesirable outcome follows from the mechanics of BIC: The second term in
the BIC equation 3.11 (which penalizes log-likelihood for the loss of degrees of
freedom) becomes less important as the number of observations n grows larger.
Accordingly, BIC is going to favor extremely stratified models as long as the sample
is big enough. However, whether the increased precision of parameter estimates is
worth the computational burden of estimating a model with 20 or more latent classes,
is an open question with no universal answer.
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work (‘Intensive margin’). We find a sizeable negative cross-elasticity
for total hours worked by women. However, note that women work
fewer hours in the base than men. In the end, the overall effect on total
hours worked by households is close to zero (not reported). We also
find a modest elasticity of the use of formal childcare with respect to
the gross hourly wage of the men.
Table 4.3: Gross wage elasticities
Hourly wage men +1% Hourly wage women +1%
0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs 0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Labour supply men 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 –0.05 0.01 –0.04 0.02
– Extensive margin 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.03 –0.02 0.01 –0.01 0.02
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.03 0.01 –0.03 0.02
Labour supply women –0.15 0.03 –0.08 0.02 0.40 0.03 0.47 0.03
– Extensive margin –0.10 0.02 –0.04 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.31 0.04
– Intensive margin 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.02
Formal childcare 0.11 0.05 0.15 0.07 0.41 0.02 0.77 0.11
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 draws.
Turning to the results for an increase in the gross hourly wage of
the women, we find much larger own-wage elasticities for women
than for men. Indeed, the own-wage elasticity for mothers with a
youngest child 0–3 and 4–11 is 0.40 and 0.47, respectively. About two-
thirds of the response is on the extensive margin, and about one-third
is on the intensive margin.37 We also find negative cross-elasticities
for men, but these cross-elasticities are considerably smaller than for
women. Following the larger labour supply response to female wages
than male wages, we also find a larger elaticity of the use of formal
childcare with respect to the gross hourly wage of women instead of
men.
Table 4.4 presents the formal childcare price elasticities. In the first
three rows, we consider the elasticity of the use of formal childcare,
labour supply by men and labour supply by women with respect to
the change in the gross price of formal childcare. We see a substantial
negative price elasticity of formal childcare: –0.66 for couples with a
youngest child 0–3 years of age and –0.77 for couples with a youngest
child 4–11 years of age. There is hardly any effect on the labour
37 Bargain, Orsini, and Peichl (2014) also find that intensive margin responses for women
in couples are relatively high in the Netherlands. Indeed, women in the Netherlands
are arguably more free to choose their working hours, given the large share of
part-time working women in the Netherlands.
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Table 4.4: Gross and net price of formal childcare elasticities
Price of formal childcare +1%
0–3 yrs 4–11 yrs
Mean SE Mean SE
Gross price elasticities
Formal childcare –0.66 0.03 –0.77 0.10
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Labour supply women –0.14 0.01 –0.04 0.01
Net price elasticities
Formal childcare –0.41 0.02 –0.54 0.07
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Labour supply women –0.09 0.01 –0.03 0.01
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 draws. The gross price of formal
childcare elasticities relate the percentage change in the use of formal childcare
and labour supply by men and women to the percentage change in the full price
of formal childcare. The net price of formal childcare elasticities relate the per-
centage change in the use of formal childcare and labour supply by men and
women to the percentage change in the parental fee for formal childcare.
supply of men, but a significant negative effect on the labour supply
of women. This is particularly true for women with a youngest child
0–3 years of age, who use much more formal childcare than women
with a youngest child 4–11 years of age. The next three rows give the
same elasticities with respect to the net price of formal childcare or the
parental fee of formal childcare. A 1% increase in the gross price leads
to more than a 1% increase in the average parental fee in part because
a fraction of the parents pays a gross price that is higher than the
maximum price for which they can get a subsidy. Hence, these parents
have to bear the full 1% rise in the gross price. The net price elasticities
are more directly comparable to other studies, that typically focus on
the elasticity with respect to the parental fee. These elasticities are
somewhat smaller, but still substantial with –0.41 for couples with a
youngest child 0–3 and –0.54 for couples with a youngest child 4–11.38
Our results for the net price elasticity of labour supply by women
is in line with the review presented in Blau (2003, p. 492). For the
studies that explicitly allow for a formal childcare choice next to a
labour supply choice, and hence do not impose a 1-to-1 link between
the two, the elasticity of labour supply of women with respect to the
net price of formal childcare is relatively low, ranging from –0.09 to
–0.20. For mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age, we find a
similar low elasticity of –0.09. For mothers with a youngest child 4–11
38 For example, in a recent study for Australia, Gong and Breunig (2012, Table 4)
calculate a net price elasticity of childcare of –0.22.
4.5 estimation results
Table 4.5: Comparison with DD analysis: policy reforms 2005–2009
Structural model DD analysisb
Childcare Comb. Income Total Coeff. SE
Credit Dep. CC
Model with latent classesa Changes in levels
Youngest child 0-3 yrs
Participation rate women 0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.030 0.020 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.693 -0.098 0.566 1.185 1.222 0.223
Participation rate men 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.059 -0.017 0.024 0.075 –0.509 0.237
Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Participation rate women 0.004 -0.008 0.020 0.017 0.022 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.173 -0.133 0.566 0.616 0.750 0.221
Participation rate men 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.016 0.005 -0.027 -0.001 –0.180 0.234
Model without latent classes
Youngest child 0-3 yrs
Participation rate women 0.017 -0.005 0.018 0.030 0.020 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.671 -0.091 0.549 1.147 1.222 0.223
Participation rate men 0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.069 -0.030 0.045 0.091 –0.509 0.237
Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Participation rate women 0.002 -0.004 0.015 0.013 0.022 0.007
Hours worked per week women 0.101 -0.078 0.418 0.445 0.750 0.221
Participation rate men 0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
Hours worked per week men 0.020 -0.029 0.061 0.056 –0.180 0.234
a
2 latent classes. bAdditional estimates on the same sample as Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012), full
regression results available on request.
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the elasticity is even much lower (–0.03), but this is partly the result of
the lower share of women using formal care in this group.39
In Table 4.5 we present a test of our structural model. Bettendorf,
Jongen, and Muller (2012) analyse the employment effects of the re-
forms discussed in Section 4.2 using difference-in-differences (DD).
The identification in Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012) comes
mostly from the intertemporal dimension, using a before–after com-
parison with data for the period 1995–2009. The identification in our
analysis comes in part from intertemporal variation from the policy re-
forms in the period 2006–2009, but in part also from the cross-sectional
variation. Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012) present estimation
results for mothers with a youngest child 0–11 years of age, but this
includes single mothers. Furthermore, they report effects for a differ-
ent classification of mothers (with a youngest child 0–3, 4–7 and 8–11
of age). To make the comparison with the DD as clean as possible,
we used the same initial sample as Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller
(2012) but we estimate responses for the subgroups we consider in our
empirical analysis, that is men and women in couples with a youngest
child 0–3 or 4–11 years of age. The results are given in Table 4.5, along
with the simulation results for the estimated structural model.
Table 4.5 shows that the results for the structural model are very
much in line with the results of the DD analysis for mothers. Indeed,
we can not reject that the DD estimates for the effect on hours worked
and participation of mothers are equal to the simulated effects. The
estimated effects on the participation rate of fathers is again very much
in line with the prediction from the structural model, and we can not
reject that they are the same. For the intensive margin, for fathers with
a youngest child 4–11 years of age, the DD analysis suggests a smaller
negative effect on hours worked per week by the employed than the
structural model, although the coefficient is not significantly different
from the prediction of the structural model. The only coefficient of
the DD analysis which differs significantly from the prediction of the
structural model is the intensive margin response by fathers with a
youngest child 0–3 years of age, for which the DD analysis suggests a
larger, negative response than the structural model.
Table 4.5 also shows the predictions of the structural model when
we do not allow for latent classes. In this case the predictions of the
structural model move away from the DD estimates, in particular for
hours worked per week by women in couples with a youngest child
4–11 years of age. Hence, a comparison with the DD analysis seems to
favour a model with latent classes over a model without latent classes.
39 Table 4.A.4 in the appendix gives the resulting elasticities when we include a proxy
for informal childcare. This hardly affects our results. The simulated labour supply
elasticities and price elasticities of formal childcare are very similar to the model
where we do not include informal care in the utility function.
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4.6 relative effectiveness of fiscal stimuli
The structural model allows for a simulation of counterfactual policy
reforms. Specifically, we use the model to study the effects of a number
of prominent fiscal stimuli for working families with children. The
policy reforms we consider are motivated by the actual reforms that
have occured in the Netherlands over the past decade. Since many
countries have witnessed, or are considering, similar types of reforms,
we believe that the relevance of our results extends well beyond the
borders of the Netherlands.
We consider three types of fiscal stimuli for working parents: i) an
increase in childcare subsidies, ii) an in-work benefit for secondary
earners, and iii) an in-work benefit for primary and secondary earners
in couples. Furthermore, for each of these fiscal stimuli we consider
an across-the-board reform, where the additional subsidy does not
depend on individual or household income, and we consider a reform
where the stimulus rises with income, targeted more at middle and
high income households and the intensive margin of labour supply.
Comparing the results for the across-the-board reforms and the income
dependent reforms we can study to what extent there is an equity-
efficiency trade-off for the different fiscal stimuli. In all simulations we
consider the effects of a reform that costs 100 million euro40 given the
initial distribution of labour supply and childcare choices, i.e. without
behavioural changes.41 Further details of the reforms we simulate and
the output we report are given below.
First we consider the following three across-the-board scenario’s:
(1) An income independent increase in childcare subsidies: we in-
crease the hourly childcare subsidy by 10.3 percentage points of
the hourly price.
(2) An income independent (‘flat’) in-work benefit for secondary earn-
ers of 290 euro per year.
(3) An income independent (‘flat’) in-work benefit for primary and
secondary earners in couples of 126 euro per year.
40 By doing so, we deviate from the approach chosen in Chapter 3 where we stipulated
that the reform has to be revenue neutral. There, we wanted to see whether we can
set up a tax-benefit system which would be more supportive of female labor supply
while sustaining the same level of public spending. Here, we want to analyze how
cost-effective are competing policy proposals in stimulating the female labor supply.
The revenue-neutrality is of secondary importance, since neither the implemented
reforms were accompanied by measures designed to compensate their budgetary
burden. The revenue-neutrality of the corresponding reforms can be achieved by
measures similar to the one applied in Chapter 3, but doing so should not change
relative cost-effectiveness of the evaluated reforms.
41 Alternatively, we could have simulated reforms that generate the same budgetary
costs after taking into account behavioural responses. However, this approach would
not lead to different conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the different fiscal
stimuli.
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For these simulations we present the following output. First, to study
the equity effects of the reforms, we present scatterplots of the redis-
tributional effects and also report the effect on the Gini-coefficient of
disposable income. Next, we report the effects on labour supply, both
in terms of participation (extensive margin) and in total hours worked
(extensive and intensive margin). Next to the effect on labour supply
and labour production we also report the effect on formal childcare
use. Finally, we measure the relative effectiveness of the different fiscal
stimuli by looking at public spending required to bring an additional
person to the workforce.
The redistributional effects of the across-the-board reforms are given
in Figure 4.5, 4.7 and 4.9, respectively. On the horizontal axis we have
disposable household income, on the vertical axis the percentage
change in disposable household income relative to the base (in %).
None of these subsidies do depend on income directly, the absolute
change in disposable income is the same for low and high income
households that use the same formal childcare and have the same
number of partners employed. However, because we present redistri-
butional effects in percentage terms, percentage changes in disposable
income are lower for high income households, ceteris paribus. For the
childcare reform in Figure 4.5 we see a number of ‘lines’, as families
differ in the number of children they have, as well as the number
of days of formal childcare they use per child. Furthermore, for the
childcare reform we further observe that although the change in the
subsidy itself does not depend on income, there is quite a large mass
of families with middle and higher incomes that receive susbtantially
more subsidy. This is because these families are more likely to use
formal childcare than lower-income families. Indeed, the effect of the
reform on the Gini-coefficient (without behavioural changes), reported
in column (1) in Table 4.6, is actually positive for the across-the-board
childcare reform (inequality rises). Figure 4.7 shows two lines for the
in-work tax credit of secondary earners. A first line lies on the x-axis
and represents couples who do not receive the in-work tax credit since
at least one of the partners does not work. The second line refers to
couples in which both partners work and therefore receice the in-work
tax credit. Looking at the percentage changes, we see that a large part
of the credit goes to households with a lower income. Indeed, for
this reform we see a modest decline in the Gini-coefficient for dis-
posable incomes, see column (2) in Table 4.6. Finally, Figure 4.9 gives
the redistributional effects of the in-work benefit for both primary
and secondary earners. Here we see three lines, one for two-earner
households, one for one-earner households and one for households
in which neither of the two parents works. Looking at the percentage
changes, this reform is targeted even more at lower incomes, and the
Gini-coefficient falls the most in this scenario, see col. (3) in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6 presents the effects on labour participation, formal child-
care and government finances of these three scenario’s. Column (1)
gives the results for the increase in the childcare subsidy. First, con-
sider the effects on labour participation of couples with a youngest
child 0–3 years of age (pre-primary school). The higher childcare
subsidy draws some men into the workforce (extensive margin). But
men already working reduce their hours worked (intensive margin).42
42 The intensive margin also captures a composition effect, when new entrants on the
labour market work different hours on average than the incumbent workforce.
Table 4.6: Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli of 100 million euro
Across-the-board Targeted more at higher incomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Childcare I-WB I-WB Childcare I-WB I-WB
subsidies 2nd earners all subsidies 2nd earners all
Percentage changes
Gini coefficient 0.35 -0.10 -0.34 0.93 0.53 -0.14
Labour supply total 0.55 0.28 0.09 0.56 0.44 0.11
Labour supply youngest child 0–3
– Men 0.04 0.03 –0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02
— Extensive margin 0.22 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.06
— Intensive margin –0.19 –0.09 –0.07 –0.06 –0.09 –0.04
– Women 2.44 0.75 0.23 2.29 1.34 0.27
— Extensive margin 1.52 0.89 0.34 1.19 0.73 0.13
— Intensive margin 0.90 –0.14 –0.11 1.10 0.61 0.14
Labour supply youngest child 4–11
– Men 0.03 –0.02 –0.03 0.05 –0.03 –0.01
— Extensive margin 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04
— Intensive margin 0.01 –0.08 –0.06 0.03 –0.09 –0.05
– Women 0.89 1.02 0.44 0.91 1.49 0.41
— Extensive margin 0.39 1.24 0.56 0.35 0.80 0.23
— Intensive margin 0.50 –0.21 –0.12 0.55 0.68 0.18
Formal childcare total 12.62 1.28 0.67 11.13 2.12 0.79
Formal childcare youngest child 0–3 11.54 1.20 0.64 9.51 1.82 0.70
Formal childcare youngest child 4–11 16.28 1.54 0.80 16.61 3.12 1.09
Millions of euro
Additional public exp. ex ante 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Knock-on effect childcare subsidies 132.4 11.0 5.8 103.4 16.8 6.3
Knock-on effect taxes and benefits –52.7 –19.7 –4.8 –60.1 –33.5 –8.5
Additional public exp. ex post 179.7 91.3 101.0 143.3 83.3 97.8
Euro
Ex ante spending per FTE 28,135 55,269 179,070 27,782 35,211 142,829
Incl. effect on formal childcare use 65,374 61,323 189,402 56,509 41,122 151,859
Incl. effect on taxes and benefits 50,559 50,442 180,772 39,810 29,328 139,741
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The overall effect on hours worked by men is small. The effect on
hours worked by women is much more pronounced. Indeed, there is
a substantial positive effect on both the extensive and the intensive
margin. Here, it is important to note that although the increase in the
childcare subsidy is income independent, there is a substitution effect
at work. Indeed, mothers that work more hours are also more likely
to use more formal childcare, and thus have an extra benefit from the
increase in the childcare subsidy. Turning to couples with a youngest
child 4–11 years of age, we observe similar though somewhat smaller
labour supply effects. Children in primary school are less likely to go
to formal childcare, and if they do they typically go for only a few
hours per day. For all couples with a child 0–11 years old, we find an
increase in hours worked of 0.55%.
In absolute terms, men in couples increase their labour supply by
0.01 hours per week. The average increase is much higher for women
in couples: 0.44 and 0.13 for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 and
4–11 years of age, respectively. However, the rise in formal childcare is
much more pronounced than the rise in total hours worked. Couples
with a youngest child 0–3 (4–11) years of age demand 1.77 (0.33)
additional hours of childcare per week. This reflects the fact that there
is not a 1-to-1 link with hours worked.
To conclude the analysis of reform (1), at the bottom of the table
we give the effects on government finances, excluding and including
so-called knock-on effects on government finances that result from be-
havioural changes. In case of the childcare subisdy reform, the increase
in hours worked increases tax receipts and reduces expenditures on
(welfare) benefits. This shift is however dominated by the increase in
childcare subsidies due to substitution of other types of care for formal
childcare. The average subsidy rate for formal childcare in the baseline
scenario is 76% of the hourly price, making the increase in formal
childcare rather costly to the government. Taking into account the
behavioural responses, government expenditures rise by 180 instead
of 100 million euro. As a measure of the relative effectiveness of reform
(1), in the last three rows we calculate the additional public spending
per additional fulltime-worker equivalent (fte) employed. Ignoring the
knock-on effects, additional public spending per additional fte is 28
thousand euro. However, when we take into account the increase in
formal childcare, additional public spending per additional fte rises to
65 thousand euro. Finally, taking into account the savings on benefits
and the additional tax receipts, we still arrive at 51 thousand euro per
additional fte. These calculations highlight that it is important to take
into account the knock-on effects of changes in formal childcare when
calculating the effectiveness of childcare subsidies.
Column (2) in Table 4.6 gives the behavioural responses and corre-
sponding budgetary effects for the ‘flat’ in-work benefit targeted at
secondary earners. First, again consider the effects on couples with
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a youngest child 0–3 years of age. The effect on the labour supply of
men is again small, most men are not secondary earners. The effect
on hours worked by women is much smaller compared to reform (1).
In part, this is simply due to the fact that a larger part of the tax credit
actually goes to the larger group of mothers with a youngest child
4–11 years of age than with reform (1). However, we also see that for
reform (2) the intensive margin response is negative for women with a
youngest child 0–3 years of age, because the in-work benefit only has
an income effect on the intensive margin. Turning to the couples with
a youngest child 4–11 years of age, we find a larger effect on hours
worked compared to reform (1), as a larger part of the subsidies goes
this group. Also for this group, the effect on the intensive margin is
negative. When we look over all couples, we find that the increase in
total hours worked in reform (2) is only about half of reform (1).
Since the tax credit does not affect the price of formal childcare
for parents, reform (2) has only a modest effect on the use of formal
childcare, following the increase in total hours worked. This is also
reflected in the knock-on effects. As the flat tax credit for secondary
earners is less succesful in raising hours worked, the knock-on effect
of increases in taxes and savings on benefits is smaller than in the
childcare subsidy reform. However, because the knock-on effect on
childcare subsidy expenditures is much smaller than reform (1), reform
(2) generates a positive knock-on effect of 9 million euro. Again, we
calculate the relative effectiveness of the reform as additional public
expenditures per additional fte employed. Ignoring the knock-on
effects, additional public spending per additional fte employed is 55
thousand euro. Taking into account the knock-effects, this number
becomes 50 thousand euro. When we compare the relative effectiveness
of reform (2) with reform (1), we find that both reforms are about
equally effective. Note however, that reform (1) goes at the expense of
greater inequality, whereas reform (2) actually reduces inequality.
Finally, column (3) in Table 4.6 gives the results of a flat in-work
benefit for both primary and secondary earners. In this senario, a
large part of the subsidies goes to the men in couples with children,
who hardly respond to financial incentives. As a result, the effects
are much smaller than in reform (1) and (2). We still see the positive
effect on the extensive margin, and the negative effect on the intensive
margin (due to the income effect). The increase in total hours worked
is just 0.09%. The knock-on effects are therefore also small, and close
to zero overall. This makes this the most expensive reform in terms of
additional spending per additional hour worked. Indeed, additional
public spending per additional fte employed is in the order of 180
thousand euro, making this policy relatively ineffective when com-
pared to reform (1) and (2). We should note though, that this reform
leads to a bigger drop in inequality than reform (2), and does not raise
inequality like reform (1). With this effect on equity in mind, the re-
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sults for reforms (1)–(3) suggest that the shift in the Netherlands from
in-work benefits for all parents to in-work benefits just for secondary
earners and to higher childcare subsidies was an effective one in terms
of raising total hours worked.
Next, we consider the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli when the fiscal
stimuli are targeted more at middle and higher incomes and the
intensive margin. Specifically, we study the effects of the following
three scenario’s:
(4) An income dependent increase in childcare subsidies: we increase
the hourly childcare subsidy so that the parental fee falls by 41%
for all incomes. Given that middle and higher incomes pay a larger
fee in the baseline, this reform targets mostly middle and high
income families.
(5) An income dependent in-work benefit for secondary earners start-
ing at 4,000 euro, and then rising with 2.2% of taxable income of
the secondary earner up to a maximum of 581 euro per year at an
individual income of 30,000 euro.
(6) An income dependent in-work benefit for primary and secondary
earners in couples, starting at 4,000 euro, and then rising with
0.6% of taxable income of the primary or secondary earner up to a
maximum of 168 euro per year at an individual income of 30,000
euro.
The redistributional effects of these reforms are given in Figure 4.6, 4.8
and 4.10, respectively. The subsidies now rise with income, and we see
that the percentage changes in disposable income are typically smaller
for lower incomes and bigger for higher incomes when compared to
the reforms considered in Figure 4.5, 4.7 and 4.9. Indeed, reforms (4)
and (5) increase income inequality, as measured by the Gini-coefficient,
more than reforms (1) and (2), see Table 4.6. Furthermore, reform
(6) reduces inequality less than reform (3). When there is a trade-off
between equity and efficiency, we expect these reforms to be more
effective in terms of labour supply and public spending per additional
fte employed. But is this actually true, and if so, how much of a
difference does it make?
Column (4) in Table 4.6 gives the effects of the increase in childcare
subsidies targeted more at middle and high incomes. Starting with
the couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age, the effect on hours
worked by men is still limited, though somewhat larger than reform
(1), as the rise in the subsidy with income mitigates the negative
intensive margin effect. The effect on hours worked by women is
actually smaller than in reform (1). The intensive margin response
is bigger, but this is dominated by a smaller effect on the extensive
margin. The results for couples with a youngest child 4–11 in reform (4)
are not that different from reform (1), though the effect on the extensive
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and intensive margin for women is somewhat smaller respectively
larger. The effect on overall hours worked is quite similar in reform
(4) when compared to reform (1). Hence, targeting childcare subsidies
on middle and higher incomes is not necessarily better when looking
at total hours worked. This suggests that the current system in the
Netherlands which targets subsidies mostly at low incomes makes
sense when it comes to hours worked. Furthermore, the increase in
formal childcare is somewhat smaller in reform (4) than in reform (1),
the reform leads to less substitution of other types of care for formal
childcare for couples with a youngest child 0–3 years of age.
The knock-on effects are more favourable for reform (4) than re-
form (1). The additional hours worked by middle and higher incomes
generate more additional tax revenue per additional hour worked.
Furthermore, substitution of other types of care for formal care is less
costly for the government, as the subsidy per hour of formal child-
care is lower for middle and higher incomes than for lower incomes.
With an about equal effect on total hours worked and much more
favourable knock-on effects, it comes as no surprise that additional
public spending per additional fte employed is more favourable in
reform (4) than in reform (1), with 40 thousand euro in reform (4)
compared to 51 thousand euro in reform (1). However, the difference
comes at the expense of additional income inequality, and hence, once
we take into account the knock-on effects on the government budget,
there is actually a trade-off between equity and efficiency when it
comes to the targeting childcare subsidies.
Column (5) gives the results for the in-work benefit for secondary
earners that rises with income. Compared to the flat in-work benefit
for secondary earners, reform (2), this reform has a more favourable
effect on hours worked of women. Indeed, the substitution effect of
this reform makes the intensive margin responses by women positive
rather than negative. The effect on total hours worked is also consider-
ably larger than reform (2), although still smaller than the childcare
reforms (1) and (4). However, because this reform does not generate
a large response in the use of formal childcare, the knock-on effects
are rather favourable: plus 17 million euro. When we calculate the
additional expenditures per additional fte employed, reform (5) is the
most effective, with 29 thousand euro per additional fte employed.
This suggests that the Dutch reform in 2009, making the in-work
benefit for secondary earners income dependent, was rather effective.
However, also here there is a trade-off with equity, as the additional
hours worked come at the expense of additional income inequality.
Finally, column (6) gives the results of the income dependent tax
credit for primary and secondary earners. The overall effect on hours
worked and government finances is slightly better than for the flat
credit for primary and secondary earners. Again, there is a trade-off
between efficiency and equity. However, this reform still has only a
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marginal effect on overall hours worked, and with 140 thousand euro
per additional fte employed is still rather expensive.
4.7 simulating the 2011-2013 childcare reform
The empirical model can also be used to simulate the effects of recent
cuts in childcare subsidies which were taken by the Dutch government.
Following the steep rise in public expenditures on formal childcare
over the period 2005–2009, and after the Dutch economy was hit
by the Great Recession, the Dutch government announced to cut
expenditures on childcare over the period 2011–2013. As a result,
the average contribution rate of households to formal childcare was
projected to increase from 22% to 34% (Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment, 2011). The redistributional effects on disposable
household income are shown in Figure 4.11. The simulated effects on
labour participation, formal childcare use and government finances
are given in Table 4.7.
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The reform is projected to have only a small negative effect on hours
worked by fathers. The effect is more pronounced for mothers, in
particular for mothers with a youngest child 0–3 years of age. Their
hours worked drop by 3.4%, of which a substantial part is on the
intensive margin. The drop in the use of formal childcare is projected
to be much bigger in percentage terms, 14% respectively 20% for
households with a youngest child 0–3 years and 4–11 years of age.
As a result, the knock-on effect for the government budget is actually
positive. Additional savings on childcare subsidies more than offset
the loss in tax receipts and the rise in benefit expenditures. We should
also note that the predicted decline in the use of formal childcare is
actually quite similar to what is observed following the recent cuts
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Table 4.7: Simulation results: childcare reform 2011–2013
Perc. changes Perc. changes
Youngest child 0–3 yrs Youngest child 4-11 yrs
Labour supply men –0.15 –0.05
– Extensive margin –0.26 –0.02
– Intensive margin 0.11 –0.03
Labour supply women –3.43 –1.12
– Extensive margin –1.88 –0.45
– Intensive margin –1.58 –0.67
Formal childcare –14.24 –19.87
Overall effect
Perc. changes Millions of euro
Gini coefficient –1.05 Additional public exp. ex antea –154.4
Labour supply total –0.79 Knock–on effect childcare subsidies –109.2
Formal childcare total –15.53 Knock-on effect taxes and benefits 82.8
Additional public exp. ex posta –180.8
aAdditional public expenditures in our sample.
in childcare subsidies, with the use of formal childcare falling by
18% (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2014). However,
uncertainty about trend growth absent the reform, and the effect of
the Great Recession, complicate the comparison.
4.8 conclusion
We have estimated a structural model for couples with a youngest
child 0–3 and 4–11 years of age, where we model the simultaneous
choice over hours worked by fathers, mothers and the hours of formal
childcare use. Large exogenous variation in childcare subsidies and
in-work benefits for working parents benefits the identification of
the structural parameters. Furthermore, we account for unobserved
heterogeneity by using a flexible framework of latent class models.
The model produces labour supply responses to reforms over the
period 2005–2009 quite similar to a DD analysis on the same reforms
performed by Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012). The model also
predicts the steep decline in the use of formal childcare observed
following the recent cuts in childcare subsidies.
We use this model to study the relative effectiveness of different
types of fiscal stimuli for working parents with children 0–11 years of
age. We find that an across-the-board increase in childcare subsidies is
more effective than an across-the-board increase in in-work benefits
for this group of working parents. That is, when we ignore the knock-
on effects on the government budget due to behavioural responses.
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However, because childcare subsidies also lead to a shift from other
types of childcare to formal childcare, the knock-on effect on the
government budget is actually negative, despite higher tax receipts
and savings on benefits. Comparing the additional public expenditures
per additional hour worked, an across-the-board increase in childcare
subsidies is about equally effective as an across-the-board increase of
in-work benefits for secondary earners. Both policies are much more
effective than an across-the-board increase of in-work benefits for both
primary and secondary earners, as labour supply by primary earners
is rather unresponsive to financial incentives. These results support the
move from the Dutch government over the period 2005–2009 to abolish
the joint in-work benefit for both primary and secondary earners, and
increase childcare subsidies and the in-work benefit for secondary
earners alone.
We also consider the extent to which childcare subsidies and in-work
benefits targeted more at middle and higher incomes are more effec-
tive in raising total hours worked than an across-the-board increase in
these policies. Indeed, we want to quantify the trade-off between effi-
ciency and equity. Our model shows that targeting childcare subsidies
more at middle and high income families has almost the same effect
on total hours worked as an across-the-board increase in childcare sub-
sidies, but of course leads to a less equitable income distribution. This
finding can motivate the current setup of the Dutch system, where low
income families receive higher childcare subsidies than middle and
high income families. However, targeting childcare subsidies more at
middle and high income families does increase hours worked by a
relatively productive group, which results in higher knock-on effects
of taxes. Furthermore, as middle and high incomes receive less sub-
sidy per hour of formal childcare, substitution of other types of care
for formal care is less costly for the government. Both factors lead to
lower additional public expenditures per additional hour worked for
childcare subsidies targeted more at middle and higher incomes, once
we take into account the behavioural effects on the government budget.
So in the end, there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency when
it comes to childcare subsidies.
An in-work benefit for secondary earners that rises with income
is substantially more effective in terms of total hours worked and
government finances than a ‘flat’ in-work benefit for secondary earners.
So, from an efficiency point of view, introducing the income dependent
part to the in-work benefit for secondary earners in 2009 by the Dutch
government made sense. However, this reform came at expense of
higher income inequality, and here we clearly face an equity-efficiency
trade-off.
There are still a number of limitations to our current analysis that we
would like to overcome in future work. An interesting next step would
be to model these decisions in a life cycle model (Blundell, Bozio, and
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Laroque, 2013). Indeed, there may be career effects extending beyond
the period when the children are young. Another interesting avenue
to consider is the effect of participation in formal childcare on the
well-being of children and how they fare later in life, and whether or
not there is a difference between children from low income and high
income families (Havnes and Mogstad, 2014). Finally, the childcare
reform may have been more salient than the reform of in-work benefits.
Indeed, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) stress the importance of
salience in the behavioural responses to taxes and subsidies, and this
too seems an interesting topic for future research.
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4.a wage equations
For the employed we use observed wages. For the non-employed we
simulate wages. To this end, we run wage regressions by sex and then
by level of education, where education is split into three levels (lower,
middle and higher educated).
We use panel data techniques to account for unobserved individual-
specific effects. We performed a Hausman test in order to test whether
random effects or fixed effects are appropriate. For all groups, we reject
the null hypothesis that the individual-specific effects are uncorrelated
with regressor and therefore we prefer fixed effects over random effects
estimation. However, we lose information on time-invariant regressors
with fixed effects and therefore opt for the quasi-fixed effects model
(Mundlak, 1978).
To account for the possibility of selection we first estimate the
probability of participation using a pooled probit regression
pit = x′itγ + z
′
itθ + νit, (4.A.1)
where vector zit contains variables that are expected to have an effect
on the probability of participation but not on wages (an exclusion
restriction). From this regression we determine the inverse Mills’ ratio
invmillsit = φ(pit)/Φ(pit). (4.A.2)
The inverse Mills’ ratio is then included in the quasi-fixed effects
model
ln(wit) = x′itβ + ωi + x̄i
′π + λtinvmillsit + εit (4.A.3)
where the individual specific effect consists of a random part, ωi with
∼ I ID(0, σ2ω), and a part which is allowed to be correlated with regres-
sors x̄i ′π. Here, x̄i is the average of time-varying variables such as age.
A significant coefficient for an element of π provides evidence that
the individual specific effect is correlated with one of the regressors.
Table 4.A.1 shows estimation results for all subgroups. We use age
splines since we expect that the relationship between wage and age
is nonlinear. Table 4.A.1 shows that age increases with age but at a
diminishing rate. This is in line with other studies (Vella and Verbeek,
1998, 1999). For both singles and couples we see that the age profile
is steeper for higher educated individuals. We also include cohort
and year dummies in the regression. Because of perfect collinearity
between age, cohort and period we use transformed time dummies
following Deaton and Paxson (1994). The time dummies for 2006
and 2007 depend on the dummies for later years and are calculated
manually.43 Year dummies are significant in most specifications while
the cohort variables are jointly significant for most subgroups. Wages
43 t2006=-(d2007+d2008+d2009) and t2007=-2*d2008-3*d2009
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Table 4.A.1: Wage equations
Men Women
Lower Middle Higher Lower Middle Higher
educ. educ. educ. educ. educ. educ.
Age
18–30 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
31–40 0.020∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
41–50 0.013∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
51–63 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
Cohorta
1980–1989 0.085∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
1975–1980 0.025 0.074∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
1970–1975 0.019* 0.034∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
1960–1965 0.010 –0.017∗∗∗ –0.012 –0.008 –0.019∗∗∗ –0.044∗∗∗
1955–1960 –0.002 –0.031∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗∗ 0.009 –0.027** –0.064∗∗∗
<1955 0.007 0.002 –0.012 0.010 –0.019* –0.046∗∗∗
Ethnicititya
Western immigrant 0.003 –0.068∗∗∗ –0.055∗∗∗ 0.001 –0.026∗∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗
Non-Western immigrant –0.062∗∗∗ –0.231∗∗∗ –0.291∗∗∗ –0.051∗∗∗ –0.074∗∗∗ –0.114∗∗∗
Partner
Married 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ –0.011** –0.015∗∗∗ –0.025∗∗∗
Year
2006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.002
2007 –0.006 –0.006 –0.003 –0.007 –0.005 –0.002
2008 –0.002∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗ –0.007∗∗∗ –0.004∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗ –0.003∗∗∗
2009 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Mundlak averages age
18–30 –0.008* 0.000 –0.005 –0.003 –0.002 0.001
31–40 –0.006** –0.003** 0.000 –0.012∗∗∗ –0.008∗∗∗ –0.004∗∗∗
41–50 –0.008∗∗∗ –0.007∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗ –0.022∗∗∗ –0.016∗∗∗ –0.017∗∗∗
51–63 –0.008∗∗∗ –0.015∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗ –0.018∗∗∗ –0.020∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗
Inverse Mills’ ratio –0.329∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ –0.008 0.026** 0.098∗∗∗
Attrition indicator –0.004 –0.001 –0.001 –0.004 –0.004 0.000
Constant 1.446∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.430∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗
Observations 88,997 168,316 129,663 60,824 146,294 89,859
Number of individuals 26,779 49,634 37,742 19,385 44,262 26,770
a Reference group: born in 1965–1970 and autochtonous.
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are lower on average for non-Western immigrants. The coefficients for
the Mundlak age averages are joinly significant in all specifications,
but have no economic interpretation.
The lower part of Table 4.A.1 shows that the inverse Mills’ ratio is
significant for most groups. Hence, we have evidence that selection
bias is present for most groups. We also include an attrition indicator in
order to test for the presence of attrition bias.44 The attrition indicator
is not significant for all subgroups.
4.b price equations formal childcare
For non-users of formal childcare we have to simulate a price for
childcare. We have information on the use of formal childcare in the
Netherlands for the period 2006–2009. Here, a distinction is made
between daycare (children 0–3 years of age) and out-of-school care
(children 4–11 years of age).
Again, we estimate a quasi-fixed effects model for the prices of
daycare and out-of-school care.45 Here, we follow the same procedure
as for the wage estimations and estimate the following price equation:
pit = x′itβ + ωi + x̄i
′π + λtinvmillsit + εit (4.A.4)
where the individual specific effect consists of a random part, ωi
with ∼ I ID(0, σ2ω), and a part which is allowed to be correlated with
regressors x̄i ′π. Here, x̄i is the average of age which does not vary
over time. Our dependent variable is the hourly real price.
We focus on households since childcare is consumed at the house-
hold level. As it turns out, characteristics of females are more impor-
tant in predicting use and price of childcare than characteristics of
men. Hence, we only include females characteristics in the regressions.
Table 4.A.2 shows estimation results for daycare and out-of-school
care.46 Estimation results show that year dummies are significantly
increasing for daycare. However, time effects are less important in
the price equation for out-of-school care. Households with higher
educated women or younger women pay a higher price on average.
We do not find evidence that selection bias or attrition bias are present.
44 The attrition indicator is a dummy which equals 1 if an individual leaves the sample
in our data period 2006-2009.
45 We conduct a Hausman test in order to test whether fixed or random effects is
appropriate. In all cases, the Hausman test favours the fixed effects model.
46 Including a squared term for age, age splines, ethnicity, a dummy for age of the
youngest child or a dummy for multiple children one at a time, leads to insignificant
coefficients for each of these variables.
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Higher educated women 0.000 0.020∗
Age women –0.017∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
Single parent 0.033∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗
Mundlak age average 0.014∗∗ 0.026∗∗
Inverse Mills’ ratio –0.032 -0.008





4.C elasticities and shares with negative marginal utility by number of latent classes 131
4.c elasticities and shares with negative marginal util-
ity by number of latent classes
Table 4.A.3: Elasticities by number of latent classes
youngest child 0–3 yrs 1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4 LC
Gross hourly wage men +1%
Labour supply men 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.09
– Extensive margin 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.07
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Labour supply women –0.15 –0.15 –0.21 –0.15
Formal childcare 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.05
Gross hourly wage women +1%
Labour supply women 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.48
– Extensive margin 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.30
– Intensive margin 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.18
Labour supply men –0.04 –0.05 –0.07 –0.06
Formal childcare 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.45
Gross price formal childcare +1%
Formal Childcare –0.61 –0.66 –1.09 –0.92
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour supply women –0.13 –0.14 –0.15 –0.16
Observed choices with negative marginal utility income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure men 0.74 0.39 0.00 0.08
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure women 0.38 0.36 0.09 0.00
Observed choices with negative marginal utility formal childcare 0.54 0.35 0.59 0.49
youngest child 4–11 yrs 1 LC 2 LC 3 LC 4 LC
Gross hourly wage men +1%
Labour supply men 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08
– Extensive margin 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.06
– Intensive margin 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Labour supply women –0.11 –0.07 –0.10 –0.11
Formal childcare 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.22
Gross hourly wage women +1%
Labour supply women 0.38 0.47 0.44 0.48
– Extensive margin 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.29
– Intensive margin 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.19
Labour supply men –0.03 –0.04 –0.07 –0.05
Formal childcare 0.45 0.77 0.71 0.83
Gross hourly price formal childcare +1%
Formal Childcare –0.36 –0.77 –0.70 –0.83
Labour supply men 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour supply women –0.02 –0.04 –0.04 –0.05
Observed choices with negative marginal utility income 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure men 0.78 0.17 0.26 0.41
Observed choices with negative marginal utility leisure women 0.41 0.22 0.34 0.02
Observed choices with negative marginal utility formal childcare 0.57 0.16 0.10 0.57
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4.d robustness check : including proxy for informal child-
care
Table 4.A.4: Elasticities for models w/o and w/ proxy informal childcare
Couples 0-3 yrs Couples 4-11 yrs
1 LC 2 LC 1 LC 2 LC
Model without proxy informal care
Labour supply elasticity men 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06
Labour supply elasticity women 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.47
Price elasticity formal childcare –0.61 –0.66 -0.36 -0.77
Model with proxy informal care
Labour supply elasticity men 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06
Labour supply elasticity women 0.37 0.41 0.41 0.48
Price elasticity formal childcare –0.62 -0.70 -0.42 -0.84
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4.e preferences and fit of preferred model
Table 4.A.5: Preferences by latent class, youngest child 0–3 yrs
Latent class 1 2 1 2
Income 6.164∗∗ 15.812∗∗∗ Fixed costs men -8.885∗∗∗ -11.758∗∗∗
Leisure men -66.223∗∗∗ -74.155∗∗∗ *Lower education 1.539∗∗ 0.522
*Age 0.367 0.663 *Middle education 1.483∗∗∗ 1.124
*Age2 0.260 -1.393 *Non-Western immigrant -0.830 -0.558
*Western immigrant -1.682∗∗∗ -1.125∗
Leisure female -21.914∗∗∗ -19.814∗∗
*Age 2.936 1.375 Fixed costs women -2.520∗∗∗ -2.550∗∗∗
*Age2 2.348 2.872 *Lower education 0.836 -0.674∗∗
*Middle education 0.484∗ 0.162
Income2 2.250∗∗ -3.646∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigrant -1.144∗∗∗ -1.412∗∗∗
Income*leisure men 21.444∗∗∗ -2.799 *Western immigrant -0.284 -0.868∗∗
Income*leisure women 5.391 -8.189
Leisure men2 -48.270 -14.755∗∗∗ Fixed cost childcare 0.690 0.365
Leisure women2 -126.255∗∗∗ -167.628∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigr. men -0.254 -0.466
Leisure men*leisure women -0.392 -11.813 *Western immigrant men 0.993 -0.664
*Lower education men -0.428 -0.287
Childcare -2.895∗∗∗ -1.637∗∗ *Middle education men -0.267 -0.477∗∗
*Urban area 0.643∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigr. women -1.598 -1.261
*Non-Western immigr. men -0.644 -0.135 *Western immigrant women -0.999 -0.147
*Western immigrant men 0.841 0.587 *Lower education women -1.737∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗
*Non-Western immigr. women 0.999 0.979 *Middle education women -0.461∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗
*Western immigrant women 0.365 0.164 *Urban area -0.859 -1.619∗∗
Childcare2 0.878 -0.135 Relative class shares 48% 52%
Childcare*income 0.943∗∗∗ 0.477∗
Childcare*leisure men 0.854 1.159
Childcare*leisure women -5.781∗∗∗ -7.935∗∗∗
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.A.6: Preferences by latent class, youngest child 4–11 yrs
Latent class 1 2 1 2
Income 3.216 3.187∗∗∗ Fixed costs men 1.475∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗
Leisure men 13.879 14.486∗∗∗ *Lower education 0.527 0.463
*Age 2.782 1.866∗∗∗ *Middle education 0.630∗ 0.417
*Age2 1.246∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigrant 0.622 0.484∗∗∗
*Western immigrant 0.622∗ 0.636∗∗∗
Leisure female 7.477 7.318∗∗∗
*Age 1.362 1.428∗ Fixed costs women 0.279∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
*Age2 1.722 1.518∗∗∗ *Lower education 0.271∗∗ 0.269
*Middle education 0.232 0.235
Income2 1.115 1.323∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigrant 0.282 0.287∗∗∗
Income*leisure men 5.684 6.258∗∗∗ *Western immigrant 0.298 0.284
Income*leisure women 4.855 5.615∗∗∗
Leisure men2 28.321 29.344∗∗∗ Fixed cost childcare 0.469∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
Leisure women2 12.140∗∗∗ 12.445∗∗∗ *Non-Western immigr. men 1.863 178.637
Leisure men*leisure women 15.919 16.436 *Western immigrant men 1.226 2.655
*Lower education men 0.378 0.357
Childcare 1.780∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ *Middle education men 0.276∗ 0.287
*Urban area 0.435∗ 0.591 *Non-Western immigr. women 0.873 0.869
*Non-Western immigr. men 1.183∗ 8.534 *Western immigrant women 0.696∗∗ 0.751
*Western immigrant men 0.860 1.366 *Lower education women 0.564∗∗∗ 0.399∗
*Non-Western immigr. women 0.725 0.640 *Middle education women 0.266 0.279
*Western immigrant women 0.556∗∗∗ 0.823 *Urban area 0.544 0.569∗
Childcare2 0.299 0.346∗∗∗ Relative class shares 42% 58%
Childcare*income 0.385 0.417∗∗∗
Childcare*leisure men 2.713∗∗∗ 2.860∗
Childcare*leisure women 1.495∗∗∗ 1.639∗∗∗
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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L A B O U R S U P P LY, F E RT I L I T Y A N D C H I L D C A R E
D E C I S I O N S - A S T R U C T U R A L A N A LY S I S O F
F I S C A L S T I M U L I F O R W O R K I N G M O T H E R S
This chapter is based on my job market paper.
5.1 introduction
This chapter focuses on two long-standing challenges faced by many
developed countries. The first is to increase labor participation of
women, which is advocated as an important step towards narrowing
the gender wage gap (Blau, 2012). The second is to promote fertility of
the population, and thereby counteract the steadily falling birthrates.
To meet these challenges, the governments are introducing public
policies specifically tailored to increase female labor participation (in-
work tax credits, child care subsidies, etc.), and others focused on
raising fertility rates (universal child benefits, extension of maternity
leave). However, as discussed by Apps and Rees (2009), childbearing
has far-reaching consequences for mother’s labor market attainment
and vice versa, which means that a policy tailored to one of the policy
goals is likely to have non-trivial spillover effects into the other domain
of interest. These effects are generally unintended1 and they can
be often also counter-productive.2 Some policies/fiscal stimuli are
therefore bound to prove more (or less) desirable when investigated
with both policy goals in mind.
In this paper, I develop a dynamic structural model of female labor
supply, fertility and child care demand for households of married and
cohabiting spouses. The model is intended for comparative analysis
of labor-enhancing policies in light of the dichotomous policy goals
presented above. The partenred women are assumed to be faced
with the interdependent choices of working and having children.
Furthermore, the spouses who decide to have children must also
1 A prominent example is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United States,
which is a means-tested transfer for working families with children. Baughman and
Dickert-Conlin (2003) find that the introduction of EITC indeed increased fertility lev-
els, acknowledging that this was an unintended consequence of the labor-stimulating
policy. Conversely, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) show that the program actually reduced
labor participation among secondary earners in the household, since their participa-
tion was not required for eligibility and their earnings lowered the effective rate of
the tax credit.
2 Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) find that apart from increasing fertility, the exten-
sion of maternity leave had a negative effect on maternal labor supply. Lalive and
Zweimuller confirm the adverse labor supply effects in the short-run, but they do not
find evidence for their long-run persistence.
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consider whether to use formal child care or not. The inclusion of
child care choice in the household decision making is motivated by
the apparent link between woman’s market wotk engagement and
her attitudes towards formal child care (See Apps, Kabátek, Rees,
and Van Soest 2012), which can prove particularly important for the
evaluation of public policies such as child care subsidies.
The evaluation of the effects of public policies on women’s labor
participation and fertility hinges on the assumption that these choices
are dependent on financial incentives. Fortunately, the literature pro-
vides ample empirical evidence that these decisions are amenable to
public policy interventions. The parental employment decisions have
been shown to be responsive to a multitude of policy reforms, many
of them being either in-work tax credits (IWTC) or child care subsidy
reforms. The debate over relative efficiency of these fiscal stimuli is
however by no means settled. The effects of child care subsidies on
labor supply vary widely3, whereas studies on in-work tax credits typ-
ically find sizable positive employment effects.4 The fertility patterns
are also generally found to be responsive to the financial incentives.
Milligan (2005) shows that introduction of universal child benefits in
Quebec had a large impact on fertility, leading to a 25% increase in
fertility among women targeted for the full benefit. Similarly, Brewer,
Ratcliffe, and dSmith (2012) show positive response of fertility to an in-
crease of WFTC in the UK. Del Bono, Weber, and Winter-Ebmer (2012)
show that job displacement and the subsequent loss of income stream
significantly reduces fertility. Blau and Robbins (1989) find a negative
link between fertility and child care costs faced by the US families.
The child care demand is found to be responsive as well, increasing
with more generous child care subsidies and higher incomes (Apps,
Kabátek, Rees, and Van Soest 2012 and de Boer, Jongen, and Kabátek
2014).
In terms of dynamic structural models, there are two strands of
literature with focus similar to this paper: models that explore fe-
male labor supply and fertility, and those that explore female labor
supply and child care demand. Francesconi (2002) estimates a dy-
namic model of female labour supply and fertility. He shows that
self-selection into fertility plays an important role for female labor
supply, as he identifies negative links between maternal work ability
and preference for children. Similar issues are investigated by Haan
and Wrohlich (2011) who evaluate labor supply and fertility decisions
of German women. In their paper, the dependency between maternal
work and fertility is captured by allowing lagged choices to enter the
3 E.g. Lundin, Mörk, and Öckert (2008), Fitzpatrick (2010) and Havnes and Mogstad
(2011) find no effect, Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012) find small effects, and
Berlinski and Galiani (2007) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008) find large effects.
4 For an overview of studies analyzing the impact of the EITC in the US see Hotz and
Scholz (2003), and for an overview of studies into the impact of the Working Families
Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK see Brewer and Browne (2006).
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contemporaneous utility function. The second strand of literature is
represented by Bernal (2008) and Griffen (2014) who develop dynamic
models of female labor supply and child care demand. Apart from
analyzing the substitution patterns of maternal and non-maternal care,
they also explore what are the effects of different types of child care
on the children’s cognitive traits and later life outcomes. From the
modeling perspective, it is interesting to note that both strands of
literature are using bivariate choice models. The underlying emphasis
is that the joint nature of work and fertility (or work and child care) is
fundamental for sound policy analysis, whereas the third (omitted)
choice variable is of secondary importance. However, since in both
cases, the authors find strong ties between the choices considered, it
seems to be appropriate to extended their analyses to a tri-variate
setting, accounting for labor supply, fertility and child care in one joint
framework.
The model presented here is estimated using a unique Dutch panel
dataset which contains administrative records on earnings, child care
expenditures and other employment-related information for a large
sample of Dutch households. The records observed span the years
2001 to 2009, covering large reforms of family tax policy targeted at
working parents. The reforms started in 2004 and within five years
they gradually raised public spending on child care subsidies, and
in-work tax credits (IWTC) for working parents. Such policy variation
is convenient for the analysis since the family tax policy reforms
(being strictly targeted at families with young children) changed the
incentives underlying fertility, female labor participation and use of
formal child care. As shown by Bettendorf, Jongen, and Muller (2012),
the households did respond to the changing incentives, increasing
the maternal labor supply and formal child care utilization. In my
analysis I confirm these results and I show that the fertility was also
stimulated by the reforms.
The policy analysis focuses on the fiscal stimuli which were intro-
duced in the Netherlands within the observed period - the increase of
in-work tax credits and child care subsidies. The results of the analysis
show that the two policy reforms induce similarly strong changes of
maternal labor supply as well as short-run government revenue. This
means that according to the traditional labor supply metric, the policy
makers could choose either policy without compromising budgetary
efficiency. On the other hand, the response of fertility rates is less
uniform. The fertility effects are more pronounced under the child
care subsidy reform. However, the increased fertility is shown to raise
the long-run costs of the child care reform, as more children become
eligible for subsidized child care in the years after the implementation.
The long-run maintenance costs of the child care subsidy reform there-
fore prove to be considerably higher than the immediate costs at the
point of implementation. They are also higher than the long-run costs
5.2 structural model 141
of the in-work tax credit reform, which are shown to fall compared to
the immediate costs.
This finding should be of particular interest for the policy makers,
since the full costs of analyzed reforms will not be realized until several
years after the implementation. This extra burden on the government
budget is therefore likely to be overlooked by analyses which focus
only on the short-run changes in the variables of interest, leading to
misdirected policy recommendations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
structural model and the estimation strategy. Section 5.3 documents
the institutional background and the two policy reforms which are
exploited by the model. Section 5.4 describes the data and addresses
some modeling choices which were adopted in Section 5.2. Section
5.5 presents the model fit, the estimation results and the outcomes of
counterfactual simulations. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 structural model
5.2.1 Setup of the model
The model evaluates households in a unitary framework, focusing
on the decisions related to women and children. Husband’s work
allocation and disposable income are taken as given.5 I further abstract
from modeling formation of the households (marriage or cohabitation
decisions), taking it as exogenous in the context of the model.6 I do
allow for accumulation and depreciation of mothers’ human capital,
which is argued to play a crucial role in mother’s decisions to return
into the labor force after taking maternity leave (Apps and Rees, 2009).
Timing of events starts with formation of the household (i.e., the year
when the spouses start living together) and ends when the woman
reaches the retirement age of 65. The household starts making deci-
sions as of period t=1. In each period, the woman is assumed to choose
5 This assumption is maintained throughout the literature (Francesconi 2002, Bernal
2008, Griffen 2014) and it is also supported by findings of de Boer, Jongen, and
Kabátek (2014), who show that the labor supply elasticity of Dutch men with respect
to changes in their spouses’ earnings is rather small. The implications of modeling
men’s choices as a flexible part of household decision making are further discussed
in Chapter 3, page 83.
6 Modeling of marriage/cohabitation markets is an interesting extension of the current
setup of the model. Modeling such decisions would allow me to include single adults
in the sample, which would broaden the scope of the analysis. Furthermore, assuming
that marriage/cohabitation decisions are non-random and that they also react to
financial incentives (such as tax credits for working parents), the reform-induced
changes in the pool of married and cohabiting couples could influence the results of
the current analysis. However, since I do not observe any pronounced differences in
marriage rates throughout the reform period, I assume that the pool of households
remains unchanged and I abstract from modeling these decisions.
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her labor supply, which generates part of the disposable household
income. At the same time the spouses decide whether to have children.
This choice is restricted to couples where the woman is aged less than
45. A positive outcome of the fertility decision results in a childbirth
in the next period. In the periods after the childbirth, the spouses also
chooses whether to use formal child care or not. The outcome of this
decision is applicable to all children in the household aged 11 years or
less. At the point when all children become at least 12 years old and
the woman also reaches the fertility threshold, the household decision
problem simplifies to the market work decision of the woman.
The life-long fertility decisions are restricted by assuming that fami-
lies can have at most two children.7 In terms of the choice sets, I allow
for three intensity levels of market work (full-time (FT), part-time (PT)
and zero hours), four intensity levels of formal child care use (0 - 3
days per week), and a binary fertility decision. The choices correspond-
ing to the formal child care do not contain 4 and 5 days of the service
per week because these intensities are almost never observed.
The instantaneous utility is derived from household consumption
ct, woman’s leisure time lt, number of children aged less than 18 years
Nt, fertility decision nt (leading to a childbirth in the next period), and



























6ict · 1(ageyng < 4) + 1 ( f ct > 0) εct






3 nt + α
n




The demand for non-maternal child care is expressed through two
separate variables, distinguishing between the total hours of child
care provided by formal carers f ct (i.e., kindergartens and daycare
centers), and the total hours provided by informal carers ict (i.e.,
grandparents and other relatives). This distinction is made to account
for differences in costs and preferences for the two types of child care.
Both variables are interacted with an indicator function which attains
value one if the youngest child is less than 4 years old. This allows
the model to account for differences in attitudes towards formal and
informal child care between the households with school-aged children
and the households with pre-schoolers. The stochastic part of the
7 This type of restrictions prevents families in our sample to be predicted to have
excessive number of children. Selecting appropriate number of children at which the
fertility should be capped is however non-trivial. An assumption which is often used
in the literature is that families are allowed to have at most one child (see e.g., Bernal
2008 or Brilli, 2013). Capping the total fertility at two children is a less stringent
assumption, although it can be argued that it should be loosened further: 14.6% of
Dutch families are observed to have three children whereas the total share of families
with births of higher parities is not larger than 4%. This observation would suggest
that three children fertility cap might be more appropriate.
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utility function is represented by a triplet of choice-specific error terms
{εnt , εct, εlt} which accounts for choices that cannot be attributed to the
observed factors.
The household’s consumption ct is assumed to be equivalent to
household’s disposable income yt. I abstract from modeling the sav-
ings decision, so that the income has to be consumed in the same
period it is earned8. The budget constraint takes the following form,
yt = wt · ht + yht − T(wt, ht, Xt)− p · f ct · Nct + S(p, f ct; Xt). (5.2)
Here, wt is gross hourly wage, ht is woman’s labour supply and
yht are earnings of the spouse which are treated as given. T(wt, ht, Xt)
denotes taxes and social security contributions. pt · f ct represents the
cost of formal child care. If the spouses decide to use formal child
care, it is assumed that the service is used by all children below 11
years of age, and therefore the cost is multiplied by the number of
children in the appropriate age range, Nct .
9 S(p, f ct; X) denotes child
care subsidies, which depend on total cost of formal child care and
other household characteristics such as households’ taxable income.
In contrast, the costs of informal child care are not included in the
budget constraint. The informal child care is often provided with no
charge, or at a price that implies an unobserved subsidy from the carer.
The lack of information about the costs of informal child care makes
any effort to impute corresponding prices infeasible. The only way the





6 in the utility function 5.1. The values of these parameters
will represent an amalgamation of 1) intrinsic utility derived from this
type of care, 2) effort required to find an informal carer, and 3) the
unobserved costs of informal child care.
The woman’s market wage is specified as follows
log(wt) = β0 + β1educ + β2ext + β3ex2t + β4educt · ext + εwt , (5.3)
8 This assumption can be interpreted in the following way: Households are restricted in
their inter-temporal consumption smoothing, since they are not able to save or borrow
against their future income. In real life, such borrowing constraint is unlikely to be
universally applicable, but it may well describe the situation faced by many families
with young children. Allowing households to borrow and save would change the
nature of the decision problem faced by the spouses. It would alleviate the severity
of realized negative income shocks, enabling households to sustain prior levels of
consumption and child care use (or to follow through with their family planning)
even while facing adverse economic conditions. If the households in our sample
are indeed actively smoothing their consumption, then allowing for borrowing and
saving would strengthen the link between disposable income and the choices which
are being modeled.
9 There is, however, an important distinction between the type of child care provided to
children aged 0-3 (daycare) and to children aged 4-11 (out-of-school care). Since the latter
group attends school for half of the day, they require half the child care provision
needed for younger children. The daily formal child care costs for older children are
therefore halved compared to the costs for pre-schoolers. Further discussion of the
formal child care costs will be provided in the Section 5.4.
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so that it explicitly accounts for heterogeneity among earnings pro-
files characteristic for specific education levels. It further allows for
the effects of human capital through the dependence on cumulative





1(ht−i = 1). (5.4)
That way, I account for appreciation/depreciation of labor skills
in a span of years which is likely to be highly relevant for the wage
determination process. The span of five years was chosen for conve-
nience, since the individual labor market histories are only known
for 5 years prior to the period when all the households’ decisions are
observed for the first time. An alternative approach would be to allow
for lifetime experience accumulation (see Francesconi, 2002, or Bernal,
2008), where the experience entering the wage equation represents
every labor market engagement preceding the given point in time.
An issue with this approach is that the lifetime experience is rarely
observed and so it has to be approximated by potential experience,
which is equal to worker’s age minus her years of schooling. This
approximation may prove particularly problematic in the context of
female labor supply, where women often opt out of the labor market
to rear their children. The potential experience would therefore often
overestimate their actual experience. For that reason, I prefer to rely on
the former approach, drawing the inference based on the experience
accumulated during the observable period.
The household is assumed to predict evolution of woman’s future
earnings according to the equation 5.3. Furthermore, in order to form
expectations about the disposable household income, the spouses are
also assumed to predict future realizations of man’s earnings. This
prediction is based on another Mincer-type equation, estimating the
man’s earnings from his experience and educational attainment,





+γ4exht · educh + εht . (5.5)
The woman’s time allocation comprises of market work h and leisure
l, and it is subject to the following constraint:
h + l = TC, (5.6)
where TC is a time constraint amounting to the standard time en-
dowment of 16 hours per day. The full-time and the part-time work
allocations take up respectively 8 and 4 hours per day, which leaves
at least eight hours per day for the leisure endowment. It should be
noted that the leisure here is defined in very broad terms, accounting
both for the actual leisure time, but also for the non-market work, and
the maternal child care.
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I also specify a second time constraint which requires the sum of all
child care inputs to exceed minimal time requirement TR.
l + f c + ic ≥ TR(ageyng). (5.7)
The value of TR is dependent on the age of the youngest child, amount-
ing to 16 hours per day for pre-schoolers and 12 hours per day for
school-aged children younger than 11 years.10 This constraint main-
tains that the child cannot be left unattended at any time during the
day, avoiding situations where parents are predicted to work full-time
without having anyone to look after their offspring. The minimal time
requirement also facilitates the incorporation of informal child care
into the structural model. Since the data used for this analysis come
from administrative records, I do not observe any information on
the provision of informal child care ic. Therefore, I assume that the
informal care supplied to the given family is equal to the difference




0, TR(ageyng)− f c− l
)
. (5.8)
This means that the inequality in equation 5.7 will be applicable only
for those women whose sum of formal child care and leisure time
alone is greater than TR. All the other cases are bound to satisfy the
equation with equality.








t ) are assumed to be
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean vector
and diagonal covariance matrix Σ. The errors are drawn independently
of their previous realizations.11 The state space at time t is defined as
a set of all the relevant factors which affect either current or future
values of household’s utility,
Ωt = {ext, exth, educ, educh, yh, pt, ageyng, ageold, Nt, ”t} (5.9)
Mother’s decision problem can be then written in terms of value
functions Vt(Ωt), which maximize over expected present value of






Vkt (Ωt) = U
k
t (Ωt) + δE (Vt+1(Ωt+1)|Ωt, dkt = 1) , t < 65
= Uk65(Ω65), t = 65
10 Children older than 11 years are assumed not to require any child care.
11 The assumptions imposed on the error terms can be relaxed to allow for more flexible
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Since we already have normally distributed
errors, the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix Σ can be allowed to differ from
zero. That way we would account for mutual dependence of the stochastic components
at the same point of time. Another way is to allow for temporal dependence of errors,
such as in Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2013) where the errors are assumed to
follow an AR(1) process with i.i.d. innovations.
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5.2.2 Solution and estimation of the model
The model is solved numerically, using backward recursion to solve the
Emax functions E (Vt+1(Ωt+1)|Ωt, dkt = 1). The functions are evaluated
for every choice k in the choice set K and for every element of Ωt,
starting from the last period T. The solution is conditional on given
parameterization of the structural equations, so that the Emax functions
serve as an input into the model optimization procedure.12
The value functions for each alternative are known conditional
on the deterministic part of the state space. The stochastic vector ”t
remains unobserved. In order to quantify probability of choosing the
observed choice, it is necessary to integrate over the joint distribution
of ”t, isolating the realizations of stochastic shocks which render the
observed choice k to be the alternative with the highest value function.
To avoid issues with optimization over non-smooth probability spaces,
we employ the kernel smoothed frequency simulator proposed by
McFadden (1989).
The probability of any sequence of choices made by the woman can
be therefore computed as follows,










t , ∀j 6= k|Ω̄t)
(5.10)
where the choice probabilities are explicitly conditioned on the observ-
able part of the state space Ωt.
5.3 institutional setting
The Dutch family tax policy has been recently subject to two major
reforms: a reform of child care subsidies and a reform of in-work tax
credits (IWTC) for working parents. Both reforms were gradual and
they were being implemented throughout the years 2004 to 2009. The
result of these reforms was a substantial increase of public spending
on families with small children. The reforms were aimed at increasing
maternal labor force participation, whereas the notion of using these
stimuli to increase fertility rates was not made explicit. The incentives
12 The state space considered is, however, very large. The decision makers have to
be aware of the age structure of children, cumulative experience, and other factors
which render solving the decision paths of entire state space infeasible for practical
purposes. To overcome this, I employ estimation strategy developed by Keane and
Wolpin (1994), the regression based interpolation. The emax functions are evaluated
at a random subset of choice and state variable combinations and I interpolate the
values of Emax functions for the rest of the state space. The interpolation step consists
of running a series of regressions with the regressand being emax functions which
are drawn for the given time period, and the regressors being the variables entering
the observable part of the state space.
5.3 institutional setting 147
for childbearing however changed as well, since both the child care
subsidies and the in-work tax credits were targeted at the parents who
had at least one child aged 12 years or less.
5.3.1 Child care subsidy reform
The child care subsidy reform started with the introduction of Law
on Child care (Wet kinderopvang) in 2005. Immediate effect of the
law involved formal changes in the institutional setting of child care
subsidies, eliminating regional differences in subsidy rates and other
idiosyncrasies characteristic for the old system (see de Boer et al. 2014).
As of 2005, all families who used formal child care (for their children
aged 0 to 11) qualified for the same subsidy scheme which had been
set by the central government.13 The institutional changes in 2005
however changed little in terms of the effective subsidy rates faced
by the majority of Dutch families (see Plantenga, Wever, Rijkers, and
de Haan 2005 and Ministry of Finance 2010).
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Source: own calculations using publicly available subsidy tables.
More important were the changes that followed in 2006 and 2007.
During this period the child care subsidy rates got substantially higher,
with the largest increase taking place in 2007. Figure 5.1 shows the
changes in the parental contribution rate for the ‘first child’.14 First,
note that the parental fee depends on the income of the household. In
13 The unification of subsidies also allowed for collection of the data on child care use
which are used in this analysis.
14 The Tax Office defines the first child as the child for which the parents have the
highest child care expenditures.
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all years, households with the lowest income received the highest sub-
sidy (up to 96% of the full price) and this subsidy rate hardly changed
throughout the reform period. For the middle income households the
subsidy rate went up by 20 to 40%-points, whereas the increase in
the subsidy for the highest income households was somewhat smaller.
On average, the child care cost share paid by the parents dropped
from 37% in 2005 to 18% in 2007 (de Boer et al. 2014). Next to the
drop in parental fees, from 2007 onwards schools were obliged to act
as an intermediary for parents and child care institutions to arrange
out-of-school care. In 2008 there were virtually no changes in child
care subsidies, but then 2009 witnessed a partial reversal of the policy
change, and parental fees were raised somewhat compared to their
prior levels. To illustrate that the parents were responding to the in-
centives, Table 5.1 shows descriptive statistics of the use of child care
in the period 2006-2009.
Table 5.1: Use of child care 2006-2009
Daycare
2006 2007 2008 2009
Share households 29.8 40.6 49.8 53.8
Average number of children 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
(0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Average number of hours per child 19.5 18.7 19.5 20.0
(9.3) (10.4) (10.3) (10.4)
Out-of-school care
2006 2007 2008 2009
Share households 7.1 11.3 15.2 18.4
Average number of children 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5
(0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
Average number of hours per child 9.6 8.7 9.4 9.9
(6.4) (6.3) (6.8) (7.6)
It is also important to discuss the situation on the supply side of the
formal child care provision, which motivates several modeling choices
adopted in the empirical analysis. As documented by Akgunduz and
Plantenga (2013), the number of child care centers in the Netherlands,
as well as their size, expanded rapidly in response to the reform. This
attenuated problems with rationing (which has been observed in other
European countries, see Kornstad and Thoresen 2007 or Haan and
Wrohlich 2011). Akgunduz and Plantenga (2013) show that despite its
swiftness this expansion did not impede the quality of provided care.
It is also worth noting that the real prices of formal child care remained
stable throughout the reform period. This goes against the general
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equilibrium effects, which suggest that the price should increase since
the subsidy induces more demand for formal child care. The apparent
price stability might have been achieved by putting a cap on the
maximal hourly price of child care which qualifies for the government
subsidies. This cap was initially set to 6.03 Euro, and a large majority
of the child care centers decided to set their hourly price equal to the
threshold (See Figure 5.2). This standardization of prices probably
contributed to the stability of child care quality indicators observed
by Akgunduz and Plantenga (2013). In the following years, the price
cap has been increased somewhat to match the Dutch consumer price
index.
Figure 5.2: Histogram of hourly prices of formal child care in the Nether-
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5.3.2 In-work tax credits reform
The reform of in-work tax credits for working parents started one year
earlier than the child care subsidy reform. Under the original system,
a uniform tax credit of 220 Euro was provided to every working
parent who earned more than 4366 Euro p.a. and whose youngest
child was up to 12 years old. Throughout the years 2005-2009 this
credit was phased out (See Figure 5.3), and it has been gradually
replaced by a more targeted IWTC policy which was introduced in
2004. This new tax credit remained conditional on the child’s age, but
it was no longer awarded to both spouses. It was provided only to
the secondary earner in the household, defined as the spouse with
the lower labor income.15 Effectively, this meant that the tax credits
15 Single parents were treated as secondary earners.
150
became targeted predominantly at women, and the men’s part was
gradually retracted. Figure 5.4 shows the changes in the amount of
total tax credit applicable to the secondary earners in years 2004-2009.
The tax credit started as a flat-rate subsidy amounting to 514 Euro.
This rate gradually increased to 858 Euro in 2008, which was followed
by a more profound change of the policy in 2009. As of 2009, the
amount of tax credit awarded to the secondary earner has been made
dependent on her labor earnings. The credit increases with earned
income up to a maximum amount which is not phased out at higher
incomes. This adjustment was intended to stimulate full-time work
arrangements among mothers with children (who were often observed
to engage in small part-time jobs) In 2009, the maximum credit of
1,765 Euro was reached at 30,803 Euro of gross individual income
(the minimum wage of a fulltime worker during the same period was
16,776 Euro).
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Source: Tax Office.
5.3.3 Modeling of the reforms
The policy changes described above show that the Dutch families have
been subject to many changes in the structure of incentives underlying
employment, child care demand and fertility. This variation facilitates
identification of the model, since it introduces sizable and arguably
exogenous variation in the incentives underlying the decisions consid-
ered in our model. The costs of maternal leisure changed in several
ways, being affected directly through the targeted IWTCs, and in-
directly through the child care subsidies and the loss of father’s tax
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Source: Tax Office.
credits. Also the costs of formal child care and the costs of childbearing
fell considerably due to the reforms.
In the context of the model, it is assumed that the households are
unaware of the prospective policy changes, assuming that the current
policy regime will be maintained indefinitely. During the first reform
year, they will update their expectations, replacing the prior policy
regime by its current variant. This belief-updating process continues
until they reach the final reform year, after which the policies are
assumed to be kept unchanged.
5.4 data
The model is estimated using a unique panel dataset provided by
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The dataset is built up from several
administrative sources, combining information from the Labour Force
Survey, Social Statistical Panel, administrative data from municipalities,
and Formal Child care Database of the Tax Office. The resulting panel
constitutes a comprehensive source of information over a large sample
of Dutch population (1.05 million individuals) who were observed in
the period 2001-2009. The dataset contains detailed information on
socio-economic characteristics of the individuals, household structure,
labor market outcomes, and child care utilization for families with
young children. The child care information is however unvailable
for years prior to 2006, since there has been no standardized child
care subsidy in place (and the tax office therefore did not collect
household-level child care data).
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In terms of sample selection, several rules have been applied to
extract the sample used for the analysis: Due to the limited availability
of child care information, I restrict myself to years for which all choices
are fully observable (2006-2009). The information from prior periods
is however not discarded - it is used to determine correct experience
levels in the equation 5.4. The sample is restricted to complete families
only. This restriction follows from the fact that the decision making
problem of single parents is likely to be very different from the one
of complete families (Blundell and Shephard, 2012). Furthermore, the
data on single parents often lacks important sources of non-labor
income, such as funds from grandparents, or alimonies. Similarly to
Chapter 4, I exclude cases where where at least one of the spouses is
self-employed, student, disabled, or on unemployment benefits. This
is done since I cannot determine either the budget constraint or the
choice set corresponding to these household types. I also exclude the
families where I observe only one of the spouses, and families which
separated within the observed period.
Finally, the dynamic model is unlikely to require the full scope
of the administrative dataset in order to provide stable estimates of
preference parameters. In order to make the estimation computation-
ally feasible, I restrict the sample to a random subset of the data that
remains after applying the selections listed above. The subset which is
used for the presented empirical analysis contains 5000 households.
This sample has been deemed sufficiently large to ensure stability
of both the estimated structural parameters and the counterfactual
simulations.16
A set of descriptive statistics corresponding to the final sample is
provided in Table 5.2. The personal characteristics are presented for
both genders separately, illustrating the relative roles and traits of
the spouses in the analyzed families. These records highlight some
important idiosyncrasies of the Dutch data. Firstly, the female labor
participation rate of 0.78 is relatively high. In the international context
it is slightly below the rates of Nordic countries which are recognized
for active engagement of the female workforce, and slightly above the
rates of English-speaking countries.17 The average hours worked show
that women, if employed, are working predominantly in part-time
arrangements. The Dutch labor market is considered to be highly
flexible in accommodating the needs of part-time workers, which is
documented by the diversity of observed work hours shown in the
Figure 5.5.
16 A robustness check based on a newly drawn sample of 10000 women was performed
and the estimated structural parameters were not significantly different from those
presented in Section 5.5.2.
17 In 2006, the aggregate female participation rate was 0.68 in the Netherlands, 0.72 in
Norway and Denmark, and 0.66 in the US and the UK. The EU-wide average was
0.57 (OECD, 2014)
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Figure 5.5: Histogram of contracted work hours per week, expressed as
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Women's contracted work hours per week, as a fraction of full-time work equivalent
The Figure plots the histogram of contracted work hours expressed
as a fraction of full-time work equivalent (fte) which generally amounts
to 40 work hours per week. The spike representing full-time (1 fte)
workers accounts for 16% of female workforce.18 The fact that women
are working mostly part-time is also reflected in their annual earnings,
which are 40% lower compared to the earnings of their partners.
Table 5.2 further shows how many families are actively using formal
child care. As noted in the Section 5.2, a distinction is made between
daycare (children 0–3 years of age19) and out-of-school care (children
4–11 years of age).20 According to the statistics, the daycare services
are used much more than the out-of-school care. This difference in
attitudes towards child care motivates the inclusion of age-dependent
child care parameters in the utility function (equation 5.1). Indeed,
many modeling assumptions about child care are closely related to
the idiosyncrasies observed in the data.
The Tax Office reports a very precise breakdown of annual hours of
formal child care used, separating different types of formal child care
used by each child in the household. Here, these quantities were re-
18 For the analysis, I use a broader definition of full-time work. Full-time workers
are defined as those women who work 0.8–1.0 fte. Part-time work is equivalent to
0.2–0.799 fte and the remaining women are coded as working 0 hours.
19 Maternity leave in the Netherlands is rather short, 3 months after the birth of the
child, which can be supplemented with 3 months of parental leave for which the
replacement rate is however rather low (OECD, 2007).
20 Children in the Netherlands go to school when they turn 4, and are typically in
secondary school when they are 12 years of age.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics stratified by gender
Men Women
Age 40.4 38.0
Labor participation rate 0.96 0.78
Hourly wage 21.3 16.2
Hours worked per weeka 38.9 22.1
Native 0.84 0.83
Western immigrant 0.08 0.09
Non-western immigrant 0.08 0.08
Lower educatedb 0.21 0.18
Middle educatedb 0.42 0.50
Higher educatedb 0.37 0.32
Children between 4 and 12 years 0.54 0.54
Urban area (share)c 0.17 0.17
Non-urban area (share)c 0.83 0.83
Daycare use (share)d 0.31 0.31
Out-of school care use (share)e 0.13 0.13
Number of observations 913236 913236
aHours worked per week by the employed. bEducation is classified as follows (using the
Dutch abbreviations): i) lower educated = BO and VMBO, ii) middle educated = MBO,
HAVO and VWO, iii) higher education = HBO and WO. cAn urban is defined as large
(small) when it has 150,000 inhabitants or more. dDaycare use among families with at




scaled to represent weekly demands for daycare and out-of school care
for every child in the respective services. Figure 5.6 shows that the vast
majority of families are observed to use less than 4 full days of daycare
per week. Furthermore, the spikes of the distribution illustrate that it
is commonplace to use full-days of daycare (rather than half-days or
other quantities).
Figure 5.6: Histogram of household’s demand for daycare per week, ex-
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Daycare (0-4 yrs) demand per week, in full-day childcare equivalents
Similar picture emerges also for the out-of-school care demand in
Figure 5.7. The reported hours are around 50% lower compared to
daycare, which follows from the fact that school-aged children do not
need more than half-days of child care. Also in this case, the histogram
indicates that families tend to use out-of-school care for less than four
days per week (which is equivalent to two full-days of child care),
and the demand bunches around rounded half-days of care. These
findings lend credibility to the modeling assumption that women are
choosing among four formal child care alternatives, corresponding
to 0–3 days of formal child care per week. The data also support the
hypothesis that the child care choice applies equally to all children
in the household. In 91% of the cases, families use overlapping child
care arrangemets for each of their children aged less than 12.
In the context of the model, the observed demands for formal
child care are translated into corresponding discrete choices by taking
weekly household averages21 and rounding them to the nearest integer.
21 The formal child care demands are averaged over all children in the household
who are less than 12 years old. The child care demand of school-aged children is
multiplied by two, so that the resulting average could be interpreted as a number of
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Figure 5.7: Histogram of household’s demand for out-of-school care, ex-
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This rounded value represents the number of days of child care the
family has decided to use.
The observed patterns of formal child care highlight another im-
portant fact about Dutch families. That is, the households are rarely
fully reliant on the services of child care centers and kindergartens.
The informal child care is an important source of child care provision
in the Netherlands.22 The informal providers are often family rela-
tives, friends, neighbors, or husbands themselves (although men in
the sample are rarely observed to change their work arrangements
after a child is born). In order to get more concrete grasp on the extent
of informal child care use, I employ the equation 5.8 and derive the
informal child care proxy ic from the observed intensities of maternal
work and formal child care provision. Figure 5.8 presents the historam
of proxied informal child care. The spike at zero represents 26.7% of
households which were assigned no informal child care at all. This
means that the observed combination of formal child care provision
and mother’s leisure time covers the entire time required by children
in these households. The histogram of non-zero hours peaks firstly
around 2.5 days and then again at 5 days, accounting for those women
who work full-time and do not use formal child care. For modeling
purposes, the informal child care provision is treated in the following
way: Instead of using the actual quantities of formal child care and
days during which the children were taken care of by formal child care providers,
instead of mother or other carers.
22 According to the 2008 wave of Dutch LISS socio-economic panel, 65% of families with
pre-school children were regularly using some form of informal child care.
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market work hours to derive the informal child care provision, I use
the values corresponding to the discrete choices which represent the
observed quantities. This step is necessary in order to assign standard-
ized values of informal care to all alternatives that can be chosen by
the households (since we observe the actual quantity of informal child
care for one of them only).
Figure 5.8: Histogram of household’s demand for informal child care, ex-
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Informal childcare demand per week, proxied, in full-day childcare equivalents
5.5 results
5.5.1 Reduced form analysis
The policy reforms of 2004-2009 were associated with profound changes
of incentives underlying work, child care and fertility decisions of the
Dutch households. Under the assumption that families do respond to
such incentives, it should be possible to get some insight about the re-
form effects by conducting a reduced form analysis of the households’
choices prior to and within the reform period.
Table 5.3 presents estimated parameters of four household-level
Random-Effects models, each focusing on one of the household’s
decisions which could be influenced by the manifested reforms. The
dependent variables are binary indicators representing either the
incidence of specific events or choices within the given year. These
are: 1) realized marriages among single women 2) childbirths among
the child-less couples, 3) use of formal child care among the parents
with children younger than 12 years, and 4) labor participation of
partnered women aged 18 - 65. The independent variables include a
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set of socio-economic characteristics, education level dummies and
yearly dummies.23
Table 5.3: Dynamics of the main variables of interest over the period 2001-
2009, Random-Effects Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marriage Fertility Child care Use Market Work
(1st time parents)
Husband’s earnings (log) 0.0232*** 0.0153*** 0.00164***
PT work 0.00369*** -0.0460*** 0.221***
FT work 0.0198*** -0.397*** 0.0126***
Age -0.00581*** 0.193*** 0.143*** -0.0425***
Age2 0.00003*** -0.00299*** -0.00215*** 0.000533***
Immigrant -0.00491*** 0.00836*** -0.0172*** -0.0727***
Grandparents in the h’hold 0.00371*** 0.566*** 0.166*** -0.0510***
No. of adults in the h’hold -0.00333*** -0.00871*** -0.00118 -0.00629***
Year: 2002 0.00137*** 0.00239 0.00713***
Year: 2003 0.00218*** 0.00121 0.00770***
Year: 2004 0.00119** 0.00910*** 0.00573***
Year: 2005 -0.000159 0.00578** 0.00760***
Year: 2006 -0.000231 0.0117*** 0.0170***
Year: 2007 -0.00144** 0.0237*** 0.0776*** 0.0308***
Year: 2008 -0.00102 0.0290*** 0.130*** 0.0381***
Year: 2009 -0.000171 0.0366*** 0.158*** 0.0390***
Education dummies yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.267*** -2.749*** -2.591*** 1.787***
Observations 534768 334380 117112 913236
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The covariates included in the regression specifications exhibit plau-
sible signs, and given the number of observations they are rarely
insignificant. The yearly dummies illustrate how did the analyzed
decisions change prior to and within the reform period. The results
in the first column show that the propensity to get married remained
rather stable throughout the whole span of eight years. We observe
a slight peak around 2003 and then a gradual decrease within the
main reform period 2005-2009. The second column corresponds to the
incidence of births among childless couples. This subsample was cho-
sen for the sake of exposition, because the patterns observed among
the first-time parents illustrate the changes in childbearing without
the confounding effects of birth spacing and other issues related to
higher-order births. Within the span of our data, we can see steady
rise of childbirth incidence among childless, which mimics the gradual
introduction of child care subsidies and in-work tax credits. The spike
23 It should be noted that since this analysis is purely reduced-form, the size of the
estimated effects may be confounded by interdependencies of the considered choice
variables, and also by their relation to other factors which are not accounted for here
(e.g., business cycle or local unemployment rates). Nevertheless, it can still give us
valuable insights about general direction of the reform effects.
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in 2004 can be potentially attributed to the preceding peak of marriage
rates in 2003.
Time dummy coefficients in the third column lead to the same
conclusion as the statistics presented in Table 5.2 - raising child care
subsidies spurred the demand for formal child care. Since I observe
the child care demand only for years 2006-2009, the regression is
restricted to this period, with year 2006 being the baseline. The last
column documents that the women also increased their labor supply
attainment throughout the reform period. According to the results,
the female labor participation began to grow in 2005 and by the end
of the reforms it was almost four percentage points higher, compared
to the 2001 levels. Similar picture emerges if we plot the results graph-
ically. Figure 5.9 shows the development of the analyzed variables
throughout the span of the data.
Figure 5.9: Dynamics of the main variables of interest over the period 2002-
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This preliminary analysis, however descriptive, leads to several
important findings. Within the reform period, the households do
exhibit changes in their allocations which are endogenous to the
structural model. The changes are also in line with the economic
theory (rising female labour participation, child care demand and
fertility). Furthermore, the households do not exhibit changes in the
marriage decisions which are accordingly taken as given by the model.
Such outcomes are supportive of the assumptions underlying the
structural model and the results presented in the next section.
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5.5.2 Structural analysis
The model is parameterized according to the equations presented in
the Section 5.2. An overview of estimated parameters is given in Table
5.4. The signs of parameter estimates are consistent with individual
optimization behavior. The linear coefficients are positive, implying
that mothers do derive utility from initial consumption, leisure, child
care, and fertility. The negative signs of quadratic coefficients show
that the utility gains for these variables exhibit decreasing returns in
scale. The parameter for interaction of formal child care and leisure is
negative, reflecting the fact that formal child care is usually used as a
substitute for maternal time with the children.
Table 5.5 presents an assessment of goodness of fit of the model. I
use the estimates of structural parameters to simulate choice paths
and earnings trajectories for the given sample of women, starting from
the observed initial conditions.
The simulated paths and earnings are used to derive a set of sample
moments corresponding to the artificial data. The simulated moments
are compared with their observed counterparts. The results in Table
5.5 show that the simulated and observed moments are matched very
well. To account for the fact that the variables of interest evolve over
time, Figure 5.10 shows their observed and simulated averages for all
years considered. The plots show that the model prediction closely
matches the observed patterns. This means that the model is capable
of replicating the effects induced by the two policy reforms, which can
serve as a validation of the estimated structural parameters.
Another potential concern is the behavior of predicted earnings
over time. It is often found in the literature that the dispersion of
earnings increases as the workers grow older (Haan and Wrohlich,
2011), which is considered as an argument for modeling wages as a
Markov process. I argue that substantial part of this dispersion can be
captured by the specification of the two earnings functions, 5.3 and
5.5. The dependence of predicted wage on recent work experience
allows for higher earnings in the later periods, but it also allows for
larger variance of earnings since some people will accumulate less
experience than others. Figure 5.11 shows gender-specific plots of
wage dispersion against worker’s age. The two trajectories present
in the plots correspond to the dispersion observed in the data and
the dispersion predicted by the model. The gap between observed
and predicted dispersion is attributed to the error terms, since the
observables can predict only a part of the total wage variance. Adding
the estimated variance of the wage errors to the predicted dispersion
would bring the two lines very close together. Both trajectories are
shown to follow similar patterns until the age of 50, when the observed
dispersion starts to diverge. This divergence is most likely driven by
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Table 5.4: Parameterization and Parameter Estimates
Value St.dev.
utility function
CRRA parameter (µ) 0.7146 ( 0.0311)
leisure (linear) 1.771 ( 0.0237)
leisure (quadratic) -0.1634 ( 0.0509)
formal child care (linear) 1.9411 ( 0.1479)
formal child care (quadratic) -0.4128 ( 0.1542)
formal child care ∗ preschool 0.1301 ( 0.0671)
formal child care ∗ leisure -0.0622 ( 0.0092)
informal child care (linear) 1.0832 ( 0.6276)
informal child care (quadratic) -0.0127 ( 0.0043)
number of children 0.5622 ( 0.0092)
number of children (quadratic) -0.1496 ( 0.0762)
birth in the curr. period -0.3346 ( 0.0966)
female wage
wage intercept 2.8585 ( 0.0153)
returns to schooling (linear) -0.2003 ( 0.0116)
returns to schooling (quadratic) 0.1944 ( 0.0057)
returns to experience (linear) -0.0372 ( 0.0097)
returns to experience (quad) 0.0244 ( 0.0018)
male earnings
wage intercept 2.7403 ( 0.0174)
returns to schooling (linear) -0.0303 ( 0.0011)
returns to schooling (quadratic) 0.0029 ( 0.0000)
returns to experience (linear) 0.0495 ( 0.0014)
returns to experience (quad) -0.0007 ( 0.0000)
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parameter estimates - cont’d Value St.dev.
error structure
σleisure 0.9581 ( 0.0113)
σf ertility 2.8378 ( 3.4351)
σchildcare 2.2825 ( 0.9763)
σwage.wi f e 0.2487 ( 0.0068)
σwage.wi f e.meas.error 0.1841 ( 0.0075)
σwage.husband 0.218 ( 0.0011)
number of observations 5000
LL : 6104.2246
Table 5.5: Comparison of observed and predicted moments
observed moments baseline prediction
employment rate 0.835 0.829
fertility rate per period 0.067 0.068
child care use rate 0.326 0.384
women’s earnings - mean 21.767 22.936
- st. dev. 6.311 7.188
men’s earnings - mean 36.92 36.231
- st. dev. 9.724 11.698
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5.5 results
Figure 5.10: Comparison of observed and predicted dynamics within the
main variables of interest over the period 2002-2009, plots of
































Figure 5.11: Comparison of observed and predicted earnings spreads for
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early retirement decisions which could influence the composition of
the older workforce and lead to higher wage dispersion.
5.5.3 Counterfactual simulations
I use the obtained estimates of structural parameters to study the
effectiveness of different types of fiscal stimuli for working mothers. I
focus on two policies in particular, assessing the relative effectiveness
of the implemented reforms of child care subsidies and in-work tax
credits in the Netherlands. I derive the reform’s effects on labour
participation, hours worked and government finances, so that I could
quantify how much money has to be spent under each of the reform
scenarios in order to induce a comparable increase of female labor
supply. The analysis is conducted by performing counterfactual sim-
ulations, letting an artificial sample of women be subject to changes
in the one of the two policy regimes. I quantify women’s response to
the policy change relative to the baseline scenario, and calculate the
corresponding effect on government budget.
The baseline scenario mimics the tax & subsidy system which was
in place in 2009.24 The child care reform scenario takes the baseline
child care subsidy system and lowers the parental contribution rate
by 12 percentage points. The IWTC reform scenario increases the 2009
levels of credit by 318 Euro for all female workers with earnings above
the minimal income threshold. The baseline and reformed policy rates
for both scenarios are presented in the Figure 5.12. The reformed
policy rates are chosen to satisfy ex-ante cost equivalence - under the
assumption that child care use and labor participation remains at the
2009 levels, both reforms would lead to an increase in public spending
of 100 million Euro. This cost equivalence is bound to be broken by
behavioral shifts induced by the policy changes, but it serves as a good
24 I have also performed policy simulations with alternative baseline tax systems, but
the results remained stable.
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reference point for counterfactual simulations of reforms with costs of
similar magnitude.
Figure 5.12: The effects of simulated reforms on the corresponding policy
rates
I maintain that the policy changes are unexpected by the households,
and that they assume the new policy regimes to remain in place
indefinitely.25 Table 5.6 shows the impact of the two policy reforms on
women’s choices. The results documented in the table represent the
‘short-run’ effects, corresponding to the impact in period immediately
following the policy change. They are expressed as percentage point
changes in the variables of interest.
Table 5.6: Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli of 100 million Euro, 1 year from the
introduction
Child care subsidy EITC
Intended costs 100.0 100.0
Realized SR costs 155.6 92.6
Labor supply effect +1.29% +0.72%
Child care demand +13.95% +1.45%
Probability of childbirth +2.15% +1.08%
Cost of raising LS by 0.1% 12.1 mil. 12.8 mil.
Cost of raising PoC by 0.1% 7.2 mil. 8.6 mil.
In all accounts, the reforms are shown to have positive effects on
the choice variables. The female labor supply is enhanced more by
the child care subsidy reform, but this advantage is counterbalanced
25 The households’ expectations that the reforms remain in place indefinitely can be
replaced by alternative forms of expectations, e.g., that the reforms are only temporary
and that the family tax policy will revert to its initial setup after several periods. In
such a setting, the reforms are likely to induce lesser labor supply responses, because
the households know that mother’s investment into human capital will bring less
income in the future (compared to the persistent reform setting).
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by steep increase of demand for formal child care. The additional
child care demand drives up the realized costs of child care reform,
because new child care users were not accounted for in the initial
cost projection. The spike of child care costs is not observed under
the IWTC reform scenario, where child care demand stays relatively
low. This result suggests that the forgone maternal time spent with
children is substituted to a large extent by informal child care sources.
Since the formal child care exhibits lesser response to the changes in
IWTC, the realized costs of the reform stay near the initial target. In
fact, the costs prove to be lower than expected due to the additional
revenue from income tax receipts filed by the women who decided to
enter the post-reform labor market.
Last row of Table 5.6 shows another interesting feature of the results.
That is, if I quantify the costs of raising labour supply by a fixed
proportion (here, ten basis points), the two reforms will prove to
require almost exactly the same level of spending. It can be therefore
claimed that, in the short-run, the two implemented reforms prove
similarly cost-effective.
This equivalence is however bound to be broken in the long-run,
since the reforms proved to have dissimilar effects on the other vari-
ables of interest. Accordingly, we will observe gradual change of the
behavioral effects, which is driven by the dynamic features of the
structural model.
The long-run effects of the reform are likely to be different from the
short-run effects, because the decisions taken five or ten years from
the implementation of the reform will reflect not only the new policy
regime, but also the decisions which were influenced by the reform
and preceded the period in question. One of the most important
considerations in this respect is that an immediate increase in the
woman’s labor supply is going to translate into additional experience
in the later stages of her life. Increased experience will make the
woman’s labor participation more appealing in years to come because
the experience will raise her potential labor earnings. Therefore, we
can expect the labor supply effects to increase further in the years
after the implementation due to the synergic effect of the new policy
regime and the accumulation of women’s human capital. This effect
is documented in Table 5.7, which shows the simulated behavioral
responses quantified 10 years after the implementation of the reforms.
We see that the labor supply effects are higher than the ones which
are observed immediately. Furthermore, we see that the other effects
get more pronounced as well. The share of childless families in the
population falls dramatically, and people are predicted to use more
formal child care, which is driven by increased labor supply (and
higher disposable incomes).
The increasing fertility proves to have important effects on the
effectiveness of child care reform. Since the families are facing higher
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Table 5.7: Effectiveness of fiscal stimuli of 100 million Euro, 10 years from
the introduction
Child care subsidy EITC
Labor supply +2.43% +1.56%
Child care demand +20.15% +3.11%
Share of families with children +11.4% +6.39%
Yearly costs 217.4 82.6
Cost of raising LS by 0.1% 9.0 mil. 5.3 mil.
Cost of raising PoC by 0.1% 10.1 mil. 7.6 mil.
probability of having a baby in each year, the pool of child care eligible
children will steadily expand as the cohorts of post-reform babies
grow older (the children remain eligible for child care subsidies until
the age of twelve). As a result, stimulated fertility will considerably
increase long-run costs of the reform. This outcome is in sharp contrast
with the long-run results corresponding to the IWTC reform. After
10 years, the maintenance costs of the reform are predicted to decline
further, following the additional increase of tax revenue coming from
larger female workforce.
The reform comparison above exposes hidden costs of the child care
subsidy reform, which are not to be realized in the initial post-reform
years. These costs correspond to reform-induced fertility increase, an
impact which is most likely unintended by the policy makers. For that
reason, it may well escape their awareness, and therefore also their
cost projections. As I have shown, such costs are non-trivial. They
are capable of erasing significant portion of tax revenues, and they
proved to reverse the policy recommendations based on the short-run
effects of the policies. This finding bolsters the presumption that a
sound policy analysis should look beyond the traditional metric of
key variable of interest, but also scrutinize the second-order effects
which are likely to be induced by the policy change, and which have
the potential to influence government’s budget.
5.6 conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic structural model of decision making
of married and cohabiting women in the Netherlands. The unique
feature of the model is that it allows the households to evaluate three
interdependent decisions: the woman’s decision to work, the fertility
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decision and (conditional on having children) the decision to use
formal child care. Each of the decisions considered has been found
to be responsive to the changes in financial incentives and they were
shown to play an important role in evaluating cost-effectiveness of
fiscal stimuli for working mothers.
The model is estimated using a rich administrative panel cover-
ing years 2001-2009, which provides high-quality information about
individual labour market histories and child care expenditures. Identi-
fication is aided by exploiting two large-scale reforms of Dutch family
policy which raised the government spending on In-Work Tax Credits
and Child care subsidies. Resulting variation in the tax and subsidy
rates is explicitly incorporated in the budget constraint.
The model fits the data well, and is capable of replicating the ob-
served dynamics in the variables of interest. The optimized structural
parameters are used for comparative analysis of the child care subsidy
reform and the IWTC reform. The results show that the two policy
reforms induce similarly strong changes in terms of maternal labor
supply, as well as short-run government revenue. The fertility is stimu-
lated more by the child care subsidy reform. However, the equivalence
of budgetary costs is broken in the long run. Reform-induced increase
in fertility rates raises the costs of the child care reform above its
short-run projection, as more children become eligible for subsidized
child care in the years after the implementation. This finding should
be of particular interest for policy makers, since the costs of reform
related to the fertility are not to be fully realized sooner than several
years after the implementation.
The question which remains to be answered is which of the policies
fares better in terms of reaching the two policy goals - to promote
female labor participation, and to increase fertility rates. I have shown
that the IWTC reform is more cost-efficient in terms of labor supply
stimulation, however it falls short of the fertility effect of child care
subsidy reform. The two policies should be therefore evaluated with
these limitations in mind, and the policy makers should decide for one
or another, depending on their priorities - be it budgetary temperance,
or fertility of the populace.
A number of improvements and extensions can be considered.
Firstly, the error structure can be made more complex, either by al-
lowing for contemporaneous dependence across choice-specific error
terms, or by modeling temporal dependence of individual errors. Sec-
ondly, the choice variables in the utility function could be further
interacted with observable characteristics, allowing for more com-
prehensive treatment of observable heterogeneity. The treatment of
unobservable heterogeneity could be made more flexible by allowing
for latent types, similar to the ones presented in Chapters 4 & 3. The
set of decisions faced by the household could be also extended, allow-
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